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Summary in Norwegian 
 
 
 
I over 60 år har palestinske flyktningar budd i Libanon, og dei utgjer i dag omlag 10 
prosent av folketalet i landet. Dei har ikkje vore mogeleg for dei å vende heim. Av ulike 
grunnar som vil bli diskutert i denne oppgåva, har dei heller ikkje fått sivile rettar i 
vertslandet Libanon. Dette har ført til at det har vore svært vanskeleg for flyktningane å 
verta sjølvhjelpne, noko som har betydd at i heile perioden har dei vore avhengige av 
internasjonal bistand. Denne oppgåva gir ei historisk analyse av denne bistanden med 
fokus på den rolla som frivillige organisasjonar har spelt. Det palestinske flyktninge- 
samfunnet i Libanon representerer eit utypisk eksempel når det gjeld bistand fordi det har 
vore avhengig av bistand så lenge og situasjonen ser ikkje ut til å endre seg med det 
fyrste. Det er difor eit noko spesielt samfunn dei frivillige organisasjonane og andre 
bistandsaktørar arbeider i.  
 
Største delen av bistanden har blitt kanalisert gjennom FN og det organet dei oppretta i 
1949 for å ha ansvar for humanitær hjelp til dei palestinske flyktningane, nemleg United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
Det er samstundes over 150 frivillige organisasjonar, såkalla NGOar, som har vore 
involvert i ulikt arbeid i det palestinske flyktningesamfunnet i denne perioden. Oppgåva 
vil sjå på utviklinga av NGO sektoren og analysere dei sterke og svake sidene til dei 
frivillige organisasjonane i dette samfunnet. Oppgåva tar nærare for seg som ein case 
study, ein internasjonal organisasjon som har vore aktiv i det palestinske 
flyktningesamfunnet i Libanon i nær 28 år, nemleg Norsk Folkehjelp.  
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Map 
 
 
 
Official UNRWA map of Palestinian Refugee camps in Lebanon (2009)1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 UNRWA Online (a). The front cover picture of this thesis shows Ein el-Hilweh camp in the forefront, the 
largest refugee camp in Lebanon with a population of more than 50,000; and the city of Sidon behind it. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
For more than 60 years Palestinian refugees have lived in Lebanon. They have not been 
able to return to their homes. As of 2009, they number between 300,000 and 400,000 
people.2 For several reasons, which will be outlined in this thesis, they have not been 
granted any civil or social rights from the host country, Lebanon, and as a result face 
difficulties in becoming self-supporting. The overall political situation for the 
Palestinians has resulted in the Palestinian actors themselves being incapable of or 
unwilling to provide assistance for the refugees for most of the 60 years. As a result, 
Palestinian refugees have depended on international humanitarian assistance for all this 
time. This thesis gives a historical analysis of the development of this assistance and what 
it has meant for the current situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon. 
 
Most of the assistance has been channelled through the United Nations (UN) and the 
agency they established in 1949 to care for the humanitarian needs of the refugees, 
namely the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA). This agency has, however, operated under certain restrictions, both 
financial and operational, deciding what kind of assistance they provide to whom. As a 
result of these limitations, part of the assistance has been channelled through non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and increasingly so the last three decades.3 The 
NGOs do provide services for the Palestinian refugees to a certain extent, which are 
provided by the public sector to Lebanese nationals. This thesis will go beyond 
                                                 
2 There is no accurate number of the Palestinian refugees present in Lebanon available. The most cited 
number is that of the UN agency the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees 
in the Near East (UNRWA). They state the number of refugees to be 422,188 as of 31 December, 2008. 
(UNRWA Online (b).) This number is not, however, accurate. Firstly, it excludes those who are not 
included in UNRWA’s definition of Palestine refugees, as will be explained below. Secondly, the 
number includes refugees that have emigrated from Lebanon, but maintained their registration at 
UNRWA’s Lebanon Office. This latter is believed to be quite a sustainable number, thus making the 
actual number lower than the UNRWA statistics.  
3 This thesis will use the term non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in its broadest sense: “To [sic] over 
the full range of formal and informal organisations and groups engaged in development, human rights 
and social justice and social welfare work in both rich and poor countries.” (Opoku-Mensah [et al] 2007, 
11.) 
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statements such as, “NGOs are important, and play a vital role in the refugee 
community.” The thesis looks into the development of the NGO sector in the Palestinian 
community, and analyses its strengths and weaknesses. It will place NGOs in relation to 
the other actors who are involved with humanitarian assistance, and discuss their position 
in the Palestinian community. The thesis provides as a case study the development of one 
international NGO (INGO) which has been working in the Palestinian community since 
1982, namely the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and discuss what role they have in this 
community. 
On NGOs and doing research on NGOs 
 
The term NGO was first coined in the 1945 UN Charter.4 NGOs constitute a wide range 
of organisations; some are huge international organisations with thousands of paid staff, 
while others are limited to one place and one project. They consist of relief organisations 
that move with every emergency situation, and development NGOs who stay in one place 
for years. They may function as service providers as well as advocacy organisations 
working for human rights and social justice or environmental issues. They are 
represented at international conferences and in negotiations with governments and they 
receive an increasingly greater portion of development funding and are intensifying 
cooperation with the World Bank, UN and other international agencies.  
 
The NGO label is a claim bearing label. In its most common use, it claims that the 
organisation is doing good for the development of others. Precisely because it is “doing 
good”, the organisation can make a bid to access funding and public representation.5 A 
form of “NGO speak” has developed which revolves around the ideas that NGOs have 
comparative advantage and are flexible, empowering, grassroot representatives of 
democracy and pluralism and a response to state and market failures.6  
 
                                                 
4 However, some organisations we today call NGOs were established in the mid-1800s such as the Red 
Cross in 1862. (UD Evaluation report 4.98, 18.) 
5 Opoku-Mensah [et al] 2007, 306. 
6 Opoku-Mensah [et al] 2007, 43, argues it can be called “system speak”, i.e. “A speak shared by all actors 
in the system, be they donors, researchers, consultants or NGO activists.”  
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As a result of the altruistic motives attributed to NGOs, they are often described in 
normative terms, instead of being analysed in terms of what they actually achieve. The 
literature tends to be divided into two oppositional views, either confirming that NGOs 
are good, progressive, autonomous and are engaged in the pursuit of development, rights 
or democratisation objectives, or on the other hand claiming that they are opportunistic, 
self-serving actors, the unwitting tools of donors and passive victims of global processes.7 
Critics of NGOs argue that rather than alleviating poverty and promoting equity, NGOs 
perform a maintenance function. They reduce the pressure for more radical reforms, 
partly by harnessing the energy of radical middle-class activists.8 Both objectives speak 
some truth and the heterogeneity of the NGO scene makes it impossible to draw 
unanimous conclusions regarding them all. This is also the case with the NGOs that are 
working in the Palestinian community in Lebanon. As appendix I of this thesis illustrates, 
there are a wide range of NGOs involved in this community and it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to analyse every single one of them. The analysis is therefore of the NGO 
sector in general and can not be said to be absolute conclusions that are valid for all. As 
will be discussed later in this thesis, the NGO sector in Lebanon, as with the NGO scene 
in every country, includes both some of the valuable and less valuable aspects of the 
NGO sector. 
Research question and case study 
 
From the outline above it seems clear that the term NGO is very wide and that NGOs can 
represent both positive and negative influences in a community. In research on 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the importance of NGOs in the refugee community is 
often mentioned. NGOs are seen as “filling the gap” due to the difficult financial and 
political position of both UNRWA and Palestinian actors. However, very few studies take 
a closer look into the NGOs’ work and place them into the “broader picture”.9 While the 
                                                 
7 Opoku-Mensah [et al] 2007, 10-13. 
8 Tvedt 1998, 6.  
9 Statements like these are examples of the importance of NGOs manifested in the research: “This 
assistance is channeled through a number of non-governmental organizations that are crucial to the 
welfare of the refugees… The many NGOS working among the refugees today cater for a major share 
of available infrastructure.” (Fafo 2003 (409), 16, 255.) “Partnerships with international agencies and 
with NGOs were invaluable in order for UNRWA to carry out its tasks.” (UNRWA press release, 
Geneva 2004.) (my emphasis added) 
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literature describes the need for NGOs in the Palestinian community, no one has, to my 
knowledge, looked at the consequences of NGOs having this influential role. It is striking 
to me that NGOs are seen as fundamental in the community, while no one asks questions 
about what NGOs really represent and if they are capable of taking on the amount of 
responsibility they are assigned.  
 
The upward transmission of needs through advocacy and lobbying is gradually becoming 
a more important legitimisation of NGOs. Spokesmen of this trend argue that any effect 
that NGOs can have on the broader political causes of suffering is more important than 
the impact of concrete, small-scale practical interventions.10 It continues however, to be a 
discussion in the NGO community whether NGOs should focus more on advocacy than 
on service provision or vice-versa, i.e. what kind of role NGOs should take on in the 
society. I will argue that in the Palestinian refugee community in particular, advocacy 
ought to be an important aspect of NGOs work. As will be discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 
4, the socio-economic difficulties that this community endures will not improve unless 
there are profound changes in the national and international laws and mechanisms 
concerning the rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. NGOs have, through their 
ability to advocate and lobby towards governments both abroad and in Lebanon, an 
opportunity to influence this, and act as agents of change. This thesis will study whether 
the NGOs involved in the Palestinian community are capable of doing this.  
 
On the basis of this, my research question will be:  
What is the role of international and local NGOs in the Palestinian community in 
Lebanon?  
 
My first hypothesis is that, due to the fact that the Palestinian refugee community lacks a 
governmental structure and is governed by a complex web of different actors, there is 
more need and room for NGOs in this community than there would be with a distinct 
governing body in place, and an opportunity exists to take on an influential role and 
                                                 
10 Tvedt 1998, 83, 91-92. 
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become agents of change. By this I mean that NGOs can act as a driving force in the 
work to improve the refugees’ socio-economic situation. 
 
My second hypothesis is that, due to limitations within the NGO sector per se, the NGOs 
are not able to take on such an influential role. 
 
NPA was originally chosen as a case study because it is a large INGO which has been 
present in the Palestinian community for a long time. It was also chosen for the simple 
reason that as a Norwegian organisation it was easily accessible for me as a Norwegian 
student. NPA therefore represents what is called a convenience sample. The sample is 
strategic, in that it represents some qualities that are relevant for the research question, 
and the process type which is used to choose the sample is based on availability to the 
researcher.11 However, during the work on this thesis it has turned out that NPA 
represents rather a particular sample.12 As will be evident in chapter 8 of the thesis, NPA 
is an INGO which has “gone local”. As such it has provided an excellent case study as an 
NGO with both international and local characteristics.  
Historical development and time period 
 
Historically, I argue that the development of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon can be divided into three phases. The initial phase started with 
emergency aid provided by UN through contracts with NGOs such as the League of Red 
Cross, and in coordination with the Lebanese government. With the establishment of 
UNRWA in 1949, this agency became the responsible actor for social services to the 
refugees.13 The second phase is characterised by the increased strength of the Palestinian 
resistance movement, and an establishment of Palestinian run social services, further 
explained in chapters 2 and 3. The third phase starts with the evacuation of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1982 from Lebanon to Tunisia and is 
further influenced by the decrease in UNRWA funding in the 1990s, with the result that 
NGOs, international and local, have to take on a larger role as service providers. NPA 
                                                 
11 Thagaard 2003, 54. 
12 Thagaard 2004, 56. 
13 This will be further explored in chapter 3. 
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arrived in Lebanon in 1982 and is today one of the major INGOs working in the 
Palestinian community. This third phase will be the main focus of this thesis and further 
explored in chapters 6, 7 and 8. The time period which is covered in this thesis is then 
from the arrival of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon in 1948 until 2009. The main focus 
will, however, be from 1982 when PLO was evacuated and NPA arrived. Regarding the 
events taking place in Lebanon, the thesis ends in April 2009; however, for the work of 
NPA my thesis will end in 2008, due to my field work and lack of available sources after 
that period.  
 
It should be noted that humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees has always had a 
political dimension. This has not always been acknowledged and one has at times tried to 
treat the Palestinian refugees as any other marginalised group, or as one Palestinian said, 
“They treat us like we were hit by a natural disaster.”14 If one looks closer at the 
implantation of assistance to the refugees, however, it becomes obvious that politics is 
part of the picture, and has played a role in the provision of assistance which is provided 
by NGOs, both local and international. 
Some remarks about the term “Palestinian refugees” 
 
There has never been an established, clear definition of what a Palestinian refugee is. A 
definition that is used today is “Those who define themselves to be one.” In a legal 
context, however, there is no one generally accepted definition of who can be considered 
a Palestinian refugee.15 The reason for this is briefly the political atmosphere surrounding 
the Palestinian refugees and for example the reference to the right of return and 
compensation. The number of refugees has been disputed ever since 1948, with the most 
cited numbers being those of UNRWA, although these numbers are not accurate for 
several reasons. Importantly, UNRWA use the term “Palestine refugees”.16 Under 
UNRWA's operational definition, they are persons whose normal place of residence was 
Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of 
                                                 
14 Yossef Salah, Bergen, 05.03.09. 
15 E-mail correspondence with Kjersti Gravelsæter Berg 05.05.09. 
16 Throughout the thesis I will emphasise by using italics when I am explaining something that is valid for 
Palestine refugees, but can not necessarily be transferred to account for all Palestinian refugees. 
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livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.17 Their definition of a Palestine 
refugee was implemented for “working purposes” and therefore included, for example, 
all refugees from 1948, as well as Jews and others who do not consider themselves 
“Palestinian”. On the other hand, the UNRWA definition up to 1993 excluded those 
Palestinians who were not “in need” and those living outside of UNRWA’s area of 
operation. Those who did not lose both their land and their livelihood continue to be 
excluded from the definition.18 In this thesis I use the term Palestinian refugees, since I 
want to include all those in Lebanon who consider themselves as such.  
State of the research 
 
Since the peace negotiations started in the early 1990s, a plethora of European and North 
American institutions have undertaken Palestinian refugee studies, conferences and 
collations in order to serve negotiators’ needs for “facts” and “solutions”. The Norwegian 
Institute of the Applied Social Sciences (Fafo), McGill University, and the Refugee 
Studies Programme, University of Oxford, are some examples. As such there have been 
several studies conducted on the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, as 
well as in other areas.19 There has also been some attention to the legal situation of the 
refugees in Lebanon and on Lebanon as a host country.20  
 
Regarding research on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the humanitarian assistance 
provided to them, two articles in particular stand out. Firstly, an article written by Marie-
Louise Weighill entitled “Palestinians in Lebanon: The Politics of Assistance” which was 
part of the Refugee Studies Programme at the University of Oxford.21 The article was 
published in 1997 and explores the extent to which political considerations have affected 
and continue to affect both the planning and delivery of assistance to Palestinians. The 
article outlines the history of the assistance as provided through UN, Palestinian actors 
and the Lebanese government. Weighill argues that, “The autonomy and prerogatives of 
                                                 
17 UNRWA Online (c).  
18 For example, excluding people on the Golan heights who had their home on the Syrian side of the border, 
but used land on the other side for their herds i.e. livelihood.  
19 Fafo 2003, 2005. 
20 El-Natour 2007, Haddad 2003, Knudsen 2009, Reme 2007, Takkenberg 1998. 
21 Weighill 1997.  
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the refugees as parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict are obscured by their status as objects 
of relief. The marginalization of the refugees is, at least in part, a consequence of their 
place within the framework of humanitarian assistance.”22  
 
The article does not go into detail about the role of NGOs involved with the refugees. 
This is, however, done in an article by Jaber Suleiman, an independent Palestinian 
scholar from Lebanon. In the article “Palestinians in Lebanon and the Role of Non-
governmental Organizations” from 1997, he analyses the social, political and legal 
context and provides insight into the roles and activities of the local NGOs.23 This article 
has provided an important background for the work on this thesis. 
 
In 2001 the Ajial centre, a Palestinian NGO also called the Statistics and Documentation 
Office, prepared a study about NGOs working in the Palestinian community.24 It includes 
46 Palestinian and 20 International NGOs, and is the most comprehensive study on 
Palestinian NGOs that I have found. It is based on a survey of the NGOs engaged in 
various types of service provision for the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon and 
includes interviews with senior members of the relevant NGOs.  
 
Secondly, another focus of this thesis is NGOs and research concerning NGOs in general 
with particular focus on Norway. I have concentrated on the works by the social scientist 
Terje Tvedt, mainly due to his involvement with some of the first evaluations which were 
conducted of NGOs in Norway. There have also been some studies conducted concerning 
NGOs in the Occupied Palestine Territories (oPt).25 The main study is by sociologist Sari 
Hanafi with Linda Tabar, entitled “The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite: 
Donors, International Organizations and Local NGOs”.26 I have used these studies as 
references, because some of the aspects of the NGO scene in oPt are similar to those in 
the Palestinian community in Lebanon.  
 
                                                 
22 Weighill 1997, 311. 
23 Suleiman 1997.  
24 Ajial 2001. 
25 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, Hammami 2001, Brynen 2000. 
26 Hanafi and Tabar 2005. 
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Thirdly, this thesis singles out one NGO, the NPA, as a case study. There is not much 
literature written about NPA per se, with the exception of a book written for their 50th 
anniversary in 1989.27 The information on NPA is therefore largely based on interviews 
and reports conducted by NPA and others.  
 
Finally, I have included in appendix I a synopsis of the NGOs which are involved with 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. It includes 97 Palestinian NGOs and 62 international 
NGOs, in all 159 NGOs that have at some point been involved with the Palestinian 
community in Lebanon.28 To my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive synopsis of 
NGOs in this community that has been compiled. The sources and methods used to 
compile the synopsis are discussed in appendix I. 
Presentation and discussion of my sources 
Oral sources 
 
I have interviewed several people who are working with both local and international 
NGOs in Lebanon. Some of them I have interviewed in person: members of local 
NGOs;29 three people who work with INGOs;30 and two scholars.31 It was my intention to 
also interview the beneficiaries of NGOs services, but I was not able to arrange any 
meetings during my field work. I have also had e-mail correspondence and telephone 
interviews with people who work for INGOs. However, I have decided to make these 
                                                 
27 Lyshagen 1989. 
28 The term “NGO” as used by my sources in the synopsis is very wide, and includes for example one 
Palestinian Popular Committee, a research institution and a range of single project NGOs as well as 
major international NGOs.  
29 Most of them are partner organisations to NPA: Kassem Aynaa, Director of Palestinian NGO Beit Atfal 
Al- Sumod; Mariam Suleiman, Administrator of the Beit Atfal Al- Sumod center in Rashidieh; Amne 
Jibril, Head of the General Union for Palestinian Women (GUPW); Ahmad Sharour, engineer working 
for Popular Aid and Relief and Development (PARD); Anni Kanafani, President of the Ghassan 
Kanafani Foundation; Soheil El-Natour, Palestinian lawyer in Mar Elias, member of Human 
Development Center, member of DFPL, author of the book “The Legal Status of the Palestine refugees in 
Lebanon and the Demands of Adjustment” and other articles. (Notably under the name Soheil El-Natour 
as well as Soheil Al-Natour) 
30 Haifa Jammal, Human Rights Coordinator and Gender Adviser, NPA Lebanon; Leila Zakharia, Country 
Manager of Welfare Association (WA), Lebanon Branch; and David Bergan, Middle East and Latin 
America Advisor at NPA Oslo, in person and by telephone. 
31 Jaber Suleiman, Palestinian researcher, author of the article “Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon”. Sari Hanafi, 
Professor at the Issam Fares Institute at American University in Beirut, member of the faculty advisor 
committee of the program “Policy and Governance of Palestinian Refugee Camps”. 
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people anonymous for reasons described below. My in-person interviews were conducted 
between 11 January, 2008, and 22 January, 2008, with the exception of some of my 
anonymous sources and Sari Hanafi, whom I met on the 19 February, 2009. 
 
An interview situation is always affected by both the interviewer and interviewee. Basic 
things can influence the course of the interview, like the fact that I am a western female 
student. In my role as interviewer I am the one to decide the topic and more or less direct 
the conversation in the direction I am interested in. However, my interviews were not 
wholly structured and I mostly let the interviewees lead the way as long as they were, to 
some extent, within the topic of the conversation. Some of my interviews were conducted 
via e-mail, and as such are written sources. However, they were “oral” in form and I will 
treat them as oral sources. Most of the people I interviewed were quite used to being 
approached by researchers to talk about their work. Most of them talked on behalf of their 
organisation and not as private individuals, and many of them agreed to be recorded on 
tape. All of these factors contribute to make the interview setting formal, and people do 
not necessarily speak as frankly as they would in an everyday conversation. 
Irrespectively of this, many of my interviewees were quite open.  
 
The reason for making some of them anonymous is that I faced the common challenge 
researchers often meet when researching NGOs. There is a kind of internal censorship in 
the NGO community which means that many are wary of being critical towards other 
NGOs, especially not to openly express criticism towards their own organisation.32 An 
intensifying factor is also that the NGO scene working in the Palestinian community in 
Lebanon is not that large, and people cooperate closely or meet at different events. The 
fact that I chose to make all of these interviews anonymous does not mean that they all 
had critical comments, but that those who did had a wish to stay anonymous. In order not 
to reveal them I chose to make them all anonymous. The exceptions are Dagfinn Bjørklid 
from the Norwegian Aid Committee (NORWAC) and Gry Ballestad from the Norwegian 
                                                 
32 Tvedt 1998, 221.  
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Refugee Council (NRC) which represents the two other major Norwegian NGOs which 
are present in the Palestinian community.33 
Written sources and field visits 
 
In 2001, an evaluation of NPA’s Lebanon program was conducted.34 The report was 
ordered by NPA International and conducted by two consultants: one Palestinian political 
scientist and one Norwegian anthropologist. The report includes field work in Lebanon 
and an extensive number of interviews with NPA staff, partner NGOs and others. In 2007 
the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), made an evaluation of 
NPA’s work as a part of their ongoing evaluation of all Norwegian NGOs working with 
aid.35 The report covered only NPA’s development work financed by Norad and not 
humanitarian aid supported with grants from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and other international donors. Therefore it did not cover the Lebanon program, 
which for reasons explained in chapter 8 is not financed by Norad. However, the report 
provides information about NPA in general and has therefore been of use for this thesis. 
 
I have spent some time at the NPA archive in Oslo and was also sent some of the annual 
reports of NPA Lebanon by e-mail. As the 2001 evaluation report presents a relatively 
detailed account of NPA’s Lebanon program up to 2001, I have concentrated on annual 
reports from NPA thereafter. I have had a closer look at the reports from the period 2001-
2006. The final reports for 2007 and 2008 are not yet finished. I have also benefited from 
information material which is produced by NPA and other NGOs to provide information 
to the donors, the public and the beneficiaries. I have also visited NPA’s rehabilitation 
centre in Mar Elias, Beirut, and was given a tour of the centre by one of the staff there. It 
was during the summer holiday so there was not much activity, but I still got a good 
impression of the centre.  
 
                                                 
33 E-mail correspondence with NORWAC 13.11.08 and NRC 06.11.08. 
34 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001. 
35 Norad 2007. Norad has established a database with several NGOs’ own evaluations available at Norad 
Online (a).  
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NGOs’ annual reports represent a distinct genre. They are a description of what the NGO 
has achieved the previous year, and to some extent what they did not achieve. Some 
reports are written for internal use, while others are written as part of an application for 
funding. This inevitably shapes what kind of information is presented. The reports often 
use the “NGO speak” and as a result, reports from NGOs working in quite different 
countries and environments are strikingly similar.36 Norwegian NGOs have recently been 
criticised for focusing too much on the process of their work and not enough on the 
results in their reports.37 Whilst working with the reports and the information material, I 
have to be aware of the fact that they inevitably present a glossy picture of the 
organisation.    
 
I have used articles from The Daily Star, the major English newspaper in Lebanon, to 
keep up to date on the ongoing developments related to the Palestinian refugee 
community in Lebanon. The articles are available to view online for one week for free, 
and subsequently with a charge. 
 
Finally, I have greatly benefited from the fact that in 2005, I lived for six months in 
Rashidieh, the southernmost refugee camp in Lebanon, where I met many Palestinians, 
listened to their stories and was a part of everyday life in the camp. Through this I have 
had the opportunity to closely observe life in a refugee camp and both the private and 
public workings of that society. I have not recorded any interviews with the people there, 
but the general observations from Rashidieh have formed my perceptions of the situation. 
It should be noted that NPA do not have any projects (other than through partners) in 
Rashidieh.    
 
There exists quite an overwhelming amount of reports, evaluations and information 
material produced by the NGOs that are active in the Palestinian community. It is beyond 
                                                 
36 Cf. NPA Online (a). 
37 Terje Vigtel, director of Norad’s department for civil society said in February 2008 that the requirements 
for report submission from the organisations will become stricter with consideration to results: “The 
organisations are surprisingly bad at stating the reason why they shall receive money. I have lately tried 
to read up on and have revised a number of reports from Norwegian aid organisations. There are many 
descriptions of what one plans to do and of different activities. However, there is usually very little about 
what one actually achieves.” (Bistandsaktuelt 02/08) cited at NPA Online (a)) (my translation.) 
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the scope of this thesis to dig deep into all of them, and this is limited to my case study of 
NPA. Therefore, parts of the thesis are based on secondary sources. This thesis is the 
result of my effort to combine self-generated material with these sources. 
Language 
 
Many of the names of both people and places are written in several different ways when 
translated from Arabic to English. For the names of the Palestinian refugee camps I use 
the names as they are written by UNRWA as found in the map on page 8. I do not read 
Arabic and Arabic sources could, therefore, only be consulted in translation. However, 
the fact that much of the NGOs information material and reports are written both in 
English and Arabic, and that most of the NGO workers speak English well, has not made 
such an impact on my ability to gather and understand my sources. Moreover, many of 
the secondary sources I use are written by scholars who are themselves Arabic speakers 
and I trust that they have access to and can offer insight into the Arabic material that 
exists.      
Outline of the thesis 
 
In order to understand the role of NGOs in the Palestinian community, it is first necessary 
to provide some background information about the particular history and status of this 
community. It is also necessary to provide information about the other actors that are 
involved with the refugees. Chapter 2 presents the historical background and political 
events taking place concerning the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Chapter 3 provides 
an outline of the international and political institutions which are involved with the 
welfare of the refugees, such as UNRWA and PLO. Chapter 4 looks into the development 
of the socio-economic standing for the refugees since their arrival in 1948. Chapter 5 
outlines some features of the NGO sector worldwide and of Norwegian aid channelled 
through NGOs in particular. Chapter 6 discusses the role of the Palestinian NGOs which 
work in the refugee community. Chapter 7 provides insight into the work of international 
NGOs in the Palestinian community. Chapter 8 analyses the development of NPA’s work 
in Lebanon and discusses the role of this NGO in the refugee community.  
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Chapter 2 
Historical background - Palestinian Refugees in 
Lebanon  
Becoming refugees and starting over (1948-1969) 
 
After the First World War, Palestine became a British mandate. However, there were 
tensions between the local population and the immigrating population of Jews. The 
British government was not able to solve the conflict that developed and in 1947 passed 
the responsibility over to the recently established UN. The General Assembly then voted 
on the 29 October, 1947, for the partition of Mandatory Palestine into two states, one 
Jewish and one Arab. The British declared that they would be leaving the area on the 15 
May, 1948, and the day before, the leaders of the Jewish organisations proclaimed the 
Israeli Declaration of Independence. As a consequence of the resulting tension and the 
Israeli-Arab war, some 600,000-760,000 Palestinian Arabs fled to the neighbouring 
countries.38 It is today an indisputable fact that the Palestinian population who became 
refugees did not flee voluntarily. However, the Israeli government has disputed this and 
has therefore not been involved with the international assistance to the refugees. Arab 
governments on the other hand insist that Israel has the responsibility.39 
 
Approximately 100,000 refugees sought refuge across the border in Lebanon. Due to the 
urgency of their situation, Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator for Palestine, set up 
a sixty-day UN Disaster Relief Project (UNDRP) in July 1948 to coordinate aid to the 
refugees from local governments and NGOs.40 It was succeeded by the United Nations 
Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) which was established in November 1948 to 
implement a relief program for the Palestinian refugees as a first response to the 
                                                 
38 Takkenberg 1991, 417. He notes that “More accurate figures do not exist, and these numbers have long 
been the subject of dispute between Israel and the Arab states.”  
39 Such as this statement from the Lebanese government: “Israel bears the fundamental responsibility for 
the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, having denied the refugees their rights for more than half 
a century.” (The Lebanese Government, 2007.) 
40 Schiff 1995, 14. Cf. also Takkenberg 1998, 21-32 for a detailed account of the early interventions of the 
UN. 
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emergency situation.41 They contracted with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and the American Friends Service Committee 
to carry out relief activities.42 However, as it became evident that the refugee situation 
was not a temporary one, the scope of the UN mission was expanded. They established 
UNRWA, which will be looked at in more detail in chapter 3. Some better-off 
Palestinians settled in the Lebanese cities and became well integrated into their new 
environment. Some of the Christian Palestinians even acquired Lebanese citizenship in 
the early 1950s.43 However, most of the refugees had been landowning or sharecropping 
peasants back home and with the loss of their land they became dependant on others to 
survive as the old political and social institutions from Palestine also began to 
disintegrate. In 1951 an UNRWA officer reported that, “The lack of certainty about the 
future haunted the refugees… They felt ‘forsaken and abandoned’ by political 
organizations, international institutions, and the big powers.”44   
 
Most refugees therefore became dependent on UNRWA. The refugees were allowed to 
settle in certain areas of Lebanon, which would later become the 15 officially recognised 
refugee camps. The camps consisted of canvas tents, sometimes reinforced with wooden 
planks, corrugated iron and metal barrels. Over the years the tents were replaced with 
cement houses covered by zinc roofs. The Lebanese authorities prohibited the use of 
concrete roofs, and the refugees also rejected this as a sign of permanence. Most of the 
Palestinians worked in agriculture; as factory workers; building workers; and in other 
low-paid physical work. Gradually, UNRWA established schools and healthcare facilities 
in the camps and became an employment opportunity for educated Palestinians. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the oil boom in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia also provided employment 
opportunities for many educated Palestinians from the camps. During their first decade in 
Lebanon, the refugees experienced a generally welcoming attitude, freedom of expression 
and political activity. However, after the Arab nationalist rebellion in 1958, the camps 
                                                 
41 Besson 1997, 335. 
42 Schiff 1995, 14-15. In Lebanon the League of Red Cross Societies was responsible for the relief 
assistance. This organisation is today known as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies. 
43 Takkenberg 1998, 164. 
44 Chief District Officer R.M Courvoiser, cited in Schiff 1995, 21. 
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became subjected to tight control, and there was a more aggressive policy towards the 
Palestinians. The League of Arab States Protocol of 1965 called for Arab host states to 
give the same rights for Palestinian refugees as for their own citizens. However, Lebanon 
refused to apply this.45  
Civil War and PLO dominance (1969-1990) 
 
Until 1967 the “Palestinian case”, and thus the refugees’ plight, was seen as a pan-Arab 
struggle against the Israeli state. The Arab League was supposed to be responsible for 
speaking on behalf of the Palestinians, but was crippled by internal disagreements. In the 
Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the 
Palestinians lost their faith in any help from the Arab countries. The Palestinian 
resistance movement took control over PLO, an umbrella organisation which had been 
established by the Arab League in 1964.46 Fatah was the biggest faction in this 
movement, with Yassir Arafat as its leader.47 On 1 January, 1965, PLO launched a 
guerrilla war across the Israeli border.48 Due to major Arab political pressure, the 
Lebanese army signed the Cairo Agreement with PLO in November 1969.49 In this 
agreement Lebanon agreed to let the Palestinian guerrilla use parts of Lebanon as a base 
in their warfare against Israel. It placed the refugee camps in Lebanon under the authority 
of the Palestinian forces. The agreement also gave the Palestinian refugees the right to 
work, move freely and live in Lebanon.50  
 
In 1970 the leadership of the PLO was thrown out of Jordan during the “Black 
September” campaign and moved all their operations to Lebanon. In Lebanon they were 
welcomed with open arms by most of the Muslim population. PLO represented for them 
a leadership in the pan-Arab movement, and a partner in their own opposition to 
                                                 
45 Schulz, Helena Lindholm with Juliane Hammer 2003, 53. The reasons for Lebanon’s relationship with 
the Palestinian refugees will be discussed in chapter 3.  
46 Khalidi 2001, 2. 
47 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); The Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFPL); General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW); and other unions are also members of 
PLO. (Peteet 1991, 29.) 
48 Peteet 1991, 27.   
49 Khalidi 2001, 3. 
50 Khalidi 2001, 2. 
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Christian Lebanese particularism. Existing tensions between Lebanese political factions 
became heightened by PLO’s presence and in 1975 the Lebanese civil war began.51 
During the civil war the central government lost much of its power and PLO sometimes 
functioned as a “state within the state”, with a separate Palestinian economy next to the 
Lebanese economy.52 PLO’s political power contributed to the establishment of a range 
of social institutions in this period. Also, some of the Palestinian NGOs emerged in this 
period, which will be further explored in chapters 4 and 6. 
 
The refugee camps became the focus of the Lebanese right-wing militia and several were 
destroyed in the fighting. The camps were under heavy Israeli bombardments, and in 
1974 Israeli air raids completely destroyed the Nabatiyeh camp.53 Three of these camps 
were not rebuilt, which means there are only 12 refugee camps today.54 Israel invaded 
Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 with the purpose of removing the PLO guerrilla once and for 
all. Eventually, PLO was forced to evacuate in the summer of 1982 after an Israeli siege 
over Beirut and moved its headquarters to Tunis. When PLO was evacuated the 
Palestinian refugees lost the only political and military organisation protecting them.55 On 
17 September, 1982, the Phalanges militia entered Shatila refugee camp and killed more 
than 1,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians who were left without protection after 
PLO’s evacuation.56 This event led to a major international focus for the first time on the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and an advent of several international NGOs into the 
Palestinian community, which will be explored in chapters 7 and 8. In May 1983 there 
was a split within Fatah, which had a profound impact on the political and organisational 
situation in the camps.57 The internal struggle between the Syrian- backed breakaway 
forces and the groups loyal to Arafat led to the defeat of the loyalists and their evacuation 
                                                 
51 For further information about PLO and the civil war cf. Brynen 1990. 
52 Suleiman 1999, 67. “PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat was now head of state in all but name, more powerful 
than many Arab rulers. His was no longer a humble revolutionary movement, but rather a vigorous para-
state.” (Khaldi 1986, 29, quoted in Schulz 2003, 55.)  In 1982 the Palestinian economy generated more 
than 15 per cent of the Lebanese gross national product (GNP). (Schulz 2003, 58.) 
53 In the 1982 invasion 70 per cent of homes in Rashidieh camp were destroyed and Ein el-Hilweh was 
completely demolished. The Lebanese authorities recorded over 3,000 Israeli attacks on Lebanon 
between 1968 and 1974. (Khalidi 2001, 3-4.) 
54 Cf. map at p. 8. 
55 For more information on PLO’s social role see chapter 3. 
56 Brynen 1990, 181. No-one knows the number precisely, but it is likely to be more than 1,000. 
57 Suleiman 1999, 68. 
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from Beirut and the northern camps. In 1985, the so-called “War of the Camps” began 
where different Palestinian groups fought each other and the Shiite Amal militia. The 
camps of Beirut and the south were under siege for up to two years, and approximately 
2,500 people were killed.58 In 1987, the Lebanese government abrogated the Cairo 
agreement. Importantly though, the refugee camps remained under the authority of the 
Palestinian parties in terms of security.59 The civil war lasted with more or less intensity 
until 1990, and the alliances and conflict lines between the different groups shifted along 
the way.  
Marginalisation (1990-2005)   
 
In these two last decades the situation for Palestinian refugees was largely influenced by 
events outside of Lebanon. Firstly, by the peace negotiations that took place in Madrid 
and Oslo between the Palestinian leaders and Israel from 1991 to 1993. In the 
negotiations, the “refugee problem” was postponed until “final status negotiations”. 
These have yet to take place. In Lebanon, the Palestinian groups were split between 
support and opposition to the Oslo Agreement, which in 1993 set up the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza. Secondly, after the Persian Gulf War in 
1991, PLO lost its revenues from the Gulf states and plunged into an economic crisis. 
The Gulf War also resulted in the expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinian workers 
from the Gulf countries.60 Many of them had sustained their family members in Lebanon, 
but they now had to return to the camps in Lebanon themselves. Neither the PLO in exile 
nor the PA has had enough resources or influence to secure the rights of the diaspora-
refugees, i.e. those Palestinians who are not living inside the West Bank and Gaza. After 
the Oslo Agreement, the Palestinian leadership was able for the first time to establish 
themselves in the West Bank and Gaza and their main focus shifted to these areas.  
 
In 1989, the Ta’if Agreement put an end to the Civil War in Lebanon. The dialogue 
between Palestinian and Lebanese leaders formally resumed in 1991 and the Palestinians’ 
                                                 
58 Khalidi 2001, 7. 
59 One Palestinian leader who participated in the Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue committee in 1991 said: 
“When it came to the security of the camps… the Lebanese representatives told the Palestinians it was 
their own responsibility.” (Reme 2007, 88.) 
60 Abu-Habib 1996, unpaginated. 
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heavy weapons were handed over to the Lebanese military. In June 1991, the Lebanese 
army took up positions in the south of Lebanon and established checkpoints at the 
entrances of the camps.61 The topics discussed at these dialogue meetings, which still 
continue to dominate the Palestinian-Lebanese dialogue were: firstly, the Palestinian 
military presence in Lebanon; secondly, the security situation in the camps; and thirdly 
the social and civil rights of Palestinians in Lebanon.62 The Palestinian delegation 
submitted a memorandum entitled “The Civil and Social Rights of the Palestinian 
People”, but there was no continued dialogue until 2005.   
 
Israeli attacks on Lebanon have continued throughout this period, with major onslaughts 
in 1993 and 1996. In 2000, Israel withdrew from the security zone they had occupied in 
the south since 1978. 
Hope and destruction (2005-present) 
 
After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 and the 
following evacuation of Syrian troops from Lebanon, there has been more public and 
official Lebanese acceptance to discuss the Palestinian refugees’ rights. In 2005, a 
Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) was established, with Lebanese 
ambassador Khalil Makkawi as its leader.63 The PLO representative office in Beirut was 
reopened in 2006, led by Abbas Zaki. The same year UNRWA, in partnership with the 
dialogue committee and other groups, held a donors' conference to raise money for all of 
the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. According to Makkawi this was “The first time the 
[Lebanese] government has given its [support] to improving the conditions of the 
camps.”64 According to Richard Cook, former Director of UNRWA Affairs in Lebanon, 
“[current Lebanese Prime minister] Siniora is building his approach [towards the 
Palestinian refugees] on four pillars: improving the humanitarian conditions in the camps, 
                                                 
61 Suleiman 1999, 69. 
62 Suleiman 1999, 69. 
63 LPDC Online. I have tried to get in touch with the LPDC but there was no response to my efforts. 
64 The Daily Star, 16 September, 2008. 
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establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, control of armament inside the camps, 
and the decommissioning of arms outside the camps.”65   
 
In 2004, Mahmoud Abbas visited Beirut as the first Palestinian official to do so in 22 
years.66 In 2008 he returned, this time as the Palestinian President. According to 
newspaper reports after this meeting, Abbas and former Lebanese President Amin 
Gemayel, “Agreed that it is imperative to introduce drastic improvements to the living 
conditions of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and we also agree on rejecting the 
settlement of Palestinians.”67 Abbas told a media conference after a meeting with the 
Lebanese President Michel Sleiman that, "The Palestinians have the right of return and 
this is an issue we are discussing with the Israelis."68 
 
In July 2006 there was a new outbreak of fighting between Israel and Lebanon. Much of 
the Lebanese infrastructure was damaged and approximately 900 civilians were killed in 
Lebanon as well as 39 civilians in Israel.69 In May 2007, clashes between the Lebanese 
Army and Fatah al-Islam militants destroyed the Nahr el-Bared camp completely.70 The 
inhabitants of the camp had to move to other camps and areas of Lebanon until the 
reconstruction of their houses. UNRWA, together with a number of local and 
international organisations, is currently working to rebuild the camp. They expect all of 
Nahr el-Bared’s residents to be back in the camp by 2011.71 
 
Recently, several studies have been published regarding Palestinian refugee camps in 
Lebanon and the growing presence of radical Islamist groups in some camps.72 This does 
not mean that the majority of Palestinian refugees are more radical, militant or Islamist 
than the average Lebanese citizen. It is rather a result of the special security status that is 
                                                 
65 Cook 2008, unpaginated. 
66 The Daily Star, 10 December, 2004. 
67 The Daily Star, 30 August, 2008.  
68 The Daily Star, 29 August, 2008. 
69 According to Human Rights Watch Online.  
70 Over 30,000 camp residents left the camp, which lay in ruins. According to military and government 
sources, the battle resulted in the deaths of 166 Lebanese army soldiers, 220 Fatah al-Islam militants, and 
at least 40 civilians, most of whom were Palestinians. (Human Rights Watch Online.) 
71 The Daily Star, 6 June, 2008. 
72 Rougier 2007, Knudsen 2005, Hanafi 2007 and International Crisis Group 2009. 
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accorded to the refugee camps and the lack of a unified Palestinian leadership in the 
camps, as will be discussed in chapter 3. However, Palestinian refugees feel they are 
collectively and unfairly blamed. “If anything happens in Lebanon, ‘Ayn El Helweh [sic] 
is responsible.”73 Throughout autumn 2008 and spring 2009 there were concerns that 
similar clashes to the one in Nahr el-Bared would break out in Ein el-Hilweh.74  
 
The total destruction of Nahr el-Bared in 2007 shows that the camps can be dangerous 
places, not least for the Palestinians who live there. The anxiety has spread to the other 
camps. “Following Naher El Bared [sic], men are scared to death from going into a 
mosque so as not to be accused of belonging to a certain organisation and get arrested and 
thrown in prison.”75 Many feel that, “We are being held hostage in this camp because of 
not more than a hundred militant [sic].”76 Others feel that the presence of armed 
personnel in the camps is their only protection in the absence of a strong Lebanese state 
and refer to the Sabra and Shatila massacres as examples of what may happen if they are 
left unprotected. The important thing to remember is that most of the refugees have no 
other choice than to stay. It is often believed that bad living conditions, unemployment 
and a general feeling of hopelessness for the future can be recruiting grounds for militant 
groups.77 Lina Abu-Habib wrote in 1996: “As for the present, keeping thousands of 
unskilled and idle youths trapped in camps by poverty and by official indecision 
concerning their status is not the best way to contribute to a lasting peace in the region.”78 
                                                 
73 Abu Sharar 2008, 13. 
74 Cf. these newspaper headlines from The Daily Star: 18 September, 2008: Grenade attack heightens 
tensions in Ein al-Hilweh; 13 September, 2008: 'Al-Qaeda has infiltrated Ain al-Hilweh [sic] camp' 
Group seeks to enlist Palestinians - Jordanian official; 31 March, 2009, Blast targets Fatah member in 
Ain al-Hilweh [sic]; 1 April, 2009: Another bombing rattles Ain el-Hilweh [sic] camp. 
75 Abu Sharar 2008, 13. I have also heard of religious refugees who have shaved (their beard) in order to 
look less “islamistic”. 
76 Abu Sahrar 2008, 28. 
77 Ambassador Makkawi, leader of LPDC is quoted in a newspaper article: “Squalid living conditions in 
Lebanon’s refugee camps are partly to blame for the rise of the Islamic extremist group Fatah al-Islam. 
… Until action is taken to improve the situation for Palestinians in the Middle East, the appeal of militant 
fundamentalism in these areas will continue to fuel violence throughout the region. … Unless you find a 
solution --a just solution-- to the Palestinian problem, there can be no peace in the Middle East.” (CNN 
2007.) 
78 Abu-Habib 1996, unpaginated. In 2008 journalist Marc J. Sirois, emphasises: “Helping the camps would 
help Lebanon... All [the new threats] stem at least partly from the general dissatisfaction that rightly 
characterizes the long-suffering refugee population, making individuals, families and even entire 
neighbourhoods susceptible to seduction by radical ideas.” He calls on the international community to 
“Help Lebanon and its Palestinian population avoid what would just be the latest side-effects of a 
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13 years later this is no less true. The situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is 
perceived as a threat to Lebanon’s stability. However, it is also highly unlikely that the 
PA and Israel can achieve a durable peace if the refugees in Lebanon and elsewhere are 
left behind.   
 
Throughout the 60 years of residence in Lebanon the Palestinian refugees have lived in 
tents, fought in wars, gone to school and raised their children in an often hostile 
environment. Their situation continues to be volatile and in the next chapter I will give an 
outline of the actors who are responsible for their social welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
historical injustice that has been abetted by some western countries and ignored by others. A little bit 
now will save a whole lot more later.” (The Daily Star, 16 December, 2008.) 
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Chapter 3 
Actors who are involved with the welfare of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon  
 
This chapter will present the actors, other than the NGOs, which play a part in the socio-
economic support for the Palestinian refugees.  
The United Nations (UN) 
 
The United Nations’ responsibility for the Palestinian refugees derives from its role in 
1947 in promoting the partition into two states of Mandatory Palestine. With this they 
paved the way for the creation of the state of Israel and the beginning of the Palestinian 
refugee situation. The right of return for the Palestinian refugees was confirmed by UN 
Resolution 194 in December 1948. The resolution: 
 
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should 
be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property 
of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.79 
 
The UN has, however, not been able to enforce the implementation of the resolution, 
which has left the refugees in limbo, with no chance to return home. The UN has been 
unable to broker a final solution to the situation, and has instead taken on the 
responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian refugees until a 
solution can be established. Two UN actors, who do not play any part when it comes to 
the socio-economic situation of Palestinian refugees, are still worth mentioning, 
ostensibly because one could assume that they should have done so. 
                                                 
79 UN Resolution 194 (III). 
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The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine 
(UNCCP), The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the Refugee Convention 
 
The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) is the body 
established by the UN Resolution 194 in 1948 to provide protection for Palestinian 
refugees.80 The General Assembly authorised the Commission to provide protection and 
facilitate durable solutions for people displaced as a result of the 1947-1948 conflict and 
war in Palestine.81 In 1950, the Assembly specifically requested the UNCCP to protect 
the rights, properties and interests of the refugees. The Commission is composed of 
representatives of the United States, France and Turkey.82 However, by 1952 the UNCCP 
had ceased to work for the implementation of protection: “The Commission reached the 
conclusion that it was unable to fulfill [sic] its mandate due to the lack of international 
political will to ensure the return of those refugees and displaced persons wishing to go 
back to their homes and villages.”83 When the UNCCP was established, one did not 
foresee that the refugees would not be able to return, and the UNCCP was not given the 
resources or machinery to continue to work for such a long period of time. Today, 
UNCCP has no budget and no staff, with the result that the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon are left with no international agency which works explicitly for their 
protection.84 
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 
December 1950 to provide protection to asylum seekers who were recognised as 
refugees. UNHCR was followed by the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. The Refugee 
Convention secures refugees the right to work, travel, receive social security and enjoy 
the freedom of association. However, the UNHCR statutes, “Stipulate[s] that a person 
receiving assistance or protection from another UN organ or agency is not entitled to 
                                                 
80 Schulz 2003, 37. 
81 This includes internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel. The UNCCP does not have a protection 
mandate for Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons from later conflicts. 
82 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Online. 
83 BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights Online. 
84 The same is the case for refugees in Syria, Jordan, West Bank and Gaza, i.e. the fields of UNRWA 
operations as will be explained below.  
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UNHCR assistance/protection.”85 Thus, because UNRWA and UNCCP were already 
established to care for assistance and protection of the Palestinian refugees in their field 
of operation, these refugees have to this day been excluded from the UNHCR mandate. 
The same is true for the Refugee Convention, which Lebanon in any case has not signed. 
There has been much confusion and discussion about what the practical implications of 
these exclusions actually are.86 In 2002, in order to clarify the issue, UNHCR stated that: 
 
If the person concerned is inside UNRWA’s area of operations and is registered, or is eligible to be 
registered, with UNRWA, he or she should be considered as receiving protection or assistance within the 
sense of paragraph 1 of Article 1D, and hence is excluded from the benefits of the 1951 Convention and 
from the protection and assistance of UNHCR. [ ] If, however, the person is outside UNRWA’s area of 
operations, he or she no longer enjoys the protection or assistance of UNRWA and therefore falls within 
paragraph 2 of Article 1D, providing of course that Articles 1C, 1E and 1F do not apply. Such a person is 
automatically entitled to the benefits of the 1951 Convention and falls within the competence of UNHCR. 
This would also be the case even if the person has never resided inside UNRWA’s area of operations.87  
 
UNHCR are thus responsible for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who come from areas 
outside of UNRWA operation, such as Palestinian refugees from Iraq, but not the 
“original” Palestinian refugees.88  
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the UN realised they had to expand their work for the 
Palestinian refugees and established UNRWA. The agency was established by UN 
Resolution 302, on 8 December, 1949 and started their operations on 1 May, 1950. By 30 
June, 1950, the number of refugees registered with UNRWA was 914,221.89 In chapter 1, 
it was described that UNRWA uses the term “Palestine refugees” which has several 
limitations. The terms “registered”, “non-registered” and “displaced person” have 
determined who is entitled to certain rights and services and who is not as we will see in 
                                                 
85 Briefing note on non-ID Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, 2007. 
86 Cf. Takkenberg 1998, 349-350. 
87 Note on the Applicability of Article 1D, UNHCR 2002.  
88 As of 3 October 2007, 8719 non-Palestinian refugees were registered with UNHCR’s office in Lebanon; 
more than 97 per cent of them are of Iraqi origin. (Lebanon-Support Online (a).) 
89 UNRWA Online (d). 
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chapter 4. UNRWA’s services are available to all those living in its area of operations 
who meet their definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance. 
UNRWA’s definition of a refugee also covers the descendants through the male line of 
people who became refugees in 1948.90 UNRWA services are usually restricted within 
their mandate areas in the officially recognised refugee camps. 
UNRWA’s work 
 
UNRWA was mandated to:  
 
Carry out direct relief and works programmes in collaboration with local government, to consult with the 
Near Eastern governments concerning measures to be taken preparatory to the time when international 
assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available and to plan for the time when relief was no 
longer needed.91  
 
UNRWA was designed to inaugurate a work program which would make the refugees 
self-supporting and eventually make the agency redundant, as well as to care for the 
immediate needs of the refugees. However, the work program was not successful and 
only the relief part of UNRWA’s program is still in place.92 Long-term refugee assistance 
became increasingly indistinguishable from development aid.93 The mixed mandate of 
providing relief and at the same time making plans with the aim of finalising this aid 
turned out to be too big a challenge. Peter Hansen, Commissioner-General of UNRWA in 
2004, reflected upon the issue like this:     
  
In a stroke of vision and good sense, a component was introduced of what today is called “development”, 
“income-generation” and “self-reliance” – the antithesis of welfare. This led to the “works” part of our 
name. Hence, when the United Nations itself was in its infancy, it developed one of its earliest programmes 
                                                 
90 UNRWA Online (c). Notably, refugee status can not be transferred through a woman. For example a 
woman who is registered with UNRWA, but is married to a man with no identification, can not transfer 
her status to her children. This is the same practice as in Lebanese law, which means that a woman with 
Lebanese citizenship who gets married to a Palestinian refugee can not transfer her citizenship to her 
children. 
91 UNRWA Online (e). 
92 Cf. Schiff 1995, 21 for a more detailed account of UNRWA’s work program and the reasons for its 
failure.  
93 Schiff 1995, 274. 
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as a mix of relief and development, something which the international community struggles to combine 
even today.94 
 
In 1982, UNRWA ceased distribution of food rations to all registered refugees and began 
to focus their relief assistance on those refugees most in need, the so called “Special 
Hardship Cases”, which in Lebanon constitutes 12 per cent of the refugees.95 As will be 
further explored in chapter 4, UNRWA’s main responsibilities are to offer education, 
healthcare, infrastructure improvements such as solid waste management, monetary 
support for hardship cases and, for some, job opportunities. UNRWA’s field of operation 
today is Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and the Gaza Strip,96 which represents 
approximately three-quarters of Palestinian refugees worldwide.97 UNRWA programs 
today are Relief and Social Services, Education, Health, Micro-Finance98 and 
Infrastructure and Camp Improvement.99 UNRWA has in all areas of operation more than 
27,000 staff members.100 
UNRWA’s relationship with the Palestinian refugees 
 
The Palestinian refugee population has become inevitably connected to UNRWA in 
many ways through their long-lasting relationship, which may be described as a love/hate 
relationship.101 The common perception prevails that UNRWA is the sole duty bearer 
responsible for ensuring assistance and protection, a perception that is reinforced by the 
existing international mechanisms.102 UNRWA has therefore become in practice 
something more than just a service provider. In many ways UNRWA has become a social 
authority substitute for the national civil authority which is not there, and is made 
                                                 
94 Hansen 2004, Keynote/vision remark.  
95 UNRWA Online (f). 
96 Until June 1952, UNRWA was also responsible for 45,800 people receiving relief in Israel. (UNRWA 
Online (d).) At times, UNRWA has provided assistance to Palestine refugees and other Palestinians 
registered with the Agency in additional areas of the Near East, including Kuwait, the Gulf States and 
Egypt. (Cf. Note on the applicability of Article D, UNHCR.) 
97 UNRWA Online (g). 
98 Launched in 1991, operating in West Bank, Gaza, and later expanded to Jordan and Syria. (UNRWA 
Online (h).) 
99 Created in 2004. (UNRWA Online (h).) 
100 Report from Commissioner-General 2007. 
101 Abu Sharar 2008, 21. 
102 ENGO report 2007, 9.  
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responsible in many ways for the welfare provision, and the lack thereof, for the camp 
refugees. It is said to be:  
 
Considered by the Palestinians as a Palestinian organization, by the Arab countries as a source of financing 
for host governments in the service of the Arab cause, and by the international community, which finances 
it, as an international humanitarian organization - and therefore neutral and apolitical by definition and 
mandate… [and therefore] has had to face the most delicate political situations in order to be able to pursue 
its operations.103 
UNRWA’s view on assistance versus protection 
 
Many refugees have seen it as the responsibility of the UN, which in practice became 
UNRWA, to help them to return to their homes. The UN response has so far been limited 
to confirm Resolution 194 every time they renew UNRWA’s mandate, which has been 
approximately every fourth year. From UN’s point of view the mandate of UNRWA has 
only been to provide humanitarian aid until a peace settlement could be reached.104 Since 
the beginning, UNRWA has been considered as a service provider organisation. As such, 
they have played an important role for the survival of the refugees. The agency was not 
empowered to guarantee the safety, security or legal and human rights of the refugees.105 
However, with the UNCCP out of practice and the UNHCR not responsible, UNRWA 
has gradually been forced to act somewhat out of their mandate. Since the Geneva donor 
meeting in 2004, UNRWA has started to link its service provision to advocacy, and a 
more rights-based approach to their humanitarian mandate is emerging.106 They now state 
that, “UNRWA is responsible for providing humanitarian and human development 
services to one group of refugees, the Palestine refugees, in its areas of operation. 
UNRWA’s role encompasses assistance, protection and global advocacy for Palestine 
refugees.”107 However, some important donors express scepticism towards the possibility 
for UNRWA to look for durable solutions and becoming too politicised, and the agency 
                                                 
103 Besson 1997, 345. 
104 Weighill 1997, 305. 
105 Shiblak 1996, 37. 
106 Hanafi 2007, 9. 
107 UNRWA Online (i). (my italics added). 
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has to tread carefully.108 Karen Abu Zayd, Commissioner General of UNRWA since June 
2005, states, “We should leave those political things to the politicians, because if we step 
over the line too far we will be prevented from doing our work.”109 Richard Cook, former 
director of UNRWA Affairs in Lebanon, writes: 
 
As a humanitarian agency the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is not mandated to play 
a political role. However, it views a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the related 
refugee crisis as paramount. Until a political solution is found, UNRWA will first and foremost continue to 
work on improving the status of the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon.110 
Funding 
 
Most of the international assistance to the Palestinian refugees is channelled through 
UNRWA.111 94 per cent of UNRWA funding comes from governments and the European 
Union (EU).112 In absolute terms the largest donor for UNRWA in 2003 was the US, 
followed by the EU, Japan and Sweden. Norway, the US, Sweden and Switzerland give 
approximately 1 per cent of their total aid to UNRWA.113 UNRWA relies on voluntary 
donations, which makes it vulnerable to shifting donor priorities. Almost from the 
beginning they have suffered from delayed and unreliable funding. Over the last two 
decades in particular, the agency has suffered from chronic under-funding, or more 
precisely, a relatively constant budget for an increasingly growing refugee population.114 
In 1975 the expenditure per refugee was US$200. In 2000 that figure had declined to 
US$75.115 This has inevitably resulted in understaffing, a reduction of services and a 
hindrance to long-term planning.116  
 
 
                                                 
108 The UNHCR for their part has been able to successfully combine the search for durable solutions with 
their humanitarian mandate in other conflicts. (Hanafi 2007.) 
109 Abu Zayd 2008. 
110 Cook 2008, unpaginated. 
111 Edminister 1999, 17. 
112 UNRWA Online (j). 
113 Fafo 2003 (415), 8.  
114 Edminister 1999, 17.   
115 Schulz 2003, 147.  
116 The Daily Star, 25 September, 2008. 
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UNRWA in Lebanon 
 
UNRWA’s headquarters were situated in Beirut between 1950 and 1978, before they 
moved to Geneva, and since 1996 in Gaza and Amman.117 UNRWA is the only UN organ 
never to have left Lebanese soil since 1950 and has never ceased its operations.118 In 
general, the Lebanese authorities have cooperated closely with the agency, mainly 
because they saw this as a way to avoid resettlement of the refugees, as will be explained 
below. Another factor was to safeguard their political position towards the refugee 
question; specifically that the refugees are the responsibility of the international 
community, through the UN, and not that of Lebanon.119  
Criticism of UNRWA  
 
One criticism of UNRWA has been that the agency is actually preventing a political 
solution to the refugee problem. By providing services and “keeping the refugees alive”, 
they have eased the urgency and thus the pressure on Israel, the Palestinian leaders, 
Lebanon and the international community to find a political solution to the problem. 
However, as the agency itself states, “Removing UNRWA from the scene would not 
cause the refugee issue to disappear, but it would lead to untold suffering and 
hardship.”120 The agency has also been criticised for being hierarchical and not including 
beneficiary participation in its program design.121 In contrast to assistance programs run 
by the UNHCR, UNRWA “Is notable for the lack of refugee participation in the design 
and implementation of assistance, and the lack of involvement of local and international 
NGOs in its assistance programmes.”122 UNRWA has also been accused of corrupt 
practices and favouritism.123  
 
 
                                                 
117 UNRWA Online (k). 
118 Besson 1997, 345. 
119 Besson 1997, 344. More about Lebanon as host country below and in chapter 4. 
120 UNRWA Online (l). 
121 Schiff 1995. 
122 Weighill 1997, 306. 
123 It is my experience in conversation with many Palestinian refugees that this is a common accusation 
made against UNRWA. Also reported in Abu Sharar 2008, 23. 
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Continuing need for UNRWA 
 
UNRWA was from the beginning meant to be a temporary organisation. In the period 
following the Oslo Agreement, it was thought that one could see the beginning of the end 
of UNRWA. Yves Besson, Director of UNRWA operations in the West Bank between 
1990 and 1992, wrote, “UNRWA is destined to disappear gradually as the peace process 
progresses.”124 However, with the failure of the peace process, the dissolution of 
UNRWA does not seem realistic in the near future. All relevant parties stress the need for 
UNRWA to continue its services and UNRWA’s mandate was most recently renewed 
until 30 June, 2011.125  
Palestinian actors  
Palestinian Authority (PA) 
 
From the perspective of most Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) has from its establishment in 1994 been almost irrelevant, “A leadership in 
abeyance.”126 A great majority of the refugees in Lebanon felt abandoned and 
disappointed by their leaders after the Oslo Agreement. As mentioned earlier, however, 
the PLO representative office in Beirut was reopened in 2006 and it has been approved to 
replace this office with a Palestinian embassy.127 This, together with Mahmoud Abbas’ 
recent visits to Beirut, is a sign that suggests that the PA is taking a greater interest in the 
refugees in Lebanon. 
PLO and other political parties 
 
PLO functions much as a para-state formation. They have many of the underpinnings of a 
government, such as a bureaucracy, a military function, financial resources, and in the 
West Bank and Gaza, a network of institutions through which it tries to exercise political 
power.128 The camps in Lebanon have been under the authority of PLO since the signing 
of the Cairo Agreement in 1969. As mentioned in chapter 2, PLO developed a vast 
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126 Sayigh 1995, 41. 
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network of social and cultural institutions in the 1970s. They provided security, quasi-
governmental services and became an important part of the Palestinian and Lebanese 
economic sector. This assistance provision was implemented with impressive speed. The 
Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) had only one hospital before 1975, but by 1976 it 
had four in Beirut alone.129 PRCS used to be sponsored by the PLO and has a largely 
local staff, providing healthcare through hospitals, clinics, home visits, health education, 
mother and child care facilities and sanitation programs in the camps. The period from 
1974 to 1982 was undoubtedly the heyday of Palestinian self-supporting ability. PLO 
employed as much as 65 per cent of the Palestinian workforce as military personnel, 
healthcare personnel, social workers, teachers and factory workers.130 PLO became an 
important employer for women in particular. During these years, PLO evidently became a 
kind of embryonic government for the refugees, providing a range of ordinary services 
far beyond those of a strictly military nature for which it is more commonly known. As a 
result, the camp population became involved with the political body in most spheres of 
their lives. It was rare to find a household without at least one member active in 
politics.131 With the evacuation of PLO in 1982 most of these institutions disappeared.  
 
As mentioned earlier, since 1982 the political environment amongst the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon has been characterised by fragmentation and rivalry which means 
that the camps are governed by a complex web of actors. The political parties can be 
divided into three main groups: loyalist (those who are pro-PLO); the opposition (those 
who are pro-Syria); and Islamist groups. Cooperation and coordination between these 
groups is very difficult, and sometimes impossible. One synopsis shows 23 different 
Palestinian factions in Lebanon, with 7 of them belonging to the PLO and controlling 70 
per cent of the camps.132 However, no political party is able to speak on behalf of the 
                                                 
129 Weighill 1997, 300. 
130 Suleiman 1997, 399. 
131 Peteet 1991, 29. 
132 These factions are: Fatah Movement; Palestinian Liberation Front (PFL); Popular Struggle Front 
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whole refugee population. This inevitably makes it difficult to negotiate for 
improvements, both with the Lebanese government, UNRWA and other international 
agencies.133 
 
Since 1982, most of the political parties have continued to offer some form of social 
service such as kindergartens, clinics, culture clubs and financial support to poor families. 
However, the PLO services such as PRCS and the kindergartens run by the General 
Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) increasingly have to depend on foreign support 
and apply for funding from donor agencies.134 Due to the political fragmentation, the 
field of service provision has become one of competition, which results in duplication 
and a lack of coordination.135 This will be further discussed in chapter 6. The parties offer 
services in order to gain political support for their party and are accused of being more 
interested in competing for providing services than to elaborate policies to improve the 
overall situation in the camps.136 The political parties have also been accused of 
corruption and favouritism.137 This was especially the case during the civil war but, as we 
shall see in chapter 6, it is a reputation the Palestinian NGOs, which often grew out of the 
political parties, are still struggling with.   
 
The number of people working for the PLO has greatly reduced since 1982. However, 
PLO is still an important employer of many Palestinians in Lebanon, thus providing the 
livelihood of many families. In the southern camps, as many as 11 per cent are employed 
by PLO and other political factions.138 It should be noted that for many Palestinians, 
interest in the political parties is often economically motivated, and many shift alliance 
according to where they can benefit most.139 As Suleiman emphasises, “In general [] it 
should be noted that the realignments and political machinations have little effect on 
                                                 
133 Suleiman 1999, 76, demonstrates this by telling of the Director of UNRWA who “Recently received 
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ordinary camp residents’ lives, the political groups by and large remaining distant from 
their concerns.”140 The PLO’s and the PA’s economic ability is vulnerable and negatively 
affected by political events, such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the international embargo 
which was imposed on the PA after the election of Hamas in 2006.141  
The Popular Committees  
 
The Popular Committees operate as municipalities in the camps and they were first 
established by the PLO in 1971.142 They are composed of representatives from the major 
political factions and independents, as well as camp elders and notables. Together with 
UNRWA, they are responsible for maintaining services such as garbage collection, 
electricity, water and sewage. They also used to have a function to maintain law and 
order in the refugee camps. However, in most cases they are not elected bodies and in 
some camps the chairmanship of the committee is linked to pro-Syrian parties. Instead of 
challenging this leadership, other parties have established rival committees.143 After 1982 
the Popular Committees were therefore weak. The influence of the Popular Committees 
varies regionally, with the strongest influence being in the south of Lebanon and the 
weakest being in the Bekaa Valley and the Mount Lebanon areas. Due to the lack of a 
unified political authority amongst the Palestinian refugees, however, the Popular 
Committees often function as the camps’ representatives in discussion with the Lebanese 
government or other law enforcement agencies.144 
Lebanon as the host country 
 
A survey which has been carried out regarding Palestinian refugees in the Middle East 
and North Africa shows that most of the refugees live in conditions quite similar to that 
of the populations of their host country, and are doing quite well compared to the 
populations of other countries in the region. The main exception of this, however, is the 
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case of the Palestinian refugees in camps and gatherings in Lebanon.145 There, the survey 
found huge differences between the living conditions for Palestinian refugees in camps 
and gatherings and the host population.  In order to understand the reasons for the 
particular treatment of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, some aspects of that country and 
its history must be explained. 
 
Lebanon is a country made up of several religious and ethnic groups. The 3.5 million 
inhabitants belong to 18 officially recognised sects or confessions, and for centuries have 
lived together with a fragile power balance between them.146 The economic situation has 
for a long time been difficult and this, together with the civil war, has led to huge 
emigration from the country. Most ethnic Lebanese today live outside of Lebanon. The 
arrival of 100,000 Palestinian refugees in 1948-1949 into a country which had at the time 
a population close to 900,000 naturally had a tremendous impact on the demography.147 
Since their first arrival, the Palestinian refugees became a threat to the precarious 
confessional balance in Lebanon. The predominately Sunni Muslim Palestinians were 
viewed by many among Lebanon’s Christian minority as a political threat. During the 
civil war, the Palestinians became active combatants, as well as attracting attacks by 
Israel on Lebanon, and alienated other confessional groups as well.148  
 
 
                                                 
145 Fafo 2003 (415), 57. “Gathering” is the term used for areas, outside of the official camps, where 25 or 
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Farid, 1997 and Reme 2007.) 
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Tawtin and “right of return”  
 
Lebanon does not want to take on responsibility for a refugee problem which they blame 
Israel and the international community for creating. It has therefore been important for 
the Lebanese government to reject tawtin, the Arabic expression used to describe 
resettlement or assimilation. As a part of this policy it has been important to emphasise 
the Palestinians’ “right of return” as confirmed in UN Resolution 194, and the need for 
international support through UNRWA. The late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri uttered in 
1998, that "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians… Integration would take the 
Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency which has supported them since 
1948."149 The “right of return” continues to be of utmost importance both in the refugee 
community and in Lebanese political debate.150 The result of these combined issues is 
that in post-war Lebanon, one of the few things that all Lebanese agree on is resistance to 
tawtin. Michel Suleiman, the current President of Lebanon, has said that Lebanon is 
“Facing three main dangers; Israeli threats, international terrorism, and the threat of the 
resettlement of Palestinian refugees here.”151 This illustrates the importance of the anti-
tawtin debate in Lebanon. 
 
Unfortunately for the Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese rejection of tawtin has been 
linked with the provision of civil rights and social services. The belief has been that if the 
refugees were granted any rights in Lebanon, it would eventually lead to their 
resettlement in the country. The practical implications of this will be further discussed in 
chapter 3. It is, however, worth mentioning here that this confusion of terms is still quite 
present in Lebanese political debate as this statement shows: “If it were up to me, I would 
give them [the Palestinian refugees] the right to work tomorrow," said Saad Hariri, of the 
Future Tide party… “But if the Palestinians stay in Lebanon it will change the whole 
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situation demographically.” He said that he believed that they would eventually 
return.”152 
 
The main actors who are responsible for the welfare of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
are the UN, several Palestinian political actors and the Lebanese government. As 
discussed above, all of the involved actors have some limitations to the services they 
provide. The next chapter will discuss what the practical consequences of this welfare 
system are for the Palestinian refugees. 
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Chapter 4 
The consequences of the prevailing welfare system for 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon   
 
The socio-economic situation for the Palestinian refugees is a result of several factors. 
Firstly, they lost their land and livelihood before and during the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 
and became refugees. Secondly, they have lived through a civil war, Israeli 
bombardments and have on several occasions been the main target for violence and 
destruction, from different actors. Thirdly, the refugees in Lebanon suffer from social, 
economic (and of course political) restrictions and legal regulations created by the 
Lebanese government.153 This chapter will explain what consequences these factors have 
on the welfare of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Firstly, I will present the different 
categories of refugees. Secondly, the Lebanese legislation that is implemented will be 
outlined. Thirdly, the economic standing of the refugees will be presented together with 
some comparisons to the Lebanese host population. Lastly, the chapter will discuss what 
implications the history and legal status have on the fields of employment, social 
security, education, health and housing for the Palestinian refugees.        
Categories of refugees 
 
The refugees are divided into three categories which have direct implications for their 
access to UNRWA services amongst things.154 The first category includes those who are 
registered with UNRWA, as well as with the Lebanese authorities. Most of these arrived 
to Lebanon in 1948. Secondly, there are Palestinian refugees registered with the Lebanese 
authorities, but not with UNRWA. This category is therefore called “non-registered 
Palestinian refugees”. It is estimated that between 10,000 and 40,000 refugees belong to 
this category. Half of these refugees were registered by the Red Cross and later by the 
Lebanese Government, and are also 1948 refugees, while the rest were registered under 
the orders of former Interior Ministries in the period 1969-1978 and are people who 
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arrived after the 1967 war. The third category of refugees are the so-called “non-ID 
Palestinian refugees”. Their numbers are unknown, and estimates range from 3,000 to 
16,000.155 These refugees moved to Lebanon in the 1970s after the events of Black 
September in Jordan or as a result of the civil war in Lebanon and were not able to or did 
not consider it necessary to register themselves due to the turmoil of the country. 
However, after the PLO political military infrastructure in Lebanon was disbanded and 
the redeployment of the Lebanese security over Lebanon, their lack of documentation 
became a prominent issue. These refugees are residing in Lebanon without papers, and 
thus cannot access education, work, health or travel. Some of these refugees are actually 
registered with UNRWA in other fields of operation. Due to the fact that refugee status is 
passed on through the father, children of non-ID refugees also become non-ID refugees, 
thus increasing the problem. Recently, attention has been drawn to this category of 
refugees.156 In 2006, UNRWA stated that in view of the exceptionally difficult 
circumstances of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, it provides services to all three 
categories of refugees.157 In 2008 the Lebanese government agreed to give a form of 
identification paper to the non-ID refugees.158    
Lebanese legislation: “A special kind of foreigners” 
 
The political reasons why the Palestinian refugees are worse off in Lebanon than in other 
host countries was discussed in chapter 2. Here, I will look at the practical implications 
and legislations which have been implemented in Lebanon to create this situation. In 
1950, the Lebanese government created a special committee entitled the Central 
Committee for Refugee Affairs to administer the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. In 
1959, new legislative decrees were added and the Lebanese government created the 
Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees as an office within the Ministry of 
                                                 
155 The International Federation for Human Rights issued a report in March 2003 estimating there to be 
10,000 non-ID refugees. The US Committee for Refugees estimated 16,000 while the Danish Refugee 
Council estimated the number to be 3,000. (Shafie 2007, 2.) 
156 “One incident in 2001 drew the authorities’ attention to the existence of thousands of undocumented 
Palestinians living in fear of discovery. Hosni Ghazal was stopped at a checkpoint outside Ain al-
Helweh, [sic] the largest camp in Lebanon, and told to get out of his car. He panicked and ran away, and 
soldiers shot him dead. The source of his panic [ ] was his forged ID.” (IRIN 11 March, 2008.) 
157 Shafie 2007, 2. 
158 The Daily Star, 16 January, 2008. 
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Interior.159 In 2000 the name was changed to the Department of Political and Refugee 
Affairs.160 Refugees must register their births, marriages, changes of residence and other 
aspects of their social life here. However, the Department, and the Lebanese government, 
is in no way made responsible for providing social services for the refugees by these 
decrees. They pledge only to “… ‘contact’ UNRWA to ‘ensure’ that basic social services 
are being provided.”161  
 
Some important legal instruments have been used to achieve the political goals. Firstly, in 
Article 1 of the Law Pertaining to the Entry Into, Residence In and Exit From Lebanon 
from 1962, and Decree No.1766 from 1964, Palestinian refugees are defined as 
“foreigners”.162 This means that they are not treated as Lebanese citizens, even though 90 
per cent of them are today born in Lebanon.163 In some ways they are treated as any other 
foreigner, even though they, unlike other foreigners, do not have the option of going back 
to their own country. Secondly, however, they are treated as a special group of foreigners. 
This is based on the principle of reciprocity, which assumes that:  
 
A given state (a) will treat the citizens of another state (b) who reside in it according to specific laws and 
conditions that also guarantee for the citizens of (a) on the territories of (b) equality in treatment according 
to equivalent laws and conditions.164  
 
This means that as long as Palestinians are stateless, they can not give the Lebanese the 
same rights in their home country, and therefore they are denied these rights in Lebanon. 
As an example, the Lebanese Social Security Law states that: “On the basis of this law, 
foreigners that work in Lebanon territory do not benefit from any or all forms of social 
security, except on condition that the country to which they belong treats Lebanese 
citizens according to the principle of reciprocity in the field of social security.”165 In 
November 2008, the Lebanese government offered for the first time to recognise the state 
                                                 
159 Said 2000, unpaginated. 
160 Shafie 2007, 9-10.  
161 Said 2000, unpaginated. 
162 Said 1999, unpaginated and El-Natour 2007, 68. 
163 Suleiman 2008. 
164 El-Natour 2007, 72. 
165 Paragraph 3, clause 2 of Article 9 of the Social Security Law. (Al-Natour, 2007.) 
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of Palestine, and to establish diplomatic relations with them.166 This should in theory 
have implications for the principle of reciprocity, but it remains to be seen what changes 
will follow. 
Economic standing 
 
Lebanon is regarded as a middle-income country, but one with huge income disparities. 
At the bottom tier of the income ladder one finds the great majority of Palestinian 
refugees. In one survey, 44 per cent of Palestinian households fall into the lowest income 
bracket (earning less than US$2,400 per year) compared to 6 per cent of Lebanese 
households.167 In Lebanon, 12 per cent of the Palestinian refugees are registered as 
“special hardship cases” by UNRWA, which is the highest percentage in UNRWA’s area 
of operation.168 These “special hardship cases” receive direct support from UNRWA 
including food aid, cash assistance and shelter rehabilitation.169 While the current living 
conditions are better then they were for the first generation of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, the progress made during the first decades after 1948 is today seriously 
stagnating and even deteriorating.170 The source of income of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon today depends on five primary sources: employment with UNRWA; remittances 
from relatives employed in the Arab and foreign countries; employment with Palestinian 
associations and organisations; employment in agriculture; and (illegally) in Lebanese 
institutions and companies; and employment in the camp economy which consists of 
small shops and enterprises within the camps.171 
 
                                                 
166 The Daily Star, 29 November, 2008 (a). 
167 As many as 87 per cent of Palestinian households are found in the three lowest income brackets, (out of 
nine) compared to 39 per cent of Lebanese households. The Fafo-report is gathered from 57 refugee 
communities. However, it is suggested that Palestinian refugees living outside of these camps and 
gatherings are better off. The report therefore represents the segment of refugees facing the worst living 
conditions. (Fafo 2005 (464).)  However, according to Sayigh 1995, 46: “While it is true that a 
Palestinian wealthy class exists, its size has been sharply reduced through migration.”  
168 UNRWA Online (f). In December 2006 the percentage of special hardship cases reached 12, and 
continues to rise, increasing from 10.2 per cent in 1997, the first year with statistics available at UNRWA 
Online. In comparison the percentage of special hardship cases in Gaza, June 2008 was 9. This number 
may have changed though after the 2009 Gaza War. (UNRWA Online (o) and (p).) 
169 Shafie 2007, 5.  
170 Fafo 2005 (464), 9. 
171Ajial 2001, ch, 2.1. Nearly 80 per cent of households have close relatives living aboard. (Fafo 
presentation 2007.) The limits of employment opportunities will be discussed below.  
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Still though, there is a commonly held myth in the Lebanese society that there is no real 
difference in the status of Palestinian and Lebanese and that “Each community has its 
rich, its middle class and its poor.”172 This gap between reality and myth shows that there 
is a great lack of knowledge in the Lebanese society about the situation for Palestinian 
refugees and especially about the conditions in the refugee camps. Most Lebanese have 
never visited a refugee camp, as most Lebanese have no Palestinian acquaintances and 
therefore no reason to go there.173 Furthermore, the camps have a reputation for being 
dangerous places, even though the majority of the 12 camps are quiet areas. Even 
Palestinians living outside of the camps are afraid to enter the camps and Palestinians 
from other camps are afraid to enter Ein el-Hilweh, the most turbulent camp. To enter the 
southern camps as a non-Palestinian, one also needs to get permission from the Lebanese 
military.174 After the demolition of Nahr el-Bared in 2007, one also needs a permit to 
enter there.175 These are all reasonable obstacles to visiting the camps. However, it leads 
to ignorance by the majority of Lebanese about the living conditions which more than 
300,000 of their fellow countrymen are enduring.176 When Lebanese government 
members recently visited some of the camps, they were “Clearly shocked by the 
conditions they encountered there.”177 Importantly, humanitarian assistance channelled 
through UNRWA, as well as support from international NGOs,  has created tension with 
the poorer part of the Lebanese population, who see free services being given to 
Palestinians while they are not being provided for.178 The lack of knowledge and fear of 
the Palestinian camps is also widespread among international visitors and workers, for 
example in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).179 Hansjorg Haber, 
the German Ambassador to Lebanon, visited Ein el-Hilweh in May 2008, and said that 
                                                 
172 Sayigh 1995, 45. 
173 Only 18 per cent say they have a Palestinian acquaintance, and 65 per cent claim to have no contact with 
Palestinians at all. (Haddad 2003, 92.) 
174 It may not be the most important civil right; however, to not be able to decide yourself who can come to 
visit you in your own house is another frustration experienced by the refugees.  
175 The Daily Star, 16 February, 2009. 
176 The ignorance results in mistrust as this quotation illustrates: “I met [sic] few rich guys at the university 
and when they knew I was Palestinian their father forbade them from talking to us again. This did not 
continue for long since after they got to know us they asked me if all the people at the camp are like me. I 
asked and how are we supposed to be? They replied [sic] with long nails and long hair and you kill 
anyone you speak to.” (Abu Sharar 2008, 6-7.)  
177 Cook 2008, unpaginated. 
178 Weighill 1997, 304. Also IRIN 10 October 2005. 
179 Conversations with UNIFIL workers, summer 2006.  
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“The harsh living conditions that Palestinian [sic] had to endure shocked him ‘and went 
beyond anything he ever saw or heard in the media.’”180 
Implications on employment and social security 
 
The difficulties that Palestinians experience in obtaining work in Lebanon have the 
greatest influence on their socio-economic situation. In 1951, the Minister of Social 
Affairs issued a law “Requesting Palestine refugees to abstain from work, on the pretext 
that they are working without permits and are competing with Lebanese labour.”181 
According to the aforementioned laws from 1962 and 1964, it became conditional for 
foreigners to obtain work permits, which is common practice in many countries.182  
However, because the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are defined as foreigners, but with 
no home country to seek legal employment in, they are left in a difficult position. 
According to some scholars these laws are in violation of international law.183 If a 
Lebanese company employs a foreigner without a work permit, the company risks having 
to pay a fine for each day the foreigner is employed.184 With the exception of the years of 
the Cairo Agreement (1969-1987), this regulation applied to all refugees. However, also 
before Cairo, an oral agreement between PLO and the Lebanese authorities stated that 
Palestinians should not be arrested for working without a permit, but only be given a 
warning the first time they were discovered.185  
 
During the civil war, much of the Palestinian workforce was employed by different 
groups in the Palestinian resistance. PLO’s political power contributed to the 
establishment of a range of social institutions in this period, as mentioned in chapter 3.186  
When the war ended the Lebanese government established a program to absorb the 
people who had been employed by the different Lebanese militias. They did not, 
however, make any similar effort to create new job opportunities for the Palestinian 
                                                 
180 The Daily Star, 5 May, 2008. 
181 El-Natour 2007, 67. 
182 El-Natour 2007, 68. 
183 Said 2001, unpaginated. 
184 Al-Natour 2007, 3. 
185 Al-Natour 2007, 3. 
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fighters. The Palestinian resistance, or PLO, was too weak to take care of their own, and 
many of the fighters faced unemployment. After the civil war, the Lebanese government 
gradually manifested its power and started to reinforce the pre-war regulations, this time 
with no PLO stronghold to worry about. Only a few months after the evacuation of the 
PLO in 1982, Palestinians were barred from entering a number of specified jobs, at most 
72 different occupations.187 In the 1990s the state introduced the condition that all 
government employees must have been Lebanese citizens for a minimum of 10 years. To 
work in professions such as medicine, law and pharmacy one has to be member of an 
association. To become a member, one either needs to have been a Lebanese citizen for a 
minimum of 10 years, or come from a state which can apply the principle of reciprocity, 
an impossibility for Palestinian refugees. 
 
This means that the Lebanese labour market has become almost impossible to enter in a 
legal way since 1990 for the Palestinian refugees. In order to obtain a work permit, the 
Palestinian refugee must be born in Lebanon, be registered with the Ministry of Interior, 
and have a contract with a specific employer. The permits are expensive and need to be 
renewed every two years.188 In other words, many Palestinians regard the application for 
work permits as too much trouble and expense for no benefits. In 2005, only 270 of 
109,000 work permits applied for by foreigners were applications from Palestinians. The 
following year that number dropped to 39.189 The actual Palestinian labour force is 
                                                 
187 For example: Director, assistant director, manager, financial secretary, accountant, secretary general, 
clerk in charge of the deposits, computer employment, protection, warden, guard, warehouse director, 
sales, money exchange, jeweller, laboratory work, barber, electrical and glass installation, health 
equipment, mechanics, and industrial employment. In general trade, import and export, commissions and 
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necessary), engineering, waiters, and driving taxis and private cars. Restrictions upon the owners of 
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of cars. (Compiled from Al-Natour 2007, 4.) 
188 Aruri (ed.) 2001, 133.  
189 IRIN News, 17 October, 2007.  
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calculated to number between 70,000 and 80,000.190 In 2005 the Labour Minister 
proposed a bill that reduced the number of restricted jobs from 72 to 25. However, work 
permits are still required and the bill has not been put into practice.191 The new bill is of 
great symbolic importance though, and may suggest some change in the Lebanese policy. 
The decrees issued by the Lebanese Labour ministers are, however, arbitrary and unstable 
and can be changed according to later ministers’ or governments’ will.192   
 
The dominant industries employing Palestinian refugees are trade, followed by 
construction, agriculture, education and health services, and manufacturing. Together, 
these five industries account for around 80 per cent of the employed Palestinians.193 
UNRWA schools, clinics and relief work constitute an important working arena for the 
Palestinian refugees without permits. UNRWA is also attractive because they offer a 
steady income, long-term jobs and a social security plan covering the employee and part 
of his/her family. UNRWA employed 3,265 Palestinians and 6 international staff in 
Lebanon in late 2008.194 NGOs, PRCS, farming and small businesses inside the camps 
are the other work arenas that do not require work permits. Political organisations also 
remain today an important employer. The majority of the workforce is, however, either 
unemployed or employed in the illegal market without any form of security.195 Different 
studies calculate the unemployment among Palestinian refugees to be between 40 and 60 
per cent.196 A survey conducted in 2003 found that there was less difference in the 
employment structures in Lebanon than what should be expected on the background of 
the restrictions on labour. They did not find one broad sector from which the refugees are 
barred, with the exception of the small public sector.197 However, the Palestinians who 
work in the illegal market risk being fired at any time, have no social security, maternity 
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leave, pensions and often have to work for longer hours and for lower wages than their 
Lebanese colleagues. Even with unskilled manual labour jobs, Palestinian refugees 
compete with permitted workers from Asia, and some 400,000 Syrian workers.198 They 
can afford to work for considerably lower wages than Palestinians, as the living costs in 
Syria or their Asian countries of origin are much lower than what the Palestinians face in 
Lebanon. The Palestinians who are able to find work, legally or illegally, do as 
mentioned not benefit from Lebanon’s National Social Security Plan, due to the principle 
of reciprocity. This plan covers illness, maternity leave, workplace accidents, and 
includes a family compensation plan and an end-of-services compensation plan.199 Those 
with a work permit are, however, required by law to pay taxes and fees to the plan even 
though they do not benefit from it. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon used to have the opportunity 
to work in the Gulf states. After the Gulf War this became difficult. Some 100,000 
Palestinian refugees have left Lebanon, many to Europe, particularly the Scandinavian 
countries and Germany, especially after the Israeli invasion and the “War of the 
Camps”.200 In the 1990s there was a growing trend among young Palestinians, especially 
males, to seek work outside of Lebanon. Illegal emigration out of Lebanon of 
Palestinians reached high numbers. However, the tightening of immigration regulations 
in Europe has made it more difficult to obtain residence there.  
Education 
 
UNRWA is the main provider of basic education amongst Palestinian refugees. 
Education is the most important activity for UNRWA if one looks at monetary expenses, 
and they run 81 elementary and preparatory schools.201 Because of the difficulties 
Palestinian children have in entering Lebanese secondary schools, UNRWA also started 
offering secondary education in Lebanon in 1993, and as of 2009 they run 6 secondary 
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schools.202 Siblin is the vocational training centre of UNRWA and offers vocational 
training for between 600 and 700 students.203 For the scholastic year 2002-2003 UNRWA 
could only offer 5 partial University loans. However, with support from the US, Qatar, 
and Canada, UNRWA granted 108 scholarships to female graduates from UNRWA and 
public schools for the scholastic year 2003-2004. This scholarship was full and covers the 
students’ fees until they graduate. However, the scholarship raised criticism and protest in 
the Palestinian community because it created a gender imbalance. The Palestinian 
community was requesting donors to create a similar fund for male students since the 
needs are high for them also.204 This is an example of a donor intervention with 
supposedly good intentions which created unintended tensions in the Palestinian 
community. 
 
NGOs are the main provider of pre-school education for the camp population. During the 
school year 1998-99, 28 different NGOs operated a total of 85 pre-schools.205 NGOs are 
also a provider of vocational training and pay for approximately 10 per cent of those who 
receive job training.206 NGOs have also offered computer training for UNRWA students 
as computer skills have become a part of the official exam, while UNRWA has not been 
able to computerise their schools.207 
 
The civil war limited the education opportunities for many Palestinians in the 1970s and 
1980s and resulted in high levels of illiteracy. Despite this, literacy rates of Palestinian 
refugees continue to be considerably higher than those of the Arab World as a whole.208 
Since the 1990s the increasing difficulty of entering the labour market in Lebanon has 
greatly influenced the motivation to finish an education. Some students are also forced to 
quit early to work and help the family economically. 21 per cent of children between the 
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ages of 7 and 18 are not enrolled in school. For the ages 5 to 9, the rate of enrolment in 
school is the same as for Lebanese children, but for the ages 15 to 24 the Palestinian rate 
drops to half of the Lebanese.209 Also compared to Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, 
Gaza and Jordan the level of education of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is low. Only 
12 per cent have completed at least secondary education, compared to 39 per cent in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and 28 per cent in Jordan.210 Palestinians are granted admission to 
university education in Lebanon. However, there are upper ceiling quotas for admitting 
foreigners, including Palestinians, particularly in technical colleges.211 The tuition fees 
used to be the same as for foreigners, which is considerably higher than for Lebanese 
citizens. This was however changed from 2005, when it was decided that Palestinian 
refugees could pay the same fees as their Lebanese peers.212  
The health sector  
 
According to the employment restrictions mentioned above, Palestinian physicians can 
not work legally in Lebanon outside of PRCS hospitals or other clinics in the camps. The 
law also prohibits Palestinians from establishing private hospitals outside of the camps.213 
This, together with the high cost of private Lebanese healthcare, which holds 90 per cent 
of hospital beds, and restrictions on access to public health, means that Palestinian 
refugees are very dependent on UNRWA when it comes to healthcare.214 They run 30 
primary healthcare facilities, which provide dental care, vaccines for children and 
contraceptives.215 UNRWA also contracts beds at non-governmental or private hospitals. 
A reduction in UNRWA budgets, as seen in the 1990s, therefore directly results in 
reduced health services for the refugees. Between 1989 and 1995 the number of hospital 
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beds available for Palestinians in Lebanon decreased by over half, from 0.56 beds to 0.25 
beds per 1000.216 UNRWA covers only one third of hospital fees excluding doctor’s fees, 
laboratory tests, x-rays and emergency admissions. Patients suffering from chronic 
illnesses, women in labour, emergency cases and the disabled are not provided with any 
financial assistance.217 People over 60 years of age have also been excluded from 
UNRWA benefits.218 
 
The PRCS also provides healthcare services. During the PLO heyday, PRCS was seen as 
one of the best and most effective hospital services in Lebanon, but with the reduction of 
PLO funding, their services are severely reduced. Today UNRWA focuses principally on 
primary healthcare, while PRCS are concentrating on the secondary level. The 
patient/doctor ratio for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 1997 was 1166:1, compared to 
a ratio of 318:1 for Lebanese.219 
 
Amongst the camp population many diseases originate from poor diets, poor sanitary 
conditions and poor ventilation. In the words of the Lebanese government, “The 
prevalence of diseases among Palestinian children is directly related to poverty and 
substandard housing and unhealthy environments where they live.”220 Rates of chronic 
infant illnesses are twice or three times higher than the Lebanese national average.221 
Nearly one in five of the refugee population suffers from chronic health failure.222 
However, many diseases are brought on by stress that is typically associated with the 
developed world, reflecting the instability and insecurity of the refugees’ situation. 
UNRWA spends more on hospitalisation in Lebanon than in any other field of its 
operations.223 
 
                                                 
216 Khalidi 2001, 13-14. 
217 Aruri (ed.) 2001, 154. 
218 NPA 2001 (b).   
219 Aruri (ed.) 2001, 128. 
220 Save the Children, 2008. 
221 Hanafi 2008, 5. 
222 Fafo 2003 (409), 67. 
223 Cook 2008, unpaginated. 
 58 
Housing 
 
The 12 official refugee camps are situated on land that the UN has rented. However, the 
boundaries of the camps have not been expanded along with the population growth. This 
means that young Palestinians would have to build on top of already existing buildings, 
which can be a risky business. In some of the most crowded camps in Beirut, it is not 
possible to see the sun from the alleys because of the high buildings and narrow streets. 
Building restrictions have been imposed on the camps in several periods, and when 
building is allowed, building permits from the Lebanese government must be obtained to 
bring building materials into the camps. This has made repair, expansion and 
improvement of homes impossible at times, and difficult at best. Overcrowding also puts 
pressure on the infrastructure, such as sewage systems, electrical capacity and water 
supplies. Daily cuts in the public electricity are a common feature for most inhabitants of 
Lebanon. The Lebanese state is not able to produce enough electricity to cover demand, 
and has introduced savings. It means that all households need to have fuel-driven 
generators in order to have a stable electrical supply. Those who cannot afford generators 
are often without electricity for up to 20 hours per day.   
 
Another option for Palestinian refugees who want to establish their own household used 
to be buying apartments or land plots outside of the camps. However, the real estate tax 
required for foreigners, including Palestinian refugees, is 16.5 per cent versus 6.5 per cent 
for Lebanese, and the rent-free nature of the camps prevented many from doing so.224 In 
2001, the Lebanese parliament passed law 296 amending decree 11614 of 1969, which 
deals with the ownership of real estate in Lebanon by non-Lebanese nationals. The 
amended first clause states that no ownership of realty right of any kind is permitted to 
any person who does not hold citizenship from a recognised state, or to any person where 
such ownership contravenes the provisions of the Constitution concerning Palestinian 
settlement.225 The principle of reciprocity and the fear of tawtin are again used to limit 
Palestinian refugees’ rights. The law also prevents Palestinians from inheriting property. 
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Palestinians who can afford to buy land outside the camps now have to align with a 
Lebanese citizen to do so, by registering the property in the name of a Lebanese friend or 
relative. This leaves them in a very vulnerable position.     
 
Almost half of the refugees have, however, settled outside the camps. They are therefore 
outside of UNRWA’s mandate.226 Formally they should be looked after by local 
authorities, but for many of them, particularly in the “gatherings”, the services provided 
are very poor.227 Approximately 40,000 live in these gatherings; another 35,000 who 
were displaced during the civil war are still housed in makeshift shelters.228 UNRWA is 
not responsible for infrastructure services in the gatherings such as water, electricity, 
sewage and garbage collection. One third of the refugee population lives in towns or 
cities and ranges from those who own or rent their own residence, to homeless squatters.  
 
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to live under very difficult socio-economic 
conditions. These conditions are a result of several factors, such as their expulsion from 
Palestine in 1948, the civil war in Lebanon and Lebanese legislation. On the basis of the 
socio-economic background which has been outlined in this chapter and on the 
limitations of the actors involved with the provision of services and protection to the 
refugees which was outlined in chapter 3, it becomes evident that there is a need for 
NGOs to be involved. However, the nature of NGOs provides them both with 
opportunities, but also with limitations, and this will be explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
History of NGOs in development 
 
This chapter presents the history of NGOs in development in order to place the NGOs 
working in the Palestinian community into the broader picture. It also discusses some of 
the particularities of the NGO system which are of most importance when evaluating the 
NGO sector there. The chapter includes an outline of the Norwegian NGO sector and 
development institutions to present a background for NPA’s work in Lebanon 
The development aid system 
 
A development NGO is defined as, “An organization receiving donor funds for 
development, which is institutionally separated from the government and is non-profit-
making.”229 The development aid system grew out of the inequality in power and 
resources between the different parts of the world. In the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, NGOs role in development originated as 
a result of American and UN initiatives and pressures in the early 1960s.230 The original 
justification for governmental support for NGOs was that western governments ought to 
broaden their support for aid to the developing countries.231 It was thought that NGOs 
could be useful in increasing and rooting public support for the official aid project.232 
There was also a need for alternative channels for aid directed to sensitive areas and 
groups, such as the Palestinian refugees, and NGOs were seen as a perfect tool.233 The 
Norwegian government in 2009 states the following as the reasons to use NGOs as a 
channel for aid:  
 
                                                 
229 Tvedt 1995, II.   
230 Tvedt 1995, II. The institutionalisation of NGOs was initially instigated to be used as a political weapon 
in the Cold War. (Tvedt 1998, 224.) The OECD countries are in 2009: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
231 Tvedt 1998, 78. 
232 Tvedt 2002, 368.  
233 Tvedt 1995, 3.  
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Civil Society in developing countries have an important function through their ability to give clear political 
messages and hold their own authorities accountable for following-up on decided politics. Norwegian and 
international NGOs can contribute by building networks between important actors in the North and South, 
cooperating with local partners within the civil society and contributing with capacity building activities in 
sister organisations in areas such as environment, human rights, freedom of media and anti-corruption. 
NGOs are important development actors and play an especially important role by being innovative and 
flexible in demanding situations. Organisations can for example reach out with health and education 
services in areas were neither the state, bilateral or multilateral, are able to work, such as in war zones, and 
to pursue humanitarian aid after man- or nature-made catastrophes in certain situations.234 
 
By the end of the 1980s the NGO system had been transferred from the western welfare 
states to most countries in the world. Organisations belonging to the NGO system are 
found in such different places as the countryside of Kenya and Afghanistan, in the big 
cities of Brazil and France, as well as in refugee camps in Lebanon. NGOs today deliver 
more official development assistance than the entire UN system, excluding the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).235 
Northern and Southern NGOs 
 
Even though the heterogeneity within the so-called Northern NGOs, as well as within the 
so-called Southern NGOs may be greater than the heterogeneity between those NGOs in 
general, this term has still been applied to distinguish between NGOs from developed 
countries and NGOs from developing countries. I choose to use the term here because 
NPA falls into the category of a typical Northern NGO while the local NGOs in the 
Palestinian community are representative of typical Southern NGOs, and I want to 
highlight some features of these categories. 
 
International development agencies such as the World Bank and western advocacy 
groups have encouraged NGOs to play a greater role in many parts of Africa and Asia, 
including the Middle East.236 Increasingly, the political and ideological development in 
developing countries has made obsolete the “old” model of Northern expatriates staying 
                                                 
234 St.prp.1 2008-2009, 8.3 (my translation.) 
235 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 38. 
236 Carapico 2000,13. The World Bank introduced a policy of reducing expenditure and state responsibility 
for social services in developing countries, which made room for NGOs. 
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in a Southern country for years to develop them. People in developing countries are better 
educated and want to control their own development. The emerging trend in the 1990s 
was therefore to establish partnerships with Southern NGOs, or as in NPA Lebanon’s 
case, to transfer the local administration to local people. As a result of this development 
Northern NGOs have competed to find suitable and good local partners, which means 
that Southern NGOs have flourished in response. The potential for growth of NGOs in 
developing countries is, however, linked to the countries’ level of education, urbanisation 
and organisational history.237  
 
NGO rhetoric asserts that NGOs do not work for but with others. The Southern partner 
should define the problem, while the Northern NGO provides the means to solve the 
problem. The increase of partnerships has therefore created new challenges. Partners 
should by definition be equal and the local administration should have as much influence 
as the head office. Institutional development and capacity building for local partners have 
therefore become important features of Northern NGOs work because responsibility for 
their own development presupposes robust, stable organisations.238 Despite considerable 
investment, however, it is clear that relatively few Southern NGOs are independent 
entities, or even sustainable without major resources from the North, which is also the 
case with the local NGOs in Lebanon.239 For example, Southern NGOs often depend on a 
limited number of sources for funding. Historically shaped and continually reproduced 
unequal aid relationships are not easily transformed into equal partnerships as Tvedt 
argues: “A change in vocabulary – to ‘equal partnership’ or a ‘global civil society’ as it 
has recently been termed in UN documents – will not alter this reality.”240  
Comparative advantage?  
 
In the development aid system different actors are supposed to manifest different 
advantages. The advantages of NGOs as opposed to other development aid actors, i.e. the 
                                                 
237 Tvedt 1998, 63. There is for example a much stronger NGO sector in India than in the Southern Sudan.  
238 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 181 suggest that “Management and capacity building are so common that they 
constitute their own donor fashion.” 
239 Wells 2001, 75. Likewise, most Northern NGOs are unsustainable without external funding. Cf. Opoku-
Mensah 2007, 165. 
240 Tvedt 1998, 224. 
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UN, WB, IMF and others are illustrated by the above cited statement from the Norwegian 
government. They are said to be flexible and possess local anchorage and due to this, are 
seen as most effective to reach the poorest and build independent civil societies in the 
developing countries. 
 
During the 1980s NGOs were furthered by both right and left as an answer to the problem 
of the authoritarian state. As a result, international agencies such as the World Bank, as 
well as radical critics of top-down development thought have embraced NGOs as the 
solution to all problems. NGOs were said to fill a gap that neither the governments nor 
the business community were able to fill. The idea was that NGOs had the capacity to 
transfer training and skills that enabled individuals and communities to compete in 
markets, to provide welfare services to those who were marginalised by the market, and 
to contribute to democratisation and the growth of a robust civil society.241 The faith in 
the advantages of NGOs was, however, exactly that. As more detailed studies of the 
NGO sector were conducted, the results were sobering.242 It has not been possible to 
empirically confirm that NGOs per se possess the advantages they were said to.243 As 
organisations, they are as vulnerable to all the problems that befall other kinds of 
institutions, including the dangers of routinisation and the gradual conversion of 
democratic to oligarchic rule.244 In fact, Tvedt argues that NGOs in some cases have a 
comparative disadvantage because they can survive despite organisational failures.245  
 
A study performed by the Rattsø Committee in 2006 concluded that Norwegian NGOs 
are good at implementing projects, yet they often have short-term objectives and lack 
knowledge about long-term objectives and effects.246 The study confirms that the NGOs 
are good at strengthening the institutional sustainability of partner organisations, but that 
the economic sustainability of partners is weak. The study concludes that the advantages 
of NGOs in relation to other development aid actors are: Firstly, they are often more cost 
                                                 
241 Fisher 1997, 444.  
242 Opoku-Mensah [et al] 2007, 28.  
243 Tvedt 1998, 130 and Fisher 1997, 441. 
244 Fisher 1997, 456. 
245 Tvedt 1995, 19. 
246 Norad and MFA 2008, 21. The Rattsø Committee was appointed by the Norwegian Parliament in 2005 
to critically evaluate the NGOs as channels for Norwegian aid. (The Norwegian Government Online (a).) 
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effective than bilateral and multilateral organisations, especially in emergency situations. 
Secondly, the advantage of being non-governmental gives them larger freedom to work 
in societies where it is not possible or desirable to work with state authorities. Thirdly, 
they are often closer to target groups outside of the elite, even though they are unable to 
reach the poorest part of the population. However, continuity and local presence gives 
local knowledge and anchorage. Fourthly, most NGOs work with sister organisations, 
and do therefore not require a separate project administration. Fifthly, they offer their 
partners an added value of capacity building and international contacts that one does not 
necessarily find with bilateral or multilateral donors. And lastly, they are principally 
flexible, creative and innovative, but show this only exceptionally in practice.247  
 
The annual report from Norad and MFA in 2008 highlighted how “The choice of channel 
and organisation which implement aid, may have significance for the results.”248 It 
concludes however, that:  
 
The different channels do not deliver as different result as expected from their different mandates. This is 
caused by thematic overlaying and corporate task solving within parts of the aid. It is also due to the fact 
that the demands for good aid are quite similar across the different channels… All results depend more on 
the cooperation partners and receivers, their interests, efforts and capacity to implement the programs, than 
on Norway’s choice of channel.249  
A globalised elite? 
 
Hanafi and Tabar argue in their study about NGOs in Palestine that there is an emerging 
Palestinian globalised elite.250 This elite is composed of leaders of NGOs and the local 
leaders of INGOs, and they define it as “A local social formation which is informed by 
and/or closely aligned with global debated and agendas.”251 NGOs in Palestine and, I will 
                                                 
247 Norad and MFA 2008, 21. 
248 Norad and MFA 2008, 14 (my translation.) 
249 Norad and MFA 2008, 5 (my translation.) The annual reports from Norad and MFA 2007 and 2008 and 
the report from the Rattsø Committee became an object of public debate in Norway.  
250 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 247.  
251 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 247-248. They emphasise that a globalised elite does not mean a global elite, 
but rather that they have ties to global actors, such as INGOs and donors. Participation in global events 
does not necessarily mean that the Palestinian NGO leaders are contributing to the decision making of 
these events, but it gives the leaders a new legitimacy back home. 
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argue, also in Lebanon, are increasingly entering the international community of 
development cooperation. They attend global conferences and are forming their own 
relations with INGOs. Personal relationships between personnel in INGOs, NGOs and 
the donor system play an important role as to who gets the funding and support.252 The 
study does not, however, want to adopt the label of an epistemic Northern and Southern 
NGO community, and argues that there is more in common in terms of institutional form 
than of knowledge.253 The study concludes that donors are not directly imposing ideas on 
NGOs, but that they have an impact on methodology, project approaches and 
administration.254 The NGO community is in this way perhaps more influenced by 
foreign political decisions than events in their own society. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that their work is influenced by the “hot topics” of the aid system. Both 
organisational structure and policy directions are influenced by these international trends. 
Today, donor support is most easily available for new programs in sectors relating to the 
contemporary thematic concerns or bilateral programming of agencies, such as human 
rights, democratic development, gender and the environment.255 
Representing the local community? 
 
The entry of NGOs into development cooperation and the reliance on western funding is 
accompanied by changes in both the internal organisation of the NGOs and the NGOs 
external way of relating to society. Internally, the conditions for funding require 
increased focus on organisational capacity. Externally, it is not so much that an NGO 
becomes detached from the grassroot, as that the development professional adopts a 
particular way of relating to society. The development professional approaches society as 
the problem field, which he can fix through interventions of technical procedures.256 The 
NGOs may therefore not necessarily have significant constituencies of public support 
beyond the involvement of beneficiaries.257  
                                                 
252 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 198. “The pomp and formality associated with formal diplomatic relations 
among state actors remains intact: delegations of foreign visitors, international experts and donor mission 
are a routine part of the NGO’s external relations.” (Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 228.) 
253 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 199.  
254 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 199. 
255 Brynen 2000, 188. 
256 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 224. 
257 Cf. Wells 2001, 75 and Pitner 2000, 36. 
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The criteria for funding have created a hierarchy amongst organisations in terms of 
access to funding, where professionalism of the organisation is more important than the 
actual work on the ground. The result is that “traditional”, unprofessionalised, charitable 
societies are marginalised and a few professionalised organisations receive a large share 
of the total funding.258 Funding also largely arrives with predefined priorities. Actually, if 
NGOs should adapt to every changing local circumstance they would not be as 
accountable upwards in the system as they are supposed to be.259 Donors provide support 
for a certain project and expect the program to be implemented, even if the situation 
changes on the ground, as was the case in Nahr el-Bared in Lebanon, as we will see in 
chapter 6. It is easier to receive funding for projects, which are limited in time, space and 
have a defined objective, than for program proposals, which are focused on long-term 
development.260 For example, it is typical that donors donate medical equipment but do 
not provide funds to cover operating costs.261 Project funding is strongly criticised for 
undermining long-term planning in the local society, but is still favoured by donors who 
perhaps do not want long-term responsibilities. 
Humanitarian relief versus development 
 
As the importance and influence of Southern NGOs is increasing, Northern NGOs have 
to develop new strategies for organisational survival. One strategy is to become more 
involved in emergency aid, which is an area still more or less monopolised by operational 
Northern NGOs, which is those who implement their own projects.262 NPA has 
specialised in mine clearance, as will be seen in chapter 8. Emergency aid typically 
involves provision of food, shelter and medical assistance to refugees and other affected 
populations. Development assistance on the other hand focuses on long-term 
sustainability, or as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD puts it, to:  
 
                                                 
258 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 25, 196. They call the latter “Mega NGOs”. 
259 Tvedt 1998, 161. 
260 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 189. 
261 Edminister 1999, 18-19. 
262 Tvedt 1998, 222. 
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Improve the capacity of developing countries to carry forward their own development, by integrating 
social, economic, and ecological perspectives in a sustainable way… establishing sound principles and 
effective donor frameworks, promoting flexible approaches, longer time frames and innovative funding 
mechanisms, to encourage growth and reduce poverty, while protecting the environment, and to foster 
widespread capacity development – in particular for environment, technological capability, good 
governance and conflict management.263 
 
Much of the increase in funding for the NGO system has been for emergency aid rather 
than for development.264 This happens in spite of the fact that governments in developing 
countries express a wish that donors should put more emphasis on development, and 
policy declarations stating that, “Emergency aid should be more closely linked to 
development assistance, and that long-term development [is] most important.”265 In 
practice, experiences from several humanitarian crises show that there is often a financial 
gap when emergency allowance in a country is ended. The result is that there is an overall 
lack of funding for early recovery and rebuilding efforts. 
 
The question of whether humanitarian relief is opposed to long-term development 
cooperation, or is in harmony with long-term social and economic development in 
recipient countries, has lately become a much debated issue in development.266 As we 
will see in chapters 6 and 7, the division of emergency aid and development work has 
great impact on the NGOs working in Lebanon. Hanafi and Tabar mention four factors 
which complicate the debate: firstly, the fact that donors have very rigid administrative 
distinctions between relief and development budgets, which makes it difficult to respond 
quickly or to coordinate types of aid; secondly, that development agents prioritise long-
term initiatives and focus on state cooperation, which is not the case with humanitarian 
relief agencies; thirdly, that it is difficult to coordinate the implantation of development 
and humanitarian aid simultaneously; and fourthly, that donors may be unwilling to 
                                                 
263 DAC, quoted in Brynen 2000, 235. 
264 UD evaluation 4.98 1998, 21. 
265 Report to Storting NO51 91991-92 quoted in Tvedt 1995, XI.  
266 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 47. UNDP stated in 1994: “If conceptualized, planned and implemented in 
isolation (relief) will replace development and breed to term dependencies, undermine indigenous coping 
strategies and increase vulnerabilities.” (UNDP 1994, quoted in Tvedt 1995, 109.) 
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support a particular political regime.267 All of these factors influence the way that 
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is implemented. 
Advocacy versus service provision 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1 there is an ongoing discussion in the NGO community as to 
whether NGOs should focus more on advocacy or service provision. Advocacy can mean 
both to work with governments to influence structural changes, but also to advocate 
towards the population to empower or educate them. In this thesis I argue that the first 
kind of advocacy ought to play an increasing role in the Palestinian NGO community. 
However, the latter form of advocacy is also becoming an increasing part of NGOs’ 
work. Hanafi and Tabar claim there are three logics behind this development: Firstly, 
neo-liberalism focuses on the need to empower the individual to look after themselves, 
while the government services are reduced. Secondly, institutional constraints of the 
donors, for example budget restrictions, lead donors to favour advocacy over services as 
advocacy can have an impact in the short-term and with less financial resources. As an 
example, it is cheaper to talk to people about health issues than to train them to become 
doctors. Thirdly, the authors bring up the logic of cultural and historical bias of the 
(western) donor in their developmental framework with regard to gender. They argue that 
workshops and conferences dealing with the empowerment of women are prioritised over 
monetary support, for instance, which enables women to get transportation to school. 
They also claim that much of the advocacy work is aimed at empowering those who 
belong to the elite, or “high” culture, as do most of the NGO workers, instead of reaching 
out to the population at large. For instance, many of the workshops are advertised in the 
newspapers which are read by few, instead of on television which is seen by most.268   
 
 
 
                                                 
267 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 47. 
268 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 191-193. They write about the situation in the oPt. I will argue that in Lebanon 
the workshops conducted in the cities may also attract the “elite” of Palestinian refugees. However, since 
many workshops are conducted inside the camps, where more than half of the refugee population live, 
they might be more open to “everyone.”  
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History of NGOs in development in Norway 
 
The first Norwegian NGOs working in developing countries were missionary 
organisations that started to send people abroad from the 1860s.269 As one of the 
founding members of the OECD, Norway followed the lead of the US and UN and 
decided to involve NGOs more in development. In 1963 the Norwegian government 
channelled money through NGOs for the first time. In 2007, Norwegian aid was 
channelled through 117 Norwegian and approximately 200 international or regional 
NGOs, and close to 250 local NGOs in receiver countries.270 The support through NGOs 
constituted approximately 20 per cent of the total aid and was 4.3 billion NOK in 2007.271 
The role of NGOs in the disbursement of aid is larger in Norway than in any other OECD 
country and reflects the close relationship which has developed between the Norwegian 
government and NGOs.272 
 
The Norwegian state and business community has few political, strategic or economic 
interests in the developing world. Therefore, the work of NGOs in developing countries 
has from the start been perceived as the work of “good-hearted” people and 
organisations, maybe more so in Norway than in other countries. This continues to be the 
self-understanding and ideology of NGOs and their staff, which emphasises that:  
 
Norwegian development aid is based on a strong attitude of solidarity. It’s neither connected too much to 
economic interests, nor to political interests. In some contexts it might be, but not much. Other major 
nations do that a lot, lot more. USA, Japan, and Germany, so when I sort of see Norwegian foreign policy, 
and also Norwegian development aid, it’s a lot about solidarity and actually a desire to help the world.273  
 
The work of NGOs is vital to the creation of the Norwegian national image as a 
humanitarian superpower and peacemaker. The strength of this image means that there is 
broad political and societal support for foreign assistance in the Norwegian society.  
                                                 
269 The term NGO is not directly translatable to Norwegian, and Norwegian NGOs are known as voluntary 
or private organisations. In Norwegian the definition is “Frivillige organisasjoner: Betegnelse for ikke-
statlige, private/humanitære/ideelle organisasjoner.” (Norad Online (b).)  
270 Norad and MFA 2008, 16. 
271 Norad and MFA 2008, 18. 
272 Norad Online (c). 
273 Fretheim 2008, 229 (my translation.)  
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The NGO channel has become an important instrument in Norwegian foreign policy 
initiatives. The policy of the MFA has changed from one of relative lack of interest to 
one of active consultation and cooperation. They have increasingly realised that the work 
of Norwegian NGOs has in a direct or indirect way influenced Norwegian foreign policy, 
and perhaps so in a rather unplanned manner. The MFA has therefore initiated several 
research programs recently to improve their work.274 The close relation which has 
developed between MFA and NGOs in Norway is not a common trait in other 
countries.275 
 
The six largest NGOs who receive aid from the Norwegian government are the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Church Aid, NPA, the Norwegian Red Cross, 
Save the Children and Norwegian Missions in Development.276 The first four mentioned 
of these received approximately 400 million NOK each in 2007. This constitutes 55 per 
cent of the total support given through NGOs. 277 
 
Until 2004 Norad was responsible for long-term bilateral aid, while MFA was 
responsible for the administration of aid through international organisations such as the 
UN, the World Bank and the IMF, as well as emergency and humanitarian aid. In 2004 
the Norwegian development cooperation administration was re-organised, and the 
responsibility for long-term government-to-government cooperation with developing 
countries was transferred from Norad to the MFA. Also the responsibility of all 
embassies who work with aid was transferred to MFA. Norad is still responsible for a 
portion of the aid directed through NGOs, and is considered as an agency which 
contributes with independent professional advice to the aid business.278 NGOs can also 
receive funding for NGO-initiated activities or funding for a project implemented on 
behalf of Norad or MFA. Larger and more established organisations can obtain frame 
                                                 
274 Seminar at MFA 2006. 
275 Tvedt 1995, 103. 
276 Bistandsnemda, The Norwegian Missions in Development is an umbrella organisation which, on behalf 
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Online.)  
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agreements in support of their self-initiated activities. These agreements normally last for 
five years. In 1996, 18 organisations had such agreements and NPA is one of those. 279  
Norway in Lebanon 
 
It is obvious that the humanitarian support for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, past 
and present, is part of Norway’s foreign policy. The continuous support from the MFA to 
the NPA’s work in Lebanon has strong political backing.280 Approximately 3 per cent of 
the Norad budget which was channelled through NGOs was in 2000-2002 directed to the 
Middle East, with the oPt receiving the great majority of this.281 In 2006, due to the July 
war, Lebanon was number 12 on the list of countries receiving most aid from Norway. 
The following year it was out of the top 35 list.282 The Norwegian initiative to start a 
process for an international ban against cluster bombs after the 2006 war gave additional 
reasons to support NGOs, such as NPA, and countries, such as Lebanon, who were 
involved with or affected by cluster bombs.283  
 
The bilateral aid for Lebanon in 2006 was channelled mostly through Norwegian NGOs, 
with a share of 65.3 per cent. In addition, 4.2 per cent was given to local NGOs. None of 
the aid was given as government-to-government aid, while multi-bilateral aid constituted 
6 per cent of the total. The rest was shared between international NGOs (0.7 per cent) and 
Nordic Research institutions (1.2 per cent).284 As mentioned, 2006 was not a typical year 
due to the July war. 73.9 per cent of the total aid was given as “emergency aid and other 
                                                 
279 UD evaluation report 4.98 1998, 23. 
280 E-mail correspondence with MFA, 03.03.09. 
281 The Middle East in this context is the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and 
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284 Norad and MFA 2006, 41. MFA supports several international, Norwegian and local NGOs in Lebanon 
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unspecified.”285 It is however, typical in that the majority of aid to Lebanon is channelled 
through NGOs. 
 
NGOs’ role in development has been of increasingly greater importance over the last 30 
years. This is the trend in Norway, Lebanon and the world at large. NGOs are seen to 
have some advantages in comparison to other actors in the development aid system. As 
the discussion above shows, the reality is more complex than the theory, and the 
difference between NGOs and other actors may not necessarily be so great. In many 
aspects, NGOs are more a creation of international trends and pressure than of a natural 
need in their community. The relationship between governments, Northern INGOs and 
local NGOs, as well as between leaders of local NGOs and their community shows the 
complexity of this scene. Certain features of donors, INGOs and NGOs behaviour such as 
the division of humanitarian relief from development aid, and the preference of advocacy 
over service provision, creates sometimes unintended results on the ground. The next 
chapter will look into how local NGOs working in the Palestinian community have been 
integrated into the development aid system and how this has implications for their role in 
the Palestinian community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
285 Norad and MFA 2006, 41. In comparison, in the oPt 38.4 per cent of the bilateral aid was given as 
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Chapter 6 
Palestinian NGOs 
 
To talk about Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon is actually a bit misleading, as officially 
there is no such thing. Firstly, there is the theoretical dilemma of using the term “non-
governmental organisations”, when there is no government to work in partnership with or 
even to counterbalance. There is no effective Palestinian government and the Lebanese 
government has refused to cooperate with Palestinian organisations to a large extent since 
the end of the civil war in 1990.286 Secondly, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are 
prevented from establishing organisations by Lebanese law, as will be discussed below. 
However, in reality there are a wide range of “NGO-like” organisations which work in 
the Palestinian community and which consist of mostly Palestinian employees. This 
thesis, in the same manner as the Lebanese and Palestinian populations themselves, uses 
the term Palestinian NGOs to describe these organisations.287 In the synopsis in appendix 
I, 97 Palestinian NGOs are listed. This chapter will analyse what role these NGOs have 
taken on in the Palestinian community. 
The legal aspect 
 
The right to establish an association is guaranteed by Article 13 of the Lebanese 
constitution and is governed by the Ottoman Law of Associations of 1909, which in turn 
was based on the French Law of 1901.288 Everyone who wishes to form an association 
has to submit an application for notification of formation or founding to the Ministry of 
Interior in order to receive a license.289 In order to submit such an application, however, 
                                                 
286 This is discussed in Suleiman 1997, 397. 
287 For example The Daily Star writes an article about a demonstration made by “A coalition of Lebanese 
and Palestinian NGOs…” (The Daily Star, 9 January, 2009.) 
288 IRIS Online 02.11.08.  
289 Prior to 2005, NGOs had to be licensed, but this was changed to “A requirement to notify of the group’s 
formation.” (Freedom House Online 03.11.08.) The law is open for interpretations which mean that in 
practice different ministers have been able to grant or revoke licenses in accordance with the shifting 
political interests. In 1992 for example, the Ministry of Interior withdrew as many as 120 registrations, 
presumably a “clean up” after the Civil War. Between 1980 and 1999, the number of withdrawn 
registrations ranged from none to 8. (IRIS Online 02.11.08.) In the period after the Hariri assassination in 
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the founder of the association must be a Lebanese citizen.290 It means that Palestinians 
who wish to establish an association legally have to align with Lebanese friends or 
sympathisers to fulfil the requirements. The Lebanese have to register and be members of 
the boards on their behalf. They would set up a head office outside the camps and employ 
a certain number of Lebanese citizens to work there. The boards have to be comprised of 
a majority of Lebanese citizens.291 While the nominal leadership is comprised of 
Lebanese citizens, however, the executive bodies of these NGOs usually include 
Palestinian activists and the majority of their services are in the Palestinian community. 
These NGOs, while legally indistinguishable from Lebanese NGOs, are therefore de 
facto Palestinian NGOs.292 As long as the NGOs work only inside the camps, however, 
the Lebanese government has mostly tolerated their existence and the fact that they 
employ Palestinians.293 It can be argued that this is because they are providing services 
that the government is not willing to provide, and “Making the Palestinians not be thieves 
afterwards.”294 However, the lack of registration may be very negative for the NGO 
sector because it creates a lawless situation which could be misused.295 
 
At certain periods, particularly during the civil war, it has been impossible for Palestinian 
NGOs to register with a Palestinian name. The NGO now called Popular Aid for Relief 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005, the process to register was eased, then tightened again. (Interview with Jaber Suleiman 
17.01.2008.) 
290 The only exception is the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, (PRCS). (Shafie 2007, 15.) 
291 According to Laila Zakharia from WA, these Lebanese citizens do take their work as board members 
very seriously and represent Palestinian-Lebanese solidarity. “The people in these boards put their 
reputation at risk because they work with Palestinians, and they stay with them, and support them so that 
their NGO can continue to exist, and this is very beautiful.” (Interview with Laila Zakharia 22.01.2008) 
Others, like Haifa Jammal suggests that “Maybe if we had the right to establish NGOs we could choose 
Palestinian figures instead of Lebanese who could understand more.” (Interview with Haifa Jammal 
16.01.2008) In The National Institute for Social Care and Vocational Training, (Beit Atfal Al-Sumod) 
one of the major Palestinian NGOs, the board consists of six Lebanese and one Palestinian. (Interview 
with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008.) 
292 Suleiman 1997, 401. 
293 Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008, Suleiman 1997, both describe one NGO which had to close, 
The National Association for Vocational Training and Social services (NAVTSS) cf. appendix I. The 
reason for the closure was that the NGO was accused of being supported by PLO. (NPA 2004 (c).) 
294 Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008. 
295 “If you have money and find donors, you can rent a room and make a name and you have an NGO… An 
NGO should have a board of directors, a membership, account, sustainability, a legal audit. People are 
giving us money to spend it on the people, the donors; if you don’t have an audit, elections, board of 
directors, how can this be an NGO?…Without registration, [you can’t open a] bank account in the name 
of the organisation. We can work [without registration] but you have to open a bank account in your own 
name and that is not right, not helping us to be transparent.” (Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008.) 
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and Development (PARD) was originally named Palestinian Agency for Relief and 
Development (PARD).296 Lately, this restriction has been eased and, for example, the 
Palestinian Human Rights Organization was registered in 1997.297 The Lebanon-Support 
group now includes several NGOs who use the word Palestinian.298  
Classification of organisations 
 
The organisations that work in the Palestinian community can be divided into four main 
types as follows: Firstly, organisations that have received a license from the Lebanese 
government by following the procedure described above. In 2006 this was approximately 
20 organisations.299 According to the Ajial study from 2001, the licensed NGOs at the 
time represented 40 per cent of the total number of NGOs.300 Secondly, there are 
organisations that have legitimacy by virtue of their closeness to the PLO, such as the 
GUPW.301 Thirdly, some organisations are religious organisations. Finally, many 
Palestinian organisations choose or are not able to obtain notification of formation or 
founding and so function without a permit. They constitute about 40 per cent of the 
organisations working in the Palestinian community.302 However, many of these 
                                                 
296 Interview with Ahmad Sharour 17.01.2008 and Jaber Suleiman 17.01.2008. The same obstacle was 
faced by several INGOs. The Norwegian solidarity group the Palestine Committee started to send health 
workers to Palestinian camps in Lebanon in 1976. When PLO was evacuated in 1982 it became 
politically impossible to work under the name of a solidarity group in favour of the Palestinians. They 
therefore re-organised and established a humanitarian NGO, NORWAC. It did not take too long though 
before the Lebanese security found out that NORWAC was only a “cover” and the first coordinator was 
arrested and deported to Amman. However, through networks and contacts in the Lebanese society, 
NORWAC has been able to continue their work in Lebanon. (E-mail correspondence with NORWAC, 
13.11.08.) The Palestine Committee and NORWAC later split their organisations, and the Palestine 
Committee is today involved with a small solidarity project in Lebanon.    
297 Palestinian Human Rights Organization Online. 
298 Palestinian Arab Women [sic] League; Palestinian Children and Youth Institution; Palestinian Human 
Rights Organization; Palestinian Popular Committee – Beddawi; Palestinian Scouts and Guides 
Association; Palestinian Women’s Humanitarian Organization; and General Union of Palestinian Women 
are listed. (Lebanon-Support Online.) They are not all licensed, however.  
299 Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008. Since registrations have been somewhat eased in recent years 
the number might be slightly higher. It has not been possible to receive any accurate information from 
the Lebanese Ministry of Interior. The Ministry requested me to consult Lebanon-Support Online for that 
purpose and that online resource does not provide a comprehensive picture as will be discussed in 
appendix I. ( E-mail correspondence with Ministry of Interior & Municipalities, 06.03.09.) 
300 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4. The Ajial study operates with a total number of 46 Palestinian NGOs, which 
means that the percentage may not be accurate today, but it gives an idea of the situation.   
301 Interview with Amne Jibril 23.01.2008. The GUPW is a union which belongs to PLO. They are 
therefore not registered as an NGO with the Lebanese government, but they do run kindergartens, youth 
centres, and libraries; they cooperate with NGOs and in many ways function as an NGO. 
302 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4. The Ajial study includes all types of organisations. 
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organisations are small and limited in scope. In fact, most of these last three types of 
organisations lack the structure, operational procedures and legal independence that 
would classify them as NGOs.303 This study, however, also includes these types of 
organisations, because part of the study’s aim is to show the plethora of organisations 
present in the Palestinian refugee community.  
The history of Palestinian NGOs 
 
As has been discussed in chapter 5, the term NGO is quite a modern and western 
invention. However, charitable organisations have for a long time been part of the Arab 
world, through the so-called waqf system.304 In Mandatory Palestine, an array of 
organisations existed, such as religious bodies, clubs, labour unions, women’s societies, 
and charitable societies. During the national struggle in the 1920s and 1930s, many of 
these organisations were drawn into the political apparatus of the Palestinian national 
movement.305 When the Palestinians had to leave their stable society and became 
refugees it took some time before they were able to establish new organisations. As 
shown above, the Lebanese government prevented them from doing so, especially during 
the strict regime between 1959 and 1969, when no organisations were permitted to 
operate in the refugee camps.306 Before the 1970s there were only three Palestinian 
NGOs.307 During the PLO period in the 1970s, eight NGOs were established, in addition 
to the numerous PLO institutions.308 During the Lebanese civil war, the public sector in 
Lebanon overall was marginalised, which resulted in the emergence of numerous non-
governmental, private and voluntary organisations aiming to fill the gap left by the 
                                                 
303 Suleiman 1997, 398. 
304 Interview with Jaber Suleiman 17.01.2008. 
305 Norton (ed.) 1995, 246.   
306 Ajial 2001, ch. 2.1. 
307 Ajial 2001, ch. 2.1. These organisations are the Association for the Development of Palestinian Camps 
(al-Inash); PRSC; and the Palestinian Arab Women Union. (Also written as Palestinian Arab Women 
League, cf. footnote 298 and appendix I.) 
308 Ajial 2001, ch. 2.1 and Suleiman 1997, 410. These organisations are today the biggest NGOs and run 50 
per cent of all projects in 2001. They are Najdeh Association; National Association for Medical and 
Social Services (Beit Atfal Al- Sumod, also written as The National Institution for Social Care and 
Vocational Training and others cf. appendix I); Ghassan Kanafani Foundation; General Union of 
Palestinian Women; Palestinian Student Fund; Department of Refugee Affairs; and Beneficence 
Association for the Detainees and Captives. Suleiman adds Association Samed (1973) which in the Ajial 
study is called Palestinian Martyrs Works Society (Samed) and has no year of establishment. 
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absence of the governmental sector.309 For example the first project of the NGO The 
National Association for Social Medical Care & Vocational Training (NAMSVT) was 
based on the realisation that the majority of nurses at the PRCS hospital in Bar Elias in 
the Bekaa Valley had not received any formal training, but rather worked on experience 
in the health field. To correct this shortcoming, a training course was established for 20 
nurses from PRCS and other clinics in Bekaa.310  
 
As with NGOs in Mandatory Palestine, most of the NGOs in the Palestinian community 
in Lebanon had their roots in the Palestinian national movement’s mass mobilisation or 
national front strategy, but became increasingly linked to different political factions 
within PLO. The organisation structures were informal and there was an emphasis on 
voluntary work. From the mid 1960s to the early 1980s, PLO provided funding for the 
organisations through their allied factions. Simultaneously, some NGOs started to form 
contacts with European donor NGOs, and thus became a part of the development aid 
system.311 When PLO had to evacuate from Lebanon in 1982, the number of Palestinian 
NGOs increased to fill the void that was left with the disappearance of the PLO 
institutions. The greater dependence on foreign funding after this period also meant that 
the NGOs faced pressure to depoliticise themselves. 13 organisations were established in 
the 1980s, and another 21 in the 1990s, thus making a total of 46 NGOs in 2001 
according to the Ajial study.312 According to my registrations the number of large and 
small NGOs is today 97 as mentioned.313 The increase in the number of organisations 
from the Ajial study in 2001 until today reflects the popularity of the NGO channel in the 
world at large as well as the impact of the July 2006 war and the Nahr el-Bared crisis, in 
Lebanon in particular. Several organisations provide services in all Palestinian population 
concentrations, while others are concentrated in only one location. 
 
 
                                                 
309 PARD 2006, 9. 
310 NPA 2001 (c). 
311 Hammami 2000, 16. 
312 Ajial 2001, ch. 2.1. 16 of the organisations established in the 1990s were single project organisations.  
313 Cf. appendix I.  
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Field of work 
 
Palestinian NGOs are mainly working in service provision in order to fill the gaps that 
are not covered by UNRWA. As such they provide services that are much needed in the 
Palestinian community. As one NGO worker said: “Our people need more than the 
Lebanese people; they are supported from the government.”314 Health and pre-school 
education compromise 45 per cent of the projects of NGOs.315 Most of the kindergartens 
are run by NGOs; in 1997 20 NGOs ran 68 kindergartens.316 A number of organisations 
run fixed or mobile dispensaries and health clinics. They are also involved in 
rehabilitation for the disabled. Some are involved in environmental health, such as 
garbage collection, especially in the gatherings.317   
 
Vocational training is another field where many NGOs are active. Different NGOs 
provide training lasting for 3 to 12 months in over 30 different occupations.318 In addition 
to this there are a number of illiteracy classes, especially focusing on women. This field 
of work has, however, been criticised for not being very effective and not making the 
students able to find work afterwards. As one author described it: “The market had 
become over-saturated with people with similar qualifications and in the case of more 
specialised courses (e.g. typing, languages...), the methods and curriculum were so 
outdated that students could not meet the standards required.”319  
 
Some organisations are also involved in cultural heritage, folklore, oral history, 
embroidery and handicrafts.320 Other organisations offer social welfare, the most 
important being National Institution for Social Care and Vocational Training (Beit Atfal 
Al-Sumod), which runs a sponsorship project for orphans and children from vulnerable 
                                                 
314 Interview with Mariam Suleiman 18.01.2008 
315 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4. According to one study, health NGOs serving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
employ 1,533 people (900 full-time and 633 part-time) in addition to some 420 volunteers. (WA and 
NPA 2000, 5.)  
316 Suleiman 1997, 403. According to Aruri (ed.) 2001, 154, 18 kindergartens were located in Nahr el-
Bared, and I assume most of them were destroyed in the 2007 fighting. Today UNRWA runs five 
kindergartens that are supported by the French government. (Hillenkamp 2008, 3.) 
317 Suleiman 1997, 404. 
318 Suleiman 1997, 403. 
319 Abu-Habib 1996, unpaginated. 
320 Suleiman 1997, 405.   
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families.321 Income generation programs and micro-credit programs are also prevalent, 
but are limited in number and scope.322 Recently, some NGOs have started working with 
advocacy for Palestinian civil rights. As such, the NGOs may constitute a link between 
the Lebanese government, who are sceptical to talk to political factions, and the 
Palestinian community. In 2005, for example, 40 local NGOs, youth groups, women’s 
associations, labour associations, and individual activists participated in a campaign 
entitled “Civil Rights till Reaching the Right of Return.” 323 However, Palestinian NGOs 
are still limited in this respect and it is my understanding that their role continues to be 
mainly as providers of services and in charity.324 There are several reasons for this, such 
as funding mechanisms, and lack of coordination and planning which are further 
discussed below.  
Funding 
 
Since the Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon are affected by the overall Palestinian situation, 
they are influenced by many of the same mechanisms as the NGOs in Palestine. Political 
scientist Rex Brynen argues that prior to the establishment of PA, i.e. a state apparatus, 
the NGO sector there were “Responsible for a significant portion of the health, education, 
and social welfare sector, as well as development and other activities.”325 The NGO 
sector at that time received approximately US$170-240 million from the PLO, 
international donors and private benefactors. However, as a consequence of the Gulf War 
and the redirection of funds to the PA, the amount fell to US$60-90 million per year.326 
Funds were also redirected from the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the NGOs 
working there, to the development of Palestinian official institutions in the oPt. The 
refugees in Lebanon have no direct benefits from these institutions, however, and the 
                                                 
321 Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008 and visit to the Beit Atfal Al-Sumod centre in Rashidieh on 
several occasions.  
322 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4. 
323 NPA 2005 (a).  
324 Several of my interviewees answered that advocacy was not a part of their organisation’s work, but that 
they worked with human rights and civil rights for the Palestinians through the services they offered. 
They said that advocacy was mostly taken care of by the Coordination Forum. (Interviews with Kassem 
Aynaa 17.01.08., Ahmad Sharour 17.01.08. and Anni Kanafani 22.01.08.)  
325 Brynen 2000, 187. 
326 Brynen 2000, 187. 
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reduction of funding for NGOs therefore had greater implications for the refugees there 
than in oPt. 
 
NGOs working in the Palestinian camps today are almost entirely dependent on foreign 
support, with between 80 and 90 per cent of the resources coming from foreign donors.327 
The donors range from embassies; INGOs from Europe, America, Australia, Japan and 
Malaysia; the Gulf states; the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European 
Commission (ECHO); and the Welfare Association (WA).328 Reliance on foreign funding 
does, however, make the NGOs vulnerable to political agendas of the funding agencies. 
Once funds stop, many projects cease to exist.329 The funding is often given for only one 
or two years, which makes it difficult to make long-term plans. The Palestine Student 
Fund is an example of an NGO that used to be self-sustaining, but now has to apply for 
funds from INGOs and the general public. The organisation was set up in 1972 by Arab 
businessmen and intellectuals. Their aim was to provide loans for Palestinian students, 
the idea being that the students would pay back these loans, and in turn pay for new 
students. However, the Gulf war together with the deteriorating economic situation of the 
Palestinians in Lebanon meant that the organisation lost both donations and paybacks 
from the students and had to look for funding from other sources.330 
 
The introduction of western funding in the 1980s meant an expansion of activities and 
service provision, but also placed new demands on NGOs, both internally and externally, 
as discussed in chapter 5. It is clear that in the Palestinian NGO community there is a 
hierarchy in terms of which organisations have the easiest access to funding. The 
unlicensed, less professionalised organisations especially face problems to receive money 
from donors which apply certain criteria, such as accountability and sustainability. The 
process of fund-raising has become very bureaucratic and requires a certain level of 
economic, legal and administrative skills which many of these organisations lack. The 
                                                 
327 Khalidi 2001, 11.  
328 The Welfare Association is a Geneva based NGO, run by wealthy Palestinians. The funding information 
is compiled from interviews with Ahmad Sharour 17.01.2008, Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008, Anni 
Kanafani 22.01.2008 and Haifa Jammal 11.01.2008. 
329 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.3.6, and Suleiman 1997, 408.  
330 NPA 2001 (d). 
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limited dependency on local resources may give the NGOs few incentives for linking up 
with the grassroots, as mentioned in chapter 5. The Palestinian NGOs may be more 
accountable to foreign donors and Palestinian political factions than to a popular 
constituency. However, as also discusses in chapter 5, the employees of NGOs are 
relevant in that there is a new structuring of knowledge, practice and elite formation 
among them, i.e. the globalised elite.331 Hanafi and Tabar argue that it might be the 
increased elitism among NGO actors, rather than their connection to donors, that removes 
them from the grassroots. 332  
 
Palestinian NGOs receive no financial support from the Lebanese government, including 
those who are legally registered as Lebanese NGOs. For example, the Lebanese NGO 
kindergartens get a certain amount of financial support from the Government per child. 
The kindergartens run by Palestinian NGOs get no such support, even if they sometimes 
include Lebanese children.333 One must keep in mind that it is very difficult to fundraise 
in the Palestinian community itself, because so few have anything to spare.  
Employment 
 
One important aspect of the NGOs is that they offer employment opportunities to 
educated Palestinians. International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), and NGOs in 
all employ 13 per cent of the Palestinian population.334 As the employment situation for 
Palestinians remains difficult, this aspect of their work should not be underestimated; it 
provides some of the educated Palestinians with a reason to stay. Many are frustrated 
with the political organisations and they see NGOs as a way to get involved and “do 
something”. The salary level in the NGO sector is comparatively high and creates a much 
needed opportunity for Palestinians to earn a decent living. NGOs constitute an important 
employer, especially for women and the disabled.  
 
                                                 
331 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 63. 
332 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 250. 
333 Interview with Anni Kanafani 22.01.2008. 
334 Fafo 2003 (409), 142. They do not specify in the report what they consider to be IGOs rather than 
INGOs. 
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Many local NGOs have very stable staff, who have been working with the organisation 
for years. This is positive for the sustainability of the organisation, but may be negative 
for the development of the organisation.  The staff inevitably become very dependent on 
their job, and can sometimes be afraid to criticise the leadership and suggest changes.335 
This contrasts with most INGOs, who on many occasions hire local staff for only a 
certain project period. The INGO approach is undoubtedly more vulnerable for the local 
staff, who frequently have to look for a new job. It does, however, create job 
opportunities for a larger part of the Palestinian population.336 It may also make changes 
and development in the organisation move more smoothly. For the Palestinian population 
it could be suggested that it would be better with more stable working conditions, but this 
is not a feature of the INGO sector.  
 
The combination of education and high salaries has brought up accusations that NGOs 
are an employment sector for the (already) economically privileged.337 Rema Hammami 
writes: 
 
NGOs are among the few workplaces perceived to operate according to professionalism. They have thus 
become desirable workplaces for a new generation of middle class professionals who view NGO 
employment as a career path to more lucrative salaries and prestigious jobs in international organizations. 
Speaking English, dressing well and maintaining a nice office are all part of this new culture.338 
 
Both Rema Hammami, and Hanafi and Tabar, who talk about the development of a 
Palestinian globalised elite as mentioned in chapter 5, write about the NGO scene in 
Palestine. As I understand it, however, this development is also evident in Lebanon. 
There seems to be a majority of educated, non-camp refugees working in the local NGOs. 
This may mean that the employees in NGOs are sometimes removed from the “world” of 
their beneficiaries, i.e. those who are most in need in the community. The employees of 
NGOs are in a position where they control the distribution of resources in the Palestinian 
community to some extent, and this may place them in a position that is easy to abuse. As 
                                                 
335 Interview with I.  
336 Interview with F. 
337 Hammami 2000, and Hanafi and Tabar 2005. 
338 Hammami 2000, 27. 
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such, the employees of NGOs, particularly those in a high position, play an influential 
role as leaders in the Palestinian community. Their role is further enhanced by the lack of 
strong political leaders.  
Humanitarian relief versus development 
 
The situation for Palestinian NGOs has been characterised by the unstable political 
situation in Lebanon. They have had to adapt to the changing situations, sometimes 
having to function as emergency, relief NGOs, while in quieter periods transforming 
themselves into development NGOs. However, the constant emergence of new crises has 
meant that long-term projects are often replaced by emergency projects. In emergency 
situations, such as the 2006 war, the Palestinian NGOs have proved to be very effective 
in their coordination and distribution of emergency assistance.339 Inevitably, this has 
reduced the capacity for NGOs to develop and evaluate their projects. 
 
The humanitarian relief versus development dilemma, as discussed in chapter 5, greatly 
influences the funding of Palestinian NGOs. After the civil war they faced a decrease in 
aid provided by NGOs, states, and foreign governments that consider the struggle in 
Lebanon to have ended. 340 While there was little trouble in securing funding for the 
Palestinian NGOs between 1982 and 1990, they faced dramatic decreases in the 1990s.341 
After the war in 2006 and the Nahr el-Bared crisis in 2007, much funding was directed to 
emergency relief at the expense of development funding.342 However, as is the case with 
Nahr el-Bared, it is not enough to plan emergency programs lasting for only three 
months. The emergency situation has so far lasted for almost two years and requires long-
term planning and funding. The earmarking of donor money for certain projects has made 
it difficult to move the money around to where it is most needed. For example, the money 
that was given to rebuild the physical infrastructure of Nahr el-Bared could not be 
reallocated to provide food and shelter for the population in the meantime.343 
                                                 
339 Interview with Jaber Suleiman 17.01.2008.  
340 Al-Natour 2007. 
341 Edminister 1999, 20. 
342 Interview with Anni Kanafani 22.01.2008. 
343 The Daily Star, 25 September, 2008. 
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Coordination and planning 
 
Coordination between Lebanese and Palestinian NGOs has been almost non-existent. An 
explanation for this is that “The priorities for Lebanese and Palestinian NGOs are 
different.”344 Interestingly, the only cooperation which has taken place between 
Palestinian and Lebanese NGOs in advocacy is concerned with the right of return. During 
periods of war and crisis, the coordination is greater.345 Recently, the LPDC has initiated 
some efforts to encourage coordination.346 
 
The lack of planning and coordination among Palestinian NGOs has been raised as a 
major problem by several sources.347 It is linked to the factionalism of the Palestinian 
community with every political party historically having their own NGO.348 As Haifa 
Jammal states, “The NGOs are independent, but some… most of them are little bit 
affiliated with political parties.”349 Officially, however, most of the NGOs themselves 
claim to be apolitical and insist that their services are for the whole population. The 
funding from international agencies has, as mentioned, given the NGOs the opportunity 
to distance themselves from the political factions.350 However, many of the people 
working with NGOs have earlier worked for different political factions.351 It is my 
experience that the camp population still regards certain NGOs as belonging to this or 
that political party and chooses to use only certain NGOs services because of that. There 
is also a widespread belief in the Palestinian population that the NGOs only provide help 
for “their” people.352  
 
                                                 
344 Interview with Haifa Jammal 16.01.2008.  
345 During the 2006 war, for example many Lebanese sought refuge in the Palestinian camps and were 
taken care of by Palestinian NGOs. In the rebuilding of Nahr el-Bared, Lebanese NGOs also take part. 
346 In July 2007 they organised a “Dialogue Session: The Role of Volunteerism and Humanitarian Work in 
Bringing the Lebanese and Palestinian Communities Closer together” and a workshop called 
“Coordination of Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Initiatives” in November 2008. (LPDC Online.) 
347 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4; Suleiman 1997; 408 and Sullivan 1996, 95. 
348 Sullivan 1996, 95. 
349 Interview with Haifa Jammal 16.01.2008. 
350 Hammami 2000, 17.  
351 Interview with Jaber Suleiman 17.01.2008.  
352 Conversations with several Palestinian refugees. 
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In an effort to improve the coordination, The Coordination Forum of the NGOs working 
among the Palestinian Community was established in 1994. The Forum includes the 
majority of NGO’s working in the Palestinian community.353 It consists today of 18 
NGOs who are all legally registered with the Lebanese government.354 Foreign NGOs 
have the right to be full members or, if they wish, to apply for “observer status”. In 1997 
NPA had such observer status together with Save the Children, UK branch.355 In my list 
from 2008, however, NPA is listed as the only foreign observer together with the WA.356 
From the answers I received from INGOs it appears that the Coordination Forum is 
regarded as a forum for local NGOs, and none of my INGO sources had considered 
joining. While some are very positive to the Forum, there seems to be some confusion as 
to what the Forum is and what it is supposed to do.357 Several of the Palestinian NGOs 
stated that the Forum was not very effective.358 The strategy of the Coordination Forum 
was revised in 2005.359 
 
The lack of coordination leads to insufficient utilisation of available resources and 
duplication of projects. As an example, many organisations are involved in kindergartens, 
but very few cater for the young and the old. One explanation behind the concentration in 
services may be that these services are the easiest to get funding for.360 For example, 
                                                 
353 Suleiman 1997, 402. 
354 The Coordination Forum of NGOs Working among the Palestinian Community in Lebanon: List of 
members and member information, received from Haifa Jammal, 11.01.08. However, this list does not 
coincide with Suleiman 1997, 410; he names 17, and not all are mentioned in the above list.  
355 Suleiman 1997, 410. 
356 The Coordination Forum of NGOs Working among the Palestinian Community in Lebanon: List of 
members and member information, received from Haifa Jammal, 11.01.08.  
357 Examples of answers to my question about the Coordination Forum: “We are in constant contact with 
them and I think their work is very efficient in avoiding overlapping and duplication in the different 
projects implemented by INGOs and NGOs.” (Interview B.) “I think this forum most recently was 
reactivated in order to fundraise for Naher El-Bared [sic]. I don’t think the Forum actually exists as one 
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see what this would offer as I think the forum already shares what it produces (when it produces 
something) with us.” (Interview D.) “[We] are not part of the Coordination Forum either which is for 
local organizations working in the Palestinian community.” (Interview F.) “It is a problem that they do 
not include everybody. It is difficult to join for new NGOs.” (Interview G.) 
358 Interview with Jaber Suleiman 17.01.2008 and Ahmad Sharour 17.01.2008. “18 organisations have 
different attitudes, also as everything else in this country, influenced by political forces.” (Interview with 
Anni Kanafani 22.01.2008.) Also other coordination committees are mentioned like the Palestinian 
Civilian Rights Committee, but their work is claimed to be infrequent and limited.  
359 NPA 2005, (b). 
360 Interview with Soheil El-Natour 16.01.2008. 
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health services and income generation programs are limited in scope.361 According to 
Soheil El-Natour the reason why few NGOs are engaged in the health sector is because it 
requires a lot of money. Due to the legal requirements it is extremely difficult for 
Palestinian NGOs to get medication and instruments through the Lebanese customs.362 
 
The services are also not distributed evenly in different areas; for example, there are five 
vocational training programs in the El-Buss camp, while the neighbouring camp of 
Rashidieh has none.363 Some camps have many projects, while others with a larger 
population have comparatively few.364 The Palestinian gatherings have very few NGOs 
working among them. One result of the lack of long-term development plans and 
coordination are that projects are implemented without seeing the broader picture. As an 
example, the percentage of illiteracy continues to be high even after many years of 
literacy courses. Soheil El-Natour suggests that it is, “Because it is not linked with the 
social development of the family of the woman, and the women together.”365 In other 
words, Palestinian NGOs are too limited by financial and administrative constraints so 
that they are not able to provide the long-term planning that the Palestinian community 
needs. Today there is an increase in the influence from Islamic NGOs that are close to 
Salafi groups and Hamas. They rely mostly on their own sources of funds, zakat 
contributions and support from the Palestinian diaspora.366 This is quite a recent 
development and creates new challenges for the existing secular NGO environment.367 So 
far there is little cooperation between the secular and Islamist NGOs.368 
“Hot topics”  
 
In the donor agencies and the NGO community there are what can be called “hot topics”, 
as we saw in chapter 5. Many projects are started on the basis of the demands from the 
                                                 
361 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.3. 
362 Interview with Soheil El-Natour 16.01.2008. The customs procedure is difficult for International NGOs 
too, and almost impossible for Palestinian NGOs. 
363 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.2.4. 
364 Ajial 2001, ch. 3.3.5.  
365 Interview with Soheil El-Natour 16.01.2008. 
366 Hanafi and Tabar 2005, 242. Zakat is the Islamic principle of giving a percentage of one’s income to 
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367 “They are more supported because they have their people.” (Interview with Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008.) 
368 Interview with Haifa Jammal 16.01.2008 and Kassem Aynaa 17.01.2008.  
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funding agencies and not necessarily on the local priorities and needs.369 Often the 
priorities of the international donors are not those of the Palestinian community. 
Especially problematic is the continual need for service provision in the Palestinian 
community in relation to the donors’ focus on the “hot topics” such as democracy, gender 
and the environment. For example, it is easier to get support for workshops about 
children’s rights than to get support for the running cost of a kindergarten. 370 Soheil El-
Natour recalls that the infliction of the “hot topics” in the Palestinian NGO community, 
especially after the Oslo Agreement was met with “A generally complete fear, how can 
we think of developing society which doesn’t have anything of a real stable society?”371 
Anni Kanafani recounts: 
 
For example, women empowerment is very much in fashion now; we do not have a direct program on this, 
but since we started our first kindergarten we did empower women by employing them, giving them a 
chance to receive education, to have a salary, to give the mother a chance to work and take education. It is 
part of our holistic approach, empowerment in an indirect way. But you have to convince the donors that 
this is acceptable for them.372  
 
The result of the dissonance between the needs of the community and the demands from 
the donors, is that the NGOs have often adopted their already existing programs into the 
NGO speak. 
Corruption and politics 
 
As mentioned, Palestinian NGOs in general lack connection to the grassroots, and are 
characterised by a lack of democratic structures. Only 6 per cent of the Palestinian 
population are members of an organisation, whether it is a women, youth, social, sports, 
cultural or religious organisation.373 Many organisations are run by a single individual 
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whose decisions are final.374 This creates an atmosphere of mistrust and indifference from 
the population and reduces the opportunity to recruit volunteers. Some NGOs leaders 
have been accused of benefiting personally from the money received for the NGOs 
work.375 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish if this accusation is true or false. 
However, the fact that this accusation is prevalent amongst the camp population suggests 
that the NGOs still have much work to do to become transparent and trustworthy, not 
only towards donors and the NGO community, but towards the people they are supposed 
to serve.  
 
Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon are undoubtedly offering some very important social 
services for the Palestinian community. They also constitute an important employer for 
the educated Palestinians. However, they continue to face many of the challenges that are 
quite common to Southern NGOs, such as weak financial and managerial foundations. 
Since the early 1980s they have entered the development aid system and are competing 
for funds and attention with NGOs all over the world. As such, Palestinian NGOs in 
Lebanon have both the advantage and disadvantage of being part of a political issue. 
They receive attention because they are part of a high profile conflict, but simultaneously 
may be neglected in relation to the core areas of the conflict, the West Bank and Gaza. As 
part of the development aid system, they have to adjust to the “hot topics” of the moment. 
It might also make the NGO actors feel somewhat removed from the grassroot, and part 
of a globalised elite. The Palestinian NGOs are very much affected by the volatile 
situation in Lebanon, and the challenge of combining relief with development. The 
volatile situation is part of the explanation to why there is a lack of long-time planning 
among the NGOs. Another factor is the divided Palestinian community which has made 
coordination difficult. Some of the “cultures” found in Palestinian NGOs are quite 
prevalent in Lebanese society in general, such as hierarchical organisational structures 
and links to political entities. However, some features, such as the ambiguous process of 
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legislation, and the uncertain future of their target population are unique for Palestinian 
NGOs. This chapter has made it clear that my first hypothesis was too optimistic of the 
Palestinian NGOs’ ability to become agents of change. They are too limited by financial 
and administrative weaknesses, as well as a lack of coordination and cooperation in the 
local NGO community, and as such confirm my second hypothesis. The next chapter will 
look into whether INGOs have been able to play such a role in the Palestinian 
community. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The role of International NGOs in Lebanon 
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, an increasingly large part of development aid is channelled 
through NGOs, and large INGOs receive a major share of this. It is therefore worth 
presenting some history and characteristics of the INGOs which work in Lebanon. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to go into detail on every INGO present in the Palestinian 
community in Lebanon. The thesis will provide an analysis of one of them, the NPA, in 
chapter 8. However, according to the synopsis of NGOs in appendix I, as many as 62 
INGOs have been present at some time in the Palestinian community.  
 
In the development aid system described in chapter 5, INGOs play an important role in 
shaping the organisational landscape. They are supported by many donors: the UN 
system; their “home governments”; other governments; and NGO networks. They are 
many and large, and run a multitude of activities; they have access to substantial funds 
and they manage the “NGO speak”.376 They therefore wield much more power and 
potential for influence than the Palestinian NGOs, and should in that respect have a 
greater opportunity to act as agents of change. However, INGOs also suffer from some 
constraints, which means that they are not always capable of realising their full potential. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, NGOs per se do not necessarily hold the comparative 
advantages they are said to, compared to governments or multilateral organisations. Most 
importantly though, for the role of INGOs in the Palestinian community, they do not 
necessarily relate to the Palestinian refugees as a “special case”, but treat them like any 
other object of relief. Whilst doing so, they are obscuring the refugees’ autonomy and 
prerogatives as parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as Weighill argues.377 The fact that the 
Palestinian refugees as part of a long-term political conflict have been objects of relief for 
more than 60 years has not necessarily affected the INGOs’ working methods. In fact, the 
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political feature of the “Palestinian refugee problem” has played to their disadvantage 
when it comes to the activities of INGOs as will be explained below.  
History and scope of work 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the responsibility for the refugees in Lebanon was initially 
accorded to the League of Red Cross Societies. The initial relief operations seem to have 
been implanted in quite a patronising way, as this excerpt from a Red Cross report 
illustrates:  
 
Experience has proved that conditions were too unstable, poverty too great, and political and personal 
influence too prevalent to allow main responsibilities to be put into the hands of local people. After a few 
unpleasant experiences, all main control of funds, supplies and ration cards distribution had to be taken 
back by the Swiss delegates. 378 
 
As the initial emergency situation became permanent, the Red Cross handed the 
responsibility over to the UN. It is, after all, not in the mandate of a humanitarian NGO to 
act as a government. 
 
The first INGOs that supported local NGOs during the 1970s and 1980s were solidarity 
groups that played a major role during this period with a focus on relief.379 For example, 
the Norwegian Palestine committee started to send health workers to Lebanon in 1976 to 
work in the hospitals of the Palestinian camps.380 In the western political environment at 
the time, with a strong support for Israel, it was not clear that European and American 
NGOs should get involved with projects in support or even in relation to Palestinian 
refugees. Most donors preferred to channel the assistance to Palestinian refugees through 
UNRWA. As a result, very few INGOs were active in the Palestinian community. 
According to the Ajial study, only two foreign organisations were engaged in service 
provision for Palestinian refugees before 1982.381 In Lebanon the situation changed 
somewhat with the civil war, especially after the massacres of Sabra and Shatila. The 
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public in Europe and America became aware of the refugee camps in Lebanon and there 
was increased public demand for emergency relief for them. However, for many donors 
and NGOs the political aspect of getting involved with the Palestinian refugees was still 
problematic. Some international agencies ran separate programs for Lebanese and 
Palestinians, while others ignored Palestinians altogether.382 According to the Ajial study, 
by the end of the 1980s only six INGOs had established offices in Lebanon and worked 
with the Palestinian community.383 When one bears in mind that there was a civil war at 
the time and a high need for emergency relief, the number of INGOs is not impressive.  
 
With the beginning of the peace process in 2001, many NGOs adopted a “wait and see” 
attitude to planning assistance for Palestinians in Lebanon. They did not want to be 
accused of predicting the outcome of the political negotiations or of increasing the post-
war tensions between the Palestinians and the Lebanese community.384 After the 
establishment of the PA in the West Bank and Gaza, many of the INGOs followed the 
donors’ wishes and focused their attention there. However, the peace process also made it 
more politically acceptable for the home public of the INGOs to get involved with 
Palestinian refugees also in Lebanon. This, together with the overall increase of NGOs as 
discussed in chapter 5, meant that in the 1990s, 13 new organisations got involved in the 
Palestinian community in Lebanon.385  
 
In the Ajial study from 2001, 20 INGOs are listed which extend direct or indirect support 
to the Palestinian community. The July 2006 war and the Nahr el-Bared crisis in 2007 
brought a number of new INGOs to Lebanon, as illustrated in appendix I, with the total 
number now being 62. Some of them stayed on after the emergency situation and 
established offices in Lebanon. A number of them got involved in the Palestinian 
community. In coherence with the development of NGOs in general, few of the INGOs in 
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Lebanon today are acting as solidarity groups and the majority are closer to the model of 
professionalised INGOs.386 This means that they to a larger extent provide humanitarian 
assistance as a business, more than doing work based on a strong feeling of solidarity 
with the beneficiaries. Only a few INGOs are running their own operational development 
projects. Some of them are involved with short-term projects, especially in rebuilding 
after warfare. As such they provide important, albeit unstable, employment opportunities 
for the Palestinian community. Most of them are, however, working through local 
organisations and maintain a purely financial role. It continues to be difficult for INGOs 
to raise funds for work in the Palestinian community. The American Near East Refugee 
Aid (ANERA) writes in their 2008 annual report:  
 
ANERA is unique among American NGOs in Lebanon in that supporting Palestinians has historically been 
our primary mandate.  The challenge we face is a lack of funds to support work with Palestinians in 
Lebanon.  Institutional donors (e.g. USAID, UN agencies, and foundations) tend to have support for 
Lebanese communities as their first priority, and private donors who are willing to assist Palestinians have 
generally focused their generosity to attempt to respond to the ever-deteriorating conditions in Palestine, 
especially Gaza.387 
The characteristics of INGOs in the Palestinian community 
 
A striking feature of the INGOs is that many of them are only involved in the refugee 
community for a short period. This is true of most staff of international organisations. 
Most of the INGOs are relief organisations that come to the country whenever there is an 
emergency. Some of them have been present in Lebanon for many years though, which 
reflects the volatile situation in the country. In the words of one Red Cross employee, 
“Come to think of it, if the ICRC needs to be in a country for 40 years, that's bad 
news."388 Since many INGOs, and their personnel, are only present for a short period of 
time, coordination and long-term planning becomes difficult. An example of an attempt 
to improve coordination is the ENGO group, which was established in June 2005.389 This 
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was a group of European NGOs which all worked in the Palestinian community and there 
was a wish to coordinate their activities better. The group started out with six 
organisations, but by 2006 they consisted of 13 member organisations. In the summer of 
2007, they contracted a consultant to develop a common strategic framework for all the 
groups.390 Due to the Nahr el-Bared crisis and the involvement of most of the group 
members in the relief work, the availability to provide input to the report was somewhat 
limited, but the report provides quite an extensive list of the main activities undertaken by 
these organisations and their local partners. The initiative to establish a coordination 
group for European NGOs was really a positive step in order to improve the long-term 
planning for INGOs’ work in the Palestinian community. However, the fate of the ENGO 
group is also an example that INGOs are quite unstable actors. To my knowledge, the 
ENGO group had dissolved by autumn 2008. The explanation for this was that some of 
the most active expatriate staff left to work in other countries and also that some of the 
member NGOs finished their work in Lebanon after the initial emergency phase 
following the July war and Nahr el-Bared crisis.391  
Advocacy 
 
It should be evident from chapter 4 that most of the social problems of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon are due to political and economical constraints, rather than cultural 
attitudes. However, as political scientist Sheila Carapico comments in an article about 
NGOs, one characteristic of INGOs is that:  
 
In the ‘liberal’ thinking of Western NGOs social problems like female unemployment are attributed to 
attitudes and lifestyles, while they may overlook political and economical constraints in the societies. The 
NGO solution is therefore to ‘change’ the individual, not society.392   
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As discussed in chapter 1 there are disagreements in the NGO community about what the 
role of NGOs should actually be. As I argued, in the case of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, the biggest potential influence of INGOs is to change the society, not the 
individual. In other words, to advocate and lobby towards their own governments and 
other decision makers about the refugees’ situation in order to bring about a durable 
solution. It appears to me that the INGOs are fully aware of this; the ENGO report for 
example concludes:  
 
What the report shows is that there will be no sustainable solution unless there is a profound change in the 
national and international laws and mechanisms to protect the rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 
in the region. The ENGO, as a group, has the potential to influence decision-makers and donors to find a 
more durable solution in this direction. 393   
 
For the ENGO group the cooperation ended, and as such the potential as a group to 
influence decision-makers. The lack of cooperation and continuation then appears to be a 
major disadvantage for INGOs in this respect. However, it seems clear that advocacy will 
continue to be one of the most important aspects of the work of INGOs. An example of 
successful advocacy is the Danish Refugee Council, which has worked to raise awareness 
about the situation of non-ID refugees in Lebanon394 Their survey report about non-ID 
refugees has been used as a tool in the work to change the situation for this group of 
refugees.  
Working in the Palestinian community  
 
In the Palestinian community where most of the population is deprived of their most 
basic civic rights, it is sometimes difficult to know where to start. There are examples of 
INGOs who come to the Palestinian community and implement programs that are not 
really needed or even wanted by the refugees. It is in the nature of gifts, however, that 
few will refuse to accept what they are given. This excerpt from a newspaper article 
illustrates the issue:  
                                                 
393 ENGO 2007, 1. 
394 LPDC 2008, and Danish Refugee Council & Palestinian Human Rights Organization 2005. Save the 
Children Sweden together with NPA is also doing valuable work in this field. (Cf. The Daily Star, 29 
November, 2008 (b).) 
 96 
 
‘Here in their hands is the ability to learn and connect to the world,’ said Middle East director of ‘One 
Laptop Per Child Europe’, Matt Keller. Sahar Dabdoub, head teacher at the Ramallah School in Chatila 
said, ‘This is very important. It will be easier for the students to use their minds and to practice working.’ 
… However, there was also some scepticism about the program’s priorities. ‘It’s good for the children, but 
there are more important things,’ said Najiba, a teacher, as her students excitedly examined their new 
computers. ‘Ensuring their fathers’ right to work would be more beneficial.’ 395  
 
The excerpt is included here not to discredit the work of one NGO in particular, but to 
illustrate the particular limitations of NGOs which are involved with single projects, and 
perhaps do not understand the environment they enter into. The excerpt also illustrates 
the ambiguous feelings of many Palestinian refugees, who have seen INGOs come and go 
for several decades, but perhaps do not see how this in the long run, has affected their 
situation for the better.        
  
INGOs hold a potential to act as agents of change through their connections to political 
actors at home and abroad. They often have strong financial and managerial foundations, 
at least compared to local NGOs. However, they are most often very volatile actors, and 
are present in the Palestinian community only for a period of time, and as such with a 
short-term vision. Their strength in advocacy is severely limited by these factors. INGOs 
have also been very wary about the political aspect of the Palestinian issue, and 
humanitarian support for Palestinians has at times been difficult for many INGOs to 
engage in. Due to these limitations, INGOs have contributed with important emergency 
aid, but have in general lacked the long-term development commitment to the Palestinian 
community. The main role of INGOs is therefore a financial one in that they are 
providing funds for the Palestinian NGOs. It appears then that my second hypothesis is 
mostly correct concerning the work of most INGOs in Lebanon. They are too limited by 
some features of INGOs, in particular their short-term presence to play a leading role as 
agents of change in the Palestinian community. In the next chapter I will present my case 
study of one INGO which unlike most has been present for a long time, and see what role 
they have taken on in the refugee community. 
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Chapter 8 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
 
This chapter will present a case study of NPA, and the role the organisation plays in the 
Palestinian community, with particular focus on their ability to become an agent of 
change. The chapter will highlight what is characteristic for NPA as an international 
organisation and how these characteristics have influenced their work in Lebanon. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to give an in depth evaluation of the quality of NPA’s 
work or their organisational structure; this has been done quite thoroughly by the 2001 
evaluation report mentioned in chapter 1.396 In this chapter I will firstly introduce NPA as 
an INGO and dwell upon some issues which they themselves consider to be their 
comparative advantages in relation to other INGOs. Secondly, I will give an outline of 
NPA’s history in Lebanon and its current program there and analyse their role in relation 
to the Palestinian community. 
 
This thesis argues that NPA is quite extraordinary in their relation to the Palestinian 
community. There is no other INGO that has been present continuously in the Palestinian 
community for so long and with such a large staff. NPA is in fact an international NGO 
gone local. This is how NPA Lebanon presents itself, and it is also a view raised by both 
the local population and other NGOs. In the process it has avoided some of the pitfalls 
that INGOs might be affected by, as discussed in chapter 7. However, while becoming a 
“local organisation” has many advantages, NPA has also picked up some of the less 
valuable aspects of being local, as discussed in chapter 6. 
NPA International 
 
NPA is the humanitarian solidarity organisation of the Norwegian Labour Movement. It 
was founded in 1939 by the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO).397 It is 
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today one of the largest NGOs in Norway and its four main focuses are youth work, 
health work and community orientated work in Norway, as well as international work.398 
 
In Norwegian aid politics during the 1960s, the principle of neutrality in conflicts was 
seen as fundamental in order for NGOs to get governmental support. During the 1970s, 
however, there was an increased pressure from the public to open up long-term aid for 
national and social people’s movements. NPA, with its roots in the social democratic 
labour movement, were given project support in line with parliament decisions and 
through MFA, primarily to the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.399 The 
International Department of NPA was established in 1976. Before 1981, however, the 
international activities of NPA were rather modest, and basically consisted of emergency 
relief to populations hit by natural disasters, support for ANC and solidarity 
commitments with Chile and Nicaragua.400  
 
The international aspect of NPA’s work has grown extensively since then. Between 1981 
and 1991, there was an increase in projects from 7 to 99.401 During the 1990s NPA 
continued to expand and was in fact the Norwegian NGO with the most expansive 
development, with an increase of state support of more than 255 million NOK from 1991 
to 1996. Much of this growth was a result of NPA getting involved in mine clearance 
work. NPA was approached by MFA in 1992 and asked if they were interested in 
engaging in this field of work. At the end of the 1990s NPA was the Norwegian NGO 
with the largest budget for international work.402 Today NPA has local or regional offices 
in 13 countries and projects in 36 countries in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
Asia, and the Middle East.403 NPA is today considered the world’s largest humanitarian 
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de-mining organisation. Its international work is focused along three lines: support for 
liberation movements and other groups who are fighting for political and social rights; 
support for local organisations in their fight against poverty, for human rights and even 
distribution of sources; and lastly, in mine clearance and political work to ban cluster 
bombs.404 In the Middle East, aside from Lebanon, NPA has worked in the oPt since 
1987 and in the Kurdish part of Iraq since 1995. More recently, NPA established a mine 
clearance program in Jordan in 2006. 
Solidarity and partnership 
 
“Solidarity in Practice” is today the slogan of NPA. While NPA at the outset presented 
itself more as an aid organisation, it has increasingly emphasised that it is a solidarity 
organisation.405 As mentioned in chapter 5, solidarity is regarded as an important aspect 
of Norwegian NGOs in general, and for NPA this aspect seems especially strong. 
Solidarity means that NPA supports groups so that they will themselves be able to defend 
and promote their own interests. The method which is used to achieve this has since the 
mid-1990s been working through partnership with local NGOs.406 NPA emphasises 
playing a supportive rather than a leading role and seems aware of the different 
limitations for developing partnerships, such as the imbalance of power between 
Northern and Southern NGOs.407 It appears to me that NPA has come a long way in 
thinking about what partnerships entail.  
 
In 2003 NPA presented a new strategy for international development. The strategy 
defined a change in the overall direction of NPA, and indicated an attempt to move 
further away from being an operational NGO providing service, to being a rights-based 
organisation which works with partners.408 Both NPA and partner organisations it works 
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with should be rights-based, which entails that the organisations must acknowledge and 
respect the human rights. The strategy for 2008-2011 continues along the same lines.409 It 
should be noted that these kinds of changes take time and the organisation is still in a 
transition process. 
Political aspects of NPA’s work 
 
NPA is not a politically neutral organisation and considers this as one of its major 
advantages. “We take a stand in important social debates. Our aim of achieving greater 
fairness in the world means that we often choose partners who can be opposed to the 
authorities.”410 In its partnership program NPA states: “Respecting the priorities defined 
by local actors, NPA does not aspire to be neutral, but rather to take sides, supporting 
partners that stand for the same fundamental values and development objectives as us.”411 
NPA therefore considers it important to be present in politically difficult areas. This has 
become a trademark of the organisation and an important aspect of the organisation’s 
identity. An NPA employee answers this when asked about in what way he/she thinks 
NPA is distinct from other NGOs: “[I] think that NPA is different because it has chosen 
to take sides in conflicts, which implies that we sometimes have been able to come closer 
to our target groups.”412 
Funding aspects of NPA International 
 
In 1983 NPA acquired the revenues from the Norwegian “Television Campaign.” This is 
an annual event, where the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) links up with 
Norwegian NGOs to raise money for different causes. The campaign raised 
approximately 70 million NOK and made it possible for NPA to increase its international 
work. An MFA evaluation report from 1992 showed that NPA had a very weak funding 
base in the 1980s and 1990s because so much of its work and expansion was based on 
this one-time fundraising event.413 The scope of the organisation and work exploded but 
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the sources of income did not follow suit.414 It is argued in the report that the difficult 
financial situation was the reason for NPA’s increased focus on emergency aid and 
refugees. In 1988 these projects constituted 2/3 of the total project volume and by 1991 
they had become 3/4 of the total. The evaluation report writes:  
 
It is not without connection to these hard institutional and economic facts that NPA is focusing more on 
what is called ‘long-term emergency aid’, where organisations have committed to provide aid in chronic 
emergency situations, and where the finance comes from MFA’s political office. The organisation has few 
possibilities to fulfil NORAD’s [sic] demands for an individual share, if not an economic miracle, like a 
new national ‘Television Campaign’ happens. NPA can in this way be an example of the ambiguity of 
building aid activity on the base of an individual share which was a one time fundraising.415  
 
This was written in 1992 and luckily for NPA the miracle happened. In 1994 NPA was 
again assigned the outcome of the “Television Campaign” and this time 123 million 
NOK was raised.416 Today, NPA international derives close to 95 per cent of its funds 
from state funding from Norway, as well as other governments.417 37 per cent of all funds 
in 2005 came from international donors.418 The remaining funds come from LO and the 
trade unions, private donations, as well as lotteries and games.419 NPA Head Office 
continues, however, to face financial challenges.420 In 2007, NPA developed a new, 
regular donor concept, called folkehjelper.no, which was expected to show significant 
results in 2008.421  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, the Norwegian aid for long-term assistance is generally 
channelled through Norad, while MFA is responsible for emergency and humanitarian 
aid. NPA has several projects which are funded mainly through MFA, and Lebanon 
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represents the longest running program.422 The financial resources from Norad make up 
an increasingly small share of the total, despite the fact that NPA intends to move away 
from operational activities and focus more on rights, i.e. long-term work, as its strategy 
implies. It seems like the financial realities which the evaluation report from 1992 
described are still valid.  
NPA in Lebanon 
The beginning (1981-1982) 
 
The NPA program in Lebanon was among the first programs to be established by the 
International Department of NPA.423 At the end of 1980 the Palestine Front, one of two 
Norwegian solidarity movements with the Palestinian people, approached NPA in search 
of support for Palestinian children in southern Lebanon. They emphasised that, “The 
medical support work can in our opinion be regarded as a solely humanitarian and 
civilian project, and does not implicate a direct stance to the controversial political 
questions such as recognition of PLO etc.”424 This was at a time in Norwegian politics 
when political and humanitarian support for the Palestinian case and the Palestinian 
people were politically controversial. However, the LO congress in 1981 decided to 
support the establishment of cooperation with the Palestinian Workers Union (PTUF).425 
The commitment of NPA for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was therefore 
controversial, but not impossible.426 During 1981 NPA supported some small projects in 
Lebanon financially. 
 
 
 
                                                 
422 These are the programs in Lebanon (1981); Sri Lanka (2002); Northwest Russia (1998); the Balkans 
(first program in Albania 1995); and Northern Iraq (1995). Norad 2007, 64. (Year of establishment 
compiled from NPA Online.)  
423 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 23. 
424 Note from the Palestine Front (my translation.) The other solidarity group was the Palestine Committee, 
the precursor of NORWAC, cf. footnote 296. 
425 “LO- bladet” 1996/1997, 3. LO had since the Second World War been in a close relationship with the 
Israeli Workers Union, Histadrut. The decision to establish contact with PTUF was taken after intense 
debate both within the congress and in the Norwegian media.  
426 For further information about Norwegian attitudes and politics to the Palestine/Israel conflict cf. Berg 
2003, ch.2. 
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Early days (1982-1987) 
 
In September 1982 the massacres of Sabra and Shatila led to international outrage, and 
resulted in important solidarity manifestations in favour of the Palestinians. In Norway 
the media coverage was broad and economic support was collected among labour unions 
and the Norwegian population. NPA coordinated the humanitarian tasks and the Palestine 
Front the political ones. While other Norwegian NGOs continued to hold a low profile in 
the Palestinian issue, NPA now established a program in support of the Palestinians.427 
As mentioned earlier, NPA acquired the revenues from the national “Television 
Campaign” in 1983 and the implementation of these funds constituted the proper 
initiation of a NPA Lebanon Program. When Israeli forces withdrew from Beirut in 1983, 
NPA had established a presence in the Shatila refugee camp. NPA chose to promote 
physical rehabilitation for war victims, and established a physical rehabilitation centre in 
the Shatila camp in January 1984. A project had also been started to collect garbage in 
the immediate surroundings of Shatila.428 In April 1984, Wafa Yassir was recruited to 
prepare a vocational training centre in Shatila, and later a second centre was initiated in 
the Burj el-Barajneh camp. In 1986, Wafa Yassir was appointed as Resident 
Representative of the NPA Lebanon Program, and continues to hold this position today. 
 
In the early 1980s Beirut was considered to be one of the most dangerous cities in the 
world. The Norwegian staff had to evacuate on several occasions and it was difficult to 
maintain follow-up and implementation of projects under these circumstances. The local 
staff had to take on larger tasks than anticipated.429 In 1985 the “War of the Camps” 
began and made it even more difficult to continue the project. In April 1985, most staff 
contracts were suspended and the expatriate staff left Lebanon while a cooperation 
agreement was made with UNRWA to keep the rehabilitation centre and the vocational 
training centres operating with earmarked funding from NPA. The centre in Shatila was 
completely destroyed by warfare in late 1985. The training centre in Burj el-Barajneh, 
                                                 
427 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 23.   
428 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 24. 
429 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 25. 
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however, carried out its first course year between December 1984 and February 1986, 
and 21 students graduated.430  
Re-establishment (1987-1995) 
 
In 1987 the vocational training centre and the rehabilitation centre were re-established 
and relocated to the Mar Elias camp which had not been subject to military attacks.431  
The Lebanon Program was then completely restored in 1987 with a rehabilitation 
program, vocational schools in Mar Elias and Burj el-Barajneh and a project for refuse 
removal in Shatila. A more systematic office operation was being developed from 1987 
onwards. In 1989 NPA decided to move the vocational training centre school in Burj el-
Barajneh to Ein el-Hilweh outside Sidon where it can be found today. In 1988, NPA 
recruited two Norwegian physical therapists to work on the transfer of the rehabilitation 
centre in Mar Elias to local staff. In 1991, they finalised their transfer of skills and 
responsibilities to local therapists, hereby making the entire NPA operations in Lebanon 
local.432  
 
NPA was legalised in Lebanon in 1990 as a branch of a foreign NGO, with presidential 
decree number 829/1990.433 That same year, the civil war in Lebanon came to an end and 
the political situation calmed down. The reconstruction of the camps was in progress and 
the NPA programs were running without obstacles. The signing of the Oslo Agreeement 
created certain constraints in the relationship between NPA headquarters and NPA 
Lebanon. Wafa Yassir signed a declaration criticising the agreement while Halle Jørn 
Hansen, the head of the International Department of NPA, favoured it. Unlike many other 
INGOs, however, NPA did not consider leaving Lebanon after the civil war. It regards its 
program in Lebanon as a political and solidarity support for the Palestinian refugees, and 
as such seems committed to continue its support.  
 
 
                                                 
430 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 26. 
431 NPA 2008 (a).  
432 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 27. 
433 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 32. 
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Working through partnership (1995-2000) 
 
From the mid-1990s, working through local partnerships was the form of cooperation 
preferred by NPA International and the Norwegian donors. Formalised partnership 
cooperation was included in the NPA Lebanon Program in 1995. NPA was one of the 
driving forces behind the establishments of the Coordination Forum as mentioned in 
chapter 6. It was also active in the establishment of The Coordination Forum of NGOs 
Working in the Disability Field among the Palestinian Community, later re-named the 
Palestinian Disability Forum which was created in 1997. As I understand it, NPA is one 
of the driving forces in the Palestinian NGO community to initiate and administer 
coordination. This is a result of the combination of being a large, stable INGO, and 
simultaneously feeling close to and responsible for the development of the local NGOs.   
  
Throughout the years of operations in Lebanon, NPA has built close partnerships with a 
number of NGOs, especially the members of the Coordination Forum. NPA also started 
to contribute financially to some partner NGOs in the mid 1990s, and in 2001 NPA gave 
financial support to eight NGOs.434 However, as mentioned above, NPA strongly 
emphasises that it partnership cooperation entails more than a primarily funding role. As 
of 2009 NPA has 33 partners, including NGO networks, UNRWA, Palestinian and 
Lebanese NGOs.435  
 
When I asked Haifa Jammal, the Human Rights Coordinator and Gender Adviser in 
NPA, about the criteria they have for choosing partners she said: 
 
In fact we work with specific partners; we consider ourselves as neutral, but in practice we have a specific 
number of partners and we prefer to work with these partners. We can not work with all. We receive many 
applications - maybe 80 per cent of the NGOs working with the Palestinian community apply to the NPA 
funds, but we have limited resources. We prefer to work with a specific number of NGOs. We focus on the 
                                                 
434 NPA 2001 (e). These NGOs were: Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation (GKCF); Association Najdeh; 
The National Institution for Social Care and Vocational Training (NISCVT, Beit Atfal Al- Sumod); The 
National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services (NAVTSS); The National Association 
for Social Medical Care and Vocational Training (NAMSCVT); Palestinian Student Fund; Health Care 
Society (HCS); and Popular Aid for Relief and Development (PARD). (NPA 2001 (f).) 
435 Cf. Appendix II. 
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quality, not only the quantity of our work. At the same time to be honest we prefer to work with secular 
NGOs, because we are secular. Concerning different political views, we do not distinguish between them; 
we work with all.436 
 
It has been suggested by some of my sources that NPA’s choice of projects and partners 
is based too much on networking and personal relationships.437 The close relationship 
between NPA Lebanon and its partners makes it difficult to change partners, and in the 
opinion of some this is not a healthy situation. I will argue on the contrary that it is a 
valuable aspect of NPA Lebanon that it does not change partners too often. In the 
difficult situation in which most of the Palestinian NGOs find themselves, they need 
someone who is stable and not as shifting as most INGOs and donors are. It seems to me 
that NPA represents one of the few stable institutions, in addition to UNRWA, which the 
Palestinian NGOs can rely on. It is in the nature of partnership that personal relationships 
influence the process and is obviously nothing special for NPA. While it might be true 
that to change partners is positive as not to make local organisations too dependent on 
one source of finance for example, I will argue that in the special circumstances 
Palestinian NGOs work in, NPA should continue to represent a stable figure.      
Getting involved with mines in Lebanon (2000-2008) 
 
When Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, much of the 
population returned to the area. One result of the many years as a military area was the 
presence of landmines and unexploded ordnances in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa 
Valley. The Norwegian Embassy in Damascus proposed at a very early stage that NPA 
should get involved in de-mining activities, because it had built up expertise in this field 
as mentioned above. It was first decided, however, that NPA should focus on the 
rehabilitation of mine injury victims, due to the long-standing experience and capacity in 
physical therapy and orthopaedic work of NPA in Lebanon.438 At the request of the 
Lebanon Mine Action Centre, NPA expanded its program to include Mine Risk 
Education in mine affected and at-risk communities.  
                                                 
436 Interview with Haifa Jammal 11.01.2008. 
437 Interview with A and G. 
438 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 50 and NPA Online (d) and (e). 
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Current Programs (2008)   
 
In 2008 NPA Lebanon branch is involved with the following programs: 
“The Right of Disabled to Participate” program  
 
This program is based in the rehabilitation centre in Mar Elias. The centre is seen as one 
of the best, if not the best, centres working with rehabilitation and documentation of 
disabled Palestinians.439 In 2005 the number of patients, treatment sessions and services 
of the rehabilitation centre numbered 1138.440 Together with The Palestinian Disability 
Forum, the NPA is working on advocacy for the disabled and capacity building for the 
organisations working with disabled people. NPA also cooperates with several Lebanese 
and international organisations in this field. The difficult economic situation in Lebanon 
also means that a number of Lebanese are using NPA’s services.441 In 2006 NPA 
cooperated with UNRWA to start a co-sharing fund to meet some of the needs of the 
Palestinian disabled people.442 In line with the new strategy, NPA is in the process of 
moving from purely providing services for the disabled to working for the rights of 
disabled Palestinians as individuals, as is implied by the title of the program. 
“The Youth Empowerment” program  
 
This program includes both formal and informal education. NPA’s vocational training 
schools give courses in business and office practice, and 1475 students had participated in 
vocational training courses by 2004443 Due to high applications for NPA’s vocational 
program, it has transferred part of its vocational training to one of its partners, the 
National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services (NAVTSS).444 In 2003 
NPA succeeded in collaborating with a number of universities to deduct credits to its 
Business and Office Practice graduates who wished to continue their university 
                                                 
439 All of my interviews confirm this statement.  
440 NPA Lebanon Online (b). 
441 NPA 2004 (d). 
442 NPA 2006 (b). 
443 NPA 2004 (e). 
444 NPA 2004 (c). For the scholastic year 2000-2001, 230 students applied. Due to limited places, both 
schools have accepted around 127 students. (NPA 2001 (g).)  
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education.445 The certificates issued by both schools are stamped by the Lebanese MFA, 
because they are signed by the Field Education Officer in UNRWA, whose signature is 
recognised by the ministry.446  
 
In line with the change of strategy for NPA international, NPA Lebanon has started 
focusing on youth empowerment rather than service provision. For example, it 
established a Youth Resource and Training Centre in Beirut and later a Youth Centre in 
Sidon was also opened.447 The youth centres are supposed to be operated by young 
people themselves, and as such provide youths with additional skills, as well as arranging 
youth exchange. Through six local partners NPA supports several more vocational 
schools and training centres. NPA also supports recreational activities such as summer 
camps, sports and the scouts. Through one of its partners NPA provides educational loans 
for youths. Sometimes, NPA also provides educational scholarships directly.448 As 
mentioned in chapter 6, the vocational training centres run by Palestinian NGOs have 
been criticised for not being updated and being of low quality. Although NPA’s 
vocational training is said to be among the best, it has been suggested that the work in the 
vocational centres and youth centres has room for improvement.449   
“Humanitarian Aid” program 
 
This program consists of three parts and is implemented by two of NPA’s partners. The 
refuse removal project in Shatila was in 1988 renamed the Public Health Project in 
Shatila Camp and was eventually handed over to one of NPA’s partners, the Popular Aid 
for Relief and Development (PARD) in 2004. PARD is also running the second project 
which is related to mother and child healthcare for refugees in displacement centres and 
in gatherings. Through a cooperating partner called Health Care Society (HCS), NPA has 
since 1995 supported the Palestinian hardship cases by paying a percentage of their 
hospitalisation expenses.450 HCS was established as a joint project by several local NGOs 
                                                 
445 NPA 2004 (e). 
446 NPA 2004 (c). 
447 NPA 2004 (e).  
448 NPA 2008 (b), February page. 
449 Interview with A and J. 
450 NPA 2008 (b), July page. 
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and activists. 40 social workers from local organisations, including NPA, work as 
volunteers for this project.451 The WA and NPA are the major donors of this NGO. 
“Organisational Development” program 
 
NPA started an Organisational Development program in 1997 to enhance the capacity of 
local partners in the administrative and managerial fields. This project involves 
supporting partners in needs assessments, strategic planning, formulating plans of action, 
and training of staff on various topics.452 NPA includes evaluation and monitoring, as 
well as the more technical aspects of report writing, English proficiency and computer 
operation in its capacity building program. 
“Land Mine Action” program 
 
In addition to the rehabilitation of mine victims and the mine education programs, NPA 
added a new component to the mine action program after the July 2006 war. It started an 
Emergency Mine Action Program to clear the land of the large amount of cluster bombs 
and other unexploded ordnances that remained in the field. Throughout 2006 NPA 
International also worked actively on encouraging the Norwegian authorities to call for 
an international ban on the use of cluster bombs.453 NPA will continue its clearance 
activities until at least 2010.454  
 
The Norad evaluation report states: 
 
NPA’s Mine Action Program… can be looked at from two different perspectives – either as a strategic 
irregularity supported by NPA mainly to secure funding and a program creating tensions between two 
groups within the organisation. On the other hand, it can be seen as an example of how NPA was able to 
respond and respond well to a major humanitarian problem, support successful mine action programs and 
become internationally recognised as one of the leading NGOs in this area.455  
 
                                                 
451 NPA Lebanon Online (c). 
452 NPA 2008 (b), November page. 
453 NPA International 2006, 11.  
454 Interview with David Bergan 16.04.2009. 
455 Norad 2007, 19-20 (my translation.) 
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In the Lebanese case it seems clear that NPA is doing good quality work in its Mine 
Action Program. However, it has also been suggested that the introduction of a mine 
program has created some tensions within NPA Lebanon.456 The technical, “macho” and 
result-orientated work in the minefield is something completely different from the long-
term development work of the other NPA programs. Adding to this is the disproportion in 
salaries between the development staff and the mine staff. It was not necessarily easy to 
integrate the “newcomer” into the already existing organisation. David Bergan, Middle 
East and Latin America advisor at NPA Oslo, however, regards the initial frictions to 
have “calmed down.”457 
“The Human Rights and Advocacy” program  
 
NPA has been active in advocacy and lobbying for the rights of the Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon from an early stage. This was done on a voluntary basis by the staff at NPA. 
The pressure on NPA in this respect became very high and it was decided to 
institutionalise this activity.458 This was recommended by the 2001 evaluation report.459 
In 2004, an Advocacy and Networking Coordinator was therefore employed to handle 
NPA’s activities in advocacy.460 Part of NPA’s work in this field is to empower the 
Palestinian NGOs to become competent in advocacy. However, due to the limitations that 
most Palestinian NGOs still face both in finances and competence, much of the initiative 
and implementation is done by NPA.461 It takes time before a new program settles, but it 
seems that NPA Lebanon is making good progress to achieve their objective.  
  
The program includes three projects which were initially set up as separate programs, 
namely the Children’s Rights Project, Women’s Rights Project and Palestinian Refugees’ 
Rights’ Project. Regarding children’s rights, NPA had since 1995 been supporting a 
                                                 
456 Interview with I. 
457 Interview with David Bergan 16.04.2009. 
458 A report from 2004 states: “The number of visitors who seek the help of NPA in organizing their trips to 
Lebanon has become a real burden on NPA’s office. This matter has been very time consuming. NPA has 
received over 100 delegations and persons in 2004. Tours of the camps have been organized in addition 
to schedule of meeting. Information packages has been prepared and distributed. This is besides the 
logistics which is time consuming also.” NPA 2004 (f). 
459 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 11-12. 
460 NPA 2004 (g). The post is today renamed Human Rights Coordinator and Gender Adviser. 
461 NPA 2004 (g). 
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number of partners in pre-school education. Due to NPA’s new strategy, however, NPA 
has phased out all projects in this field except one. NPA converted its work to concentrate 
on defending the rights of the Palestinian refugee children in Lebanon. It has for example 
supported the Coordination Forum to issue three supplementary reports on the human 
rights situation of the Palestinian refugee children in Lebanon.462 In women’s rights NPA 
has since 2005 been supporting its cooperating partner Association Najdeh in a project 
called “Combat Violence Against Women”. In 2007, NPA started supporting another 
partner, the GUPW to start a similar project. At the end of 2006, NPA Head Office 
started a project called “Women Can Do It”. This project involves a number of Lebanese 
and Palestinian women organisations. It aims at empowering women by giving them 
additional skills that enhance their participation in political and public life.463  
 
The project for Palestinian refugees’ rights started in 2004. The project aims at helping 
partners and other human rights organisations to advocate and lobby for the rights of 
Palestinian refugees. It also aims to enhance and monitor their human rights situation. 
NPA supports the right of return, but also works for the Palestinian refugees’ civil rights 
in Lebanon.464 In 2004 NPA employees from Lebanon contributed to a book which 
focuses on the Palestinians’ democratic rights, and their right to land and resources.465 
 
NPA has been present at several meetings both with the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue 
Committee and with the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs.466 It has also represented 
the Palestinian NGO community in the Committee of Employability of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon. This committee consists of representatives from UNRWA, PLO, 
Lebanese Ministries, International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Palestinian civil 
society.467 In 2000, NPA helped in organising a coordination meeting in Cyprus among 
                                                 
462 NPA 2008 (b), April page. 
463 NPA 2008 (b), May page. 
464 NPA 2008 (b), June page. 
465 The book is called “The Fight Against Injustice.” The book was published by NPA International and has 
contributions also from NPA staff from Palestine and several journalists. (NPA Online (f).) 
466 NPA 2005 (a) and NPA 2006 (c). 
467 NPA 2006 (c). NPA has also been represented at meetings related to the Euro Mediterranean 
partnerships; meetings related to the right of return; meetings related to campaigns for the civil rights of 
refugees; meetings related to disability and disability rights; as well as meetings related to children’s 
rights and women’s rights. (NPA 2005 (c).) 
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the three Palestinian NGO networks: The Coordination Forum of NGOs Working among 
the Palestinian Community in Lebanon; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisation 
Network (PNGO) from the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and The Union of Arab Non-
Governmental Organisations (Ittijha) from 1948 Palestine.468 
 
To me it is striking that a specific advocacy program was not initiated at an earlier stage. 
The work towards securing the rights of Palestinian refugees in particular appears to have 
been part of NPA’s work from the start and should, as I understand it, be fundamental for 
an NGO that works with the Palestinian community with such a strong commitment as 
NPA has presented. In my understanding there are several reasons behind this. Firstly, it 
seems like NPA needed some input from an “outsider”, namely the 2001 evaluation 
report, to realise that this was needed. It may suggest that in such a large and old NGO as 
NPA Lebanon is the danger of routinisation emerges. It is maybe not as flexible and 
innovative as it is claimed to be as an NGO. NPA Lebanon has been characterised by its 
continuity, both in programs and in staff, rather than change and development, 
throughout most of its stay in Lebanon. Therefore it is important to sometimes be looked 
at with fresh eyes. The 2001 evaluation report was the first evaluation to be done on NPA 
Lebanon’s program, and was an important step towards the development of the programs.  
 
Secondly, the ascendance of the advocacy program coincides with advocacy getting 
greater focus as an approach in NGOs worldwide as mentioned in chapter 5. NPA 
International is following this trend and is in the process of moving from service 
provision to a rights-based approach, i.e. advocacy, as mentioned above. It is 
understandable that the work to organise trips for visitors from Norway and others is time 
consuming and sometimes may feel like a burden, as mentioned in the 2004 report 
above.469 I would however emphasise that, as I understand it, this is the most important 
work that NPA Lebanon undertakes. To spread information about the refugees’ situation 
is fundamental in the work to press governments and politicians to change the situation.    
                                                 
468 NPA 2001 (e). 
469 Cf. footnote 458. The report may be a reflection of the sometimes resigned feeling of many Palestinians 
towards international visits. After years and years, and thousands and thousands of visitors, there is not 
much visible change on the ground.  
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Emergency relief operations 
 
Since the civil war ended NPA has been involved with emergency relief operations in 
1996, 2000 and 2006 during Israeli aggression. NPA has also carried out emergency 
relief operations during internal conflicts such as during the Nahr el-Bared crisis.470 NPA 
International has a policy of only engaging in emergency situations in countries where it 
already has or has had an established presence.471 In Lebanon, the fact that NPA has a 
local presence has meant that it can react swiftly in emergency situations, more so than 
other INGOs.472 
Funding for NPA Lebanon 
 
During the entire period of NPA professional involvement in Lebanon, the majority of 
the funding has been obtained from the MFA as an extended emergency activity, and 
only small amounts come from Norad, which would normally fund long-term projects 
like this.473 As such, the Lebanon program fits right in as a “long-term emergency aid” 
program, which the Evaluation report 3.92 suggested above that NPA needed due to 
financial constraints. The total contribution from the MFA for these activities increased 
from 4.6 million NOK in 1994 to 11.4 million NOK in 2001.474 NPA contributes with a 
10 per cent proper share on the partner projects.475  
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, the majority of aid from the Norwegian government to 
Lebanon is channelled through NGOs, and NPA receive the largest share of this. 
According to MFA: 
  
                                                 
470  UNRWA Lebanon Online. NPA is one of the most active organisations in this emergency situation 
according to this webpage.  
471 NPA Online (c). 
472 For example: “The Red Cross had originally reduced its presence after the Civil War, down to one 
international representative and one Lebanese back in 2000. The 2006 war with Israel then had caught 
the organization off-guard. With virtually no staff, no stock and equipment slowly shipped in on cargo 
ships, the ICRC had no immediate response to the humanitarian crisis that had unfolded. As a reaction, 
the organization then went to 80 international staff and hired 300 local employees. With the situation 
improving again, there still remain 17 expatriates and 15 Lebanese staff with the ICRC.” (The Daily Star, 
14 November, 2008.) 
473 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 6. 
474 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 28. 
475 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 101. 
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The reason for the long-term humanitarian support in Lebanon [for NPA] is the work directed towards 
Palestinian refugees. In the section for humanitarian aid we mainly give support for one year at a time. 
However, in many places there are long-term humanitarian crisis which means that we must be present with 
more long-term support. Here the Palestinian refugees represent a special case. Concerning NPA’s work 
with cluster munitions - and mines clearance, we are currently in a process of elaborating a multiyear 
agreement. This is a pioneer project, which covers their work in several countries, including Lebanon.476  
 
According to notes on several NPA applications, the funding for NPA Lebanon seems to 
have solid political backing.477 The relationship between the Norwegian MFA and 
Norwegian NGOs is as mentioned a particular close one.  
 
It does strike me as somewhat odd that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, according to 
the funding mechanisms, are handled as an emergency project, while the Palestinian 
refugees in the West Bank and Gaza are not.478 According to David Bergan the reason 
behind this is logistic, as there is “no room” for the Lebanon program within NPA’s 
frame agreement with Norad.479 And because MFA shares NPA’s commitment for the 
Palestinian refugees, it is willing to provide funding for the foreseeable future.480 The 
practical implication of the allocation under MFA funding is that the Lebanon program 
has to apply for funds on a yearly basis, instead of every fifth year as part of a frame 
agreement. Because the funding is still relatively stable, it has not had such a major effect 
on the Lebanon program’s ability to plan for the long-term, but I assume it would be 
preferable to have more secure long-term funding. The fact that the Lebanon program, for 
example, is not included in the Norad evaluation report which looks at NPA’s 
                                                 
476 E-mail correspondence with MFA 03.03.09. 
477 “Referring to political clearing bill concerning distribution of aid from 02.04.08, the Embassy in Beirut 
is positive. NPA is doing an important job in LBN [sic].” (Handwritten note by MFA employee on NPA 
2008 (c).) “The embassy in Beirut supports the application. [It is a] project of political importance, in 
relation to a ban against certain types of cluster bombs.” (Handwritten note by MFA employee on NPA 
2008 (d).) “It is the appraisal of the department that NPA through its humanitarian activities with 
Palestinian refugees and underprivileged Lebanese in Lebanon is playing an important role.” (NPA 2006 
(d).) 
478 Due to the deteriorating situation in West Bank and Gaza a larger part of NPA program there than 
initially planned has also been “emergency programs”, and as such funded from MFA. Parts of the 
program continue, however, to be included in the frame agreement with Norad. (Interview with David 
Bergan 16.04.2009.)   
479 Interview with David Bergan, 16.04.2009. The frame agreement has a ceiling of 112 million NOK, 
while the Lebanon program is approximately 14-15 million NOK, in addition to the mine program of 
about 8-9 million NOK. 
480 David Bergan calls it a “Companionship of fate.” (Interview with David Bergan, 16.04.2009.) 
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development programs, while at the same time being one of the oldest development 
programs of NPA, is in my opinion a contradiction. 
Employees 
 
NPA Lebanon employs over 50 people. A number of them have been with NPA since its 
foundation in Lebanon.481 The staff employed by NPA seem highly qualified, dedicated 
and have developed a strong identity to NPA as their organisation. The fact that NPA 
employs almost exclusively local staff is an advantage for the organisation in that the 
staff are very familiar with the community they work with.482 As an INGO the local staff 
have the opportunity to participate in international, regional and local training workshops 
and seminars. For other Palestinians working in local NGOs, this opportunity is not 
available.483 If one were to make a hierarchy of the “globalised elite” in the Palestinian 
NGO community, I argue that the staff of NPA would be near to the top due to their 
access to both secure funding and international arenas. 
 
However, by having a largely local staff, NPA is also affected by the difficult working 
situation in the Palestinian community in the same way as local NGOs. It is definitely a 
large carrier-step to become an employee of NPA. It means that the staff often become 
very dependent on their job, because they have few other alternatives. It therefore 
becomes one of the main tasks of the leadership to protect the jobs of their employees. As 
one of my sources said: 
 
The employees are dependent on their job, so if there is decrease in the budgets or changes from the head 
office it is difficult to change locally. There is a danger that a certain dynamic is created; the most 
important is to provide for the local employees. People have been employed for 10-20 years and are 
dependent on their job; the local leadership will be held responsible if someone has to go.484 
 
                                                 
481 NPA 2001 (e). 
482 NPA has today one Norwegian employee in Lebanon who is responsible for the mine clearance 
program. 
483 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 42. 
484 Interview with J.  
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The reason for this is understandable. As Sari Hanafi said: “What to do? Should one 
throw them on the street? It is different with international employees of international 
NGOs who can get work in other countries or other organisations. Palestinian refugees 
have few opportunities.”485 The dependency situation may, however, mean that there is 
less room for criticism within the organisation, and because of this it can be difficult to 
undertake major changes.486 This is not to suggest that the staff of NPA are necessarily 
afraid to express their opinions or that they should all be replaced. However, this is meant 
to highlight some of the challenges that Palestinian NGOs, and NPA as a “local” NGO, 
face as organisations. 
 
It may also be the case that the aspect of personal relationships, networks and cultural 
closeness is a disadvantage in order to introduce new ideas into the community. A 
Norwegian NPA employee in Iraq emphasised this as one important aspect of their work 
there: 
 
We must pressure for change. The traditions in the Middle East in general and in Kurdistan is… top-down, 
patronising in a way; one wants people’s best and then you think that you know how to promote people’s 
best. Then you do it for them; one comes and implements projects so that their situation is improved. The 
opposite bottom-up approach is quite alien in this community.487  
 
I will argue that it is more difficult for an exclusively local staff to implement changes 
that contradict the local culture. As one of my sources said: “The advantage of a mixed 
[local and international] staff is that they learn from each other, and are not as tied by 
local strings.”488  
 
The central role played by Wafaa Yassir as the “face of NPA” was brought up by several 
sources.489 In the evaluation report from 2001 this is said about the issue:  
 
                                                 
485 Interview with Sari Hanafi 19.02.2009. 
486 Interview with I. 
487 Cited in Ryen 2005, 120 (my translation.) 
488 Interview with J. 
489 Interview with G, H, I, J. 
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NPA staff and stakeholders have raised the issue of the extension of the contract of the NPA representative 
for an additional period of time, contrary to the formal policy and regulations of NPA of not recruiting a 
local NPA representative for more than five years. The NPA staff have expressed their concerns toward this 
policy and has recommended the extension of the contract for the NPA representative because of her 
important role in the coming period, which will witness a restructuring process. In addition to this, they 
strongly believe that NPA, within its existing organisational development phase, badly needs the 
continuation of the leadership role of the local representative. UNRWA and other local Palestinian NGOs 
have recognised the leadership qualities of the NPA representative and her important role in the 
sustainability of the organisations within the prevailing political socio-economic conditions of the 
Palestinian refugees community in Lebanon. It is recommended to discuss the extension of the post of the 
local NPA representative, not only according to NPA policy and regulations based on quantitative criteria, 
but also according to in-depth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of NPA’s decision in this 
regard, and according to a qualitative evaluation of the present representative.490   
 
It seems clear that NPA has assessed this question in a profound way and concluded that 
it is for the good of the organisation to keep on the Resident Representative. However, it 
seems equally clear that this decision is not understood or appreciated by all. 
Coordination and cooperation with other INGOs 
 
The other Norwegian NGOs which are actively involved in Lebanon today are 
NORWAC and the NRC. NORWAC focuses on health and education and is working 
mainly through partners. It has been working in Lebanon since 1983 and has one 
Norwegian coordinator in Lebanon.491 NRC had for some time considered establishing a 
presence in Lebanon, with the focus on Palestinian refugees. However, it first got 
involved in Lebanon during the July 2006 war, and then at the beginning through its work 
with Lebanese Internally Displaced Persons.492 NPA has coordination meetings with 
NORWAC and NRC on a regular basis every other month and otherwise when needed.  
 
When I asked a number of INGO’s about their relationship with NPA the answers were 
predominantly positive.493 However, it was suggested also that the coordination with 
                                                 
490 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 85-86 (my translation,) 
491 Cf. footnote 296. 
492 E-mail correspondence with NRC, 06.11.08. 
493 The exact statements are: “Our local Palestinian partners say that NPA is a very professional 
organization. They are very respectful towards the Palestinian population and very helpful whenever a 
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INGOs is somewhat neglected. My source argued that the reason for this was that NPA 
regarded itself as a local organisation and therefore focused more on coordination with 
the Palestinian NGOs.494 My source considered this to be a disadvantage for NPA and 
encouraged more coordination with INGOs. 
Challenges of being international and local 
 
As mentioned above, several of the programs have adjusted somewhat to the new 
international strategy of NPA which was introduced in 2003. In the evaluation report 
from 2001 it was “Recommended that NPA start thinking to reduce its direct involvement 
in providing services, and to increase its role in advocacy, capacity building and 
networking, and to institutionalize these program components.”495 This was enforced 
with the 2003 international strategy. There was, however, initial reluctance by the local 
staff in NPA Lebanon to stop the service provision. However, the report continues: “NPA 
Lebanon has realized the importance to conduct a serious discussion about the future 
perspective and future strategy of NPA in Lebanon. In spite of the staff reluctance to 
change the existing mandate as a service provider, a re-thinking process has been started 
and new dynamics and trends of thinking are taking place.”496 It is clear that as long as 
the future of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is uncertain and as long as their socio-
economic conditions continue to deteriorate, NPA projects can not be financially 
sustainable and none of NPA’s partners are willing to take over their operational 
projects.497 There is, however, an ongoing process to explore the possibilities for 
establishing new local NGOs to take over NPA’s operational programs.498    
                                                                                                                                                 
need emerges.” (Interview with B.) “NPA is one of the major and important INGOs who are working 
with the Palestinians in Lebanon and they enjoy big respect and recognition in the local community.” (E-
mail correspondence with NORWAC 13.11.08.) “Our opinion of their work is that they are very 
professional and the work they do is essential; they are the main provider of rehabilitation services for the 
disabled Palestinians, they provide funding for local Palestinian NGOs, and their work in the landmines 
is very unique since very few organizations are doing this type of work.” (Interview with C.) “I generally 
have great respect for their work.” (Interview with D,) “We know them quite well but do not have them 
as partners” (Interview with F.) “NPA has long-time experience and an impressive knowledge of the 
local circumstances in Lebanon” (E-mail correspondence with NRC 06.11.08.) “We always talk to NPA 
while doing research in Lebanon.” (Interview with H.) 
494 Interview with G. 
495 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 12.  
496 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 12. 
497 NPA 2001 (h). 
498 Interview with David Bergan 16.04.2009.  
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The implementation of the new strategy highlights some of the challenges for NPA 
Lebanon. It is part of a large INGO, which develops its strategy on a worldwide basis. 
Therefore sometimes the overall strategy or visions of NPA International may not 
coincide with what NPA Lebanon considers as appropriate in its community. As seen in 
other chapters, the Palestinian community is quite unique in that they have been regarded 
as refugees for more than 60 years. As such the refugees are treated as an emergency 
case. However, as new generations are born into refugeehood and the solution to their 
situation remains unknown, there has also been a need for working with long-term 
development.  
 
Haifa Jammal highlights the complexity of the question like this:  
 
It is difficult to work with development. We do work with “development”, but our situation is not like 
people living in their countries, even if we work with women’s rights, children’s rights, and to empower the 
“civil society” (in quotations, it is not the same as civil society in a country). We are refugees, have been 
for a long time and we do not know when it will change, so as refugees our situation is considered as relief 
and emergency. But at the same time we work with human rights, and development issues. Sometimes you 
feel the issues are a little bit contradictory with each other; we are considered as an emergency situation, 
but at the same time, we should also follow the main themes of the NPA strategies. We work on them and 
focus on them according to our situation; we can not talk about for example election for Parliament here.499 
 
NPA Lebanon therefore has to balance its work in such a way as to adjust to both NPA 
International’s strategies and the particular situation for the Palestinian refugees. To 
maintain this balance is, as the quote illustrates, not always easy. 
NPA’s role in the Palestinian community  
 
NPA is regarded in a positive light in Lebanon and certainly in the Palestinian refugee 
community. The organisation has been present in the Palestinian community for more 
than 27 years and has developed a close relationship with the community. As mentioned 
above NPA considers itself to have become a local organisation. This is evident in 
                                                 
499 Interview with Haifa Jammal 16.01.2008. 
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statements like this, gathered from NPA’s annual reports: “It [NPA] acts as a grass-roots 
organisation and is viewed as a local NGO because it is very community-oriented.”500  
 
NPA encompasses in my opinion a tremendous opportunity in their position as a bridge 
between the local community, with access to ideas, networks and funds as an INGO. 
NPA in Lebanon has developed from an emergency relief NGO to becoming one of the 
most important and oldest NGO actors in the Palestinian community. As I understand it, 
NPA holds a unique position in the Palestinian NGO community. It has the advantage of 
being a large INGO, with the financial and administrative stability that implies, as well as 
having easy access to international arenas. On the other hand, NPA is closely linked to 
the Palestinian community, and as it appears to me, plays a leading role in the local NGO 
community. It seems evident that they themselves are aware of this position: “Being 
dependent on local staff, NPA fully understands the cultural sensitivities in its area of 
operation. At the same time, being a branch of a foreign NGO has enabled NPA-Lebanon 
to integrate some of the concepts, values and objectives set by NPA worldwide.”501 
NPA’s position enables it to maintain relationships with different stakeholders including 
the Lebanese government, UNRWA, PLO, Popular Committees in the camps, political 
parties, donors, and various existing NGOs.502 However, NPA has also to be aware of the 
challenges the local staff faces in their intermediate position as international and local. 
 
NPA has come a long way in treating the Palestinian refugees as individuals with rights, 
rather than objects of relief, a status which has marginalised the refugees as argued by 
Weighill.503 With NPA’s 2003 strategy this has become even more emphasised. By 
focusing on rights, it transforms the situation of the beneficiary group from being passive 
aid recipients to becoming right-holders. As individuals who entail rights, the Palestinian 
refugees therefore become responsible actors who can demand to be treated according to 
the human rights standards. It is clear that this is an issue which NPA is fully aware of. 
                                                 
500 NPA 2001 (e).  
501 NPA 2004 (f). 
502 Buvollen and Abdul-Hadi 2001, 41. 
503 Weighill 1997, 311. Cf. footnote 22. 
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Petter Eide, current Secretary General of NPA, wrote an article in a Norwegian 
newspaper in the aftermath of the 2009 Gaza War concerning this very issue:  
 
Media and the international society leave an impression that the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip are passive 
victims with no capability to do something about their own situation. Focus on ‘help from abroad’ and a 
‘humanitarian crisis’ transforms the Palestinians into clients. That is the opposite of what they need in a 
political fight against the occupation.504  
 
The article concerns Palestinians in Gaza, but a similar attitude has been present 
concerning the refugees in Lebanon, as Weighill illustrated in the excerpt in chapter 1.  
 
NPA International has increasingly emphasised its role in advocacy and working with 
rights. It has worked on advocacy for the rights of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
since the start of its program there but only recently institutionalised that part of its work. 
This signals that NPA in the future will play an even larger role in this respect. However, 
in Lebanon NPA also continues to this day to consider the implementation of services as 
part of its work, although this is in a process of transition. I assume, however, that even if 
NPA will eventually withdraw from running the operational programs itself, it will 
continue to play an important role in the Palestinian community and seem committed to 
stay present until the day when Palestinian refugees are no longer in need of international 
assistance. 
 
                                                 
504 Eide, Petter, Secretary General of NPA (my translation.) (NPA Online (g).) 
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Chapter 9 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This thesis has offered a description and an analysis of the humanitarian assistance to the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the role which NGOs have played in this assistance 
since 1948. I have combined the research done by others with my own material, to make 
the most comprehensive study to my knowledge about NGOs that are involved in the 
Palestinian community in Lebanon.  
 
The first chapters of this thesis provided the background information for the status of the 
refugees as it has developed through their 60 years of presence in Lebanon. Above all, 
the Palestinian refugees hold the position they do today due to the fact that they became 
refugees of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, as well as subsequent warfare between Palestinian 
actors and the State of Israel. The solution to the “Palestinian refugee problem” relies on 
negotiations between these two parties. At this point, it is not possible to predict what the 
outcome of these eventual negotiations will be or when they will take place. It does, 
however, seem likely that the Palestinian refugees will remain refugees for some time. 
 
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have also been affected by the volatile political 
situation in the host country, and especially so during the years of the Lebanese civil war. 
They have been both participants and targeted victims of that war. After the civil war 
ended, the refugees were affected by several events that further marginalised their 
position. The decline in both PLO and UNRWA funding, the redirection of attention to 
the oPt, as well as the stricter enforcement of Lebanese legislation resulted in declining 
rather than improved conditions after the war. The last couple of years have been 
characterised by more openness and willingness from the Lebanese government and 
society to discuss the situation for the refugees. Some projects have been launched to 
enhance the situation for the refugees. However, the recent history of the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon also includes the July 2006 war and the total destruction of Nahr el-
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Bared, as well as heightened tensions in several other refugee camps. As of 2009, it is 
difficult to predict which course their future history will take. 
The actors involved with the Palestinian refugee community 
 
The major actors (other than NGOs) that are involved with the refugees’ welfare are the 
UN and their agency UNRWA. Two other UN agencies that one could assume to be 
(more) responsible for the refugees’ welfare, the UNCCP and UNHCR, are for reasons 
that are explained in chapter 3, not involved. The mandate of UNRWA has also for most 
of the time been restricted to those who fulfil the agency’s rather strict set of criteria as 
explained in chapter 3. The refugees who fall outside of this definition are therefore 
especially vulnerable as outlined in chapter 4. Importantly, UNRWA’s mandate has also 
been restricted to humanitarian assistance. UNRWA is, however, the main provider of 
both educational and health related services for the refugees despite both their limited 
mandate and financial instability. They also provide assistance for the most vulnerable, 
the so- called “special hardship cases,” which in Lebanon constitute a high percentage of 
the refugees. The need for UNRWA to continue their services seems as important today 
as it was at their establishment in 1949.  
 
The Palestinian political actors have been marginal and fractionised for most of the 
refugee sojourn in Lebanon, with the exception of the PLO heyday in the 1970s. Lebanon 
has, for their part, been a reluctant host country for a refugee population it feels it should 
not be held responsible for. For reasons such as the demography of the country and the 
volatile confessional make-up of Lebanon, the refugees have not been granted any civil 
rights by the Lebanese host government. Chapter 4 outlined the particular legislation 
which has been implemented to restrict the refugees’ rights and the consequences of this 
on the refugees’ socio-economic standing, which continues to deteriorate. 
 
The Palestinian refugees have throughout their 60 year stay in Lebanon, faced restrictions 
which in turn have made it difficult for them to become self- supporting and independent 
from international assistance. They have also been subject to recurrent armed conflicts 
which has further intensified their status as “objects of relief.” The first chapter of this 
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thesis have then proved that there is a need for continued international assistance for the 
refugees in Lebanon. The actors who are involved with the welfare of  the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, i.e. UN, Palestinian actors and the Lebanese government, are 
limited in their response are outright unwilling to offer all the services that are needed for 
the Palestinian community to function. There is therefore clearly a need for the work of 
NGOs in the Palestinian community. 
NGOs 
 
NGOs have played an increasingly larger role in the Palestinian community the last three 
decades, due to the enhanced constraints on both UNRWA and PLO. However, the 
increase of NGOs in the Palestinian community has happened as NGOs have received an 
increasingly larger role in the development aid system in the world at large. One can say 
that there has been a need for NGOs to get involved, which has been intensified by the 
general promotion of NGOs as “a solution to all problems”. Chapter 5 outlined some of 
the factors which have led to the increased role of NGOs world wide. In Norway in 
particular, the role of NGOs in the development aid system is especially influential and 
there is a close relationship between the Norwegian government and NGOs. Norwegian 
aid to Lebanon is mainly channelled through NGOs. 
 
As mentioned above it is clear that there is a need for NGOs to be involved in the 
Palestinian community due to the constraints of the other actors involved. NGOs as a 
whole provide important services and opportunities and as such play an invaluable role in 
the society. However, as discussed in chapter 5 NGOs are not the “solution to all 
problems” and are also constrained by their role in the development aid system and their 
organisational structures. Especially important in the Palestinian community in Lebanon 
is the relatively strict division between humanitarian relief and development programs 
which is prevalent in the development aid system. Due to the volatile situation in 
Lebanon, there have been channelled large amounts of short-term humanitarian aid in 
emergency situations, but less investment in, or time for, long-term planning. However, 
the Palestinian refugee community have been in a sort of “emergency situation” for 60 
years and are in much need of long-term planning and stability. It is therefore a major 
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problem that the funding and international attention (for example from INGOs) has come 
and gone with the emergency events. The role of INGOs is therefore limited by their 
often short-term presence in the Palestinian community. They have also been influenced 
by the political aspect of the “refugee problem” which at times has made them reluctant 
to enter into relationships with Palestinian actors. The unstable presence of INGOs, and 
in particular their expatriate staff, means that they are limited in their long-term planning, 
coordination and capability to advocate for major changes. 
   
The Palestinian NGOs are on the other hand typical Southern NGOs and are limited by 
their financial and administrative weaknesses. As part of the development aid system the 
Palestinian NGOs have to adapt to the “NGO speak” in order to get funds as well as to 
adjust to international trends. This sometimes makes it difficult to cater for the actual 
needs of the Palestinian community in particular, because it is still very much in need of 
basic services provided by the NGOs. Employment in an NGO is, next after UNRWA, 
the “top job” for educated Palestinians and may place them within a globalised elite. 
Because of this, there is both a danger that the employees of NGOs are too dependent on 
their job and that they get somewhat removed from the grassroot. The Palestinian NGOs 
continue also to be influenced by the fact that they are affiliated with the political 
environment in the refugee community and as such have some way to go in order to 
enhance cooperation. Due to the fragmentation of the NGO community, volatile finances, 
as well as the recurrent emergency situations, the Palestinian NGOs have not been able to 
provide as much long-term development or to advocate for structural changes as perhaps 
is wanted and needed. 
NPA 
 
The case study of NPA shows that it is not a typical example of an INGO. It is rather an 
INGO which has “gone local.” NPA International is one of the major NGOs in Norway 
and involved with projects in 36 countries across the world. It presents itself in terms of 
solidarity and of taking a stand in social debates. It is as such not primarily a 
humanitarian aid NGO, but regards for example its commitment in the Palestinian society 
as both a solidarity activity and politically important. It has then, been present in the 
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Palestinian community for almost three decades and declares a strong commitment to the 
Palestinian refugees. NPA Lebanon is almost entirely run by local staff and has been so 
for almost two decades. It runs two operational programs itself, and implements several 
others in cooperation with Palestinian partner NGOs.  
 
There is currently an ongoing process to restructure the NPA program, and it is too early 
to predict exactly what the result will be. Most likely, NPA will focus more on and 
develop its partnerships with local NGOs, instead of continuing operational activities 
itself. However, it also seems clear that NPA is committed to continuing its presence in 
Lebanon until a solution is reached that will improve the situation for the Palestinian 
refugees. NPA Lebanon’s challenge as an organisation in the meantime is to not “rest on 
the laurel” and to continue to develop its current programs. It also has to enhance its 
cooperation with both local and international and has to carefully balance its position 
between being an international and local organisation, so as not to teeter too much 
towards the latter. Because of its long presence and strong commitment, NPA enjoys 
strong support and a particular closeness to the refugee community, which I understand to 
be quite special to NPA in relation to most other INGOs. NPA functions as one of the 
driving forces behind coordination and long-term planning in the Palestinian NGO 
community. Its position as an INGO also provides some special opportunities to reach out 
and participate in the international civil society. I argue that because of this, NPA is 
playing a leading role in the Palestinian NGO community.     
 
Critics of NGOs (and of UNRWA) claim that NGOs perform a maintenance function, 
and by “keeping the refugees alive” reduce the pressure for radical reforms. It is clear that 
the situation for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will not improve unless there are 
major shifts in the political will to do so. The dilemma is that without many of the 
services provided by NGOs (and UNRWA) in the Palestinian community the situation for 
the refugees would be very difficult. As long as the refugees are facing obstacles that 
prevent them from becoming self-sufficient, they will continue to be in need of 
international assistance. The challenge for all actors involved is to not treat the refugees 
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as “objects of relief” but as individuals who are entitled to rights. NPA is as I understand 
it, in a very good position to do so. 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I asked what the role of international and local NGOs is 
in the Palestinian community in Lebanon. I also presented two contradictive hypotheses 
that have formed the development of the thesis. The first hypothesis stated that NGOs 
play a larger role in the Palestinian community than in other communities, because there 
is no government in place and therefore more room for NGOs. The second hypothesis 
stated on the other hand, that NGOs are not capable of taking on such an influential role 
because there are some limitations in the NGO sector. Throughout the work on this 
thesis, it soon became evident that my first hypothesis was too optimistic regarding the 
capability of NGOs in general to take on an influential role, even if there is room for it. 
As with all other NGOs in the world, the NGOs involved in the Palestinian community 
do not necessarily hold the “solution to all problems”. My second hypothesis proved 
then, to be mostly correct; The Palestinian NGOs are too weak financially and 
administratively, and the INGOs are in general too fluctuating to play a leading role in 
the refugee community. However, I will also argue that NPA as a stable, committed 
INGO with a strong local connection has the opportunity to play an influential role in the 
Palestinian community and to be an agent of change.      
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I 
Appendix I 
 
I have included in appendix I a synopsis of NGOs which are involved with the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The literature and sources I have used to make this need 
some special attention and are explained below. 
 
I can from the outset conclude that I will not be able to provide a complete synopsis of 
the NGOs which are involved in the Palestinian community, as their number and scope of 
work is too extensive. Even UNRWA, which is involved with the Palestinian community 
on a daily basis, are not able to provide an accurate and updated statistic of NGOs 
working in this community, and I must realise my limitations. Therefore, I will emphasise 
that there are certainly NGOs involved, events taking place and work being done without 
my knowledge and therefore left out of my analysis. The list includes huge INGOs as 
well as small local NGOs. It also includes research centres and Palestinian Popular 
Committees and is in this way a perfect example of the complexity of the NGO scene. It 
is also clear that many of the NGOs in the list are probably no longer active in the refugee 
community and new ones have most likely arrived. Several of the NGOs are only 
involved in one project or in a specific emergency situation, and then disappear out of the 
country or are dissolved. This is in the nature of NGOs and is part of why it is so difficult 
to provide accurate information on them. Another challenge when compiling this list is 
that, when the Arabic names of the NGOs are translated into English, the same NGO can 
be translated with several slightly different names. It is therefore possible that the same 
NGO is listed twice. This is particularly the case with a number of NGOs with “national” 
in their name. As will be evident from the synopsis, the confusion concerning these 
NGOs is prevalent in many of my sources also. With these limitations in mind, this thesis 
sets out to give a certain overview of NGOs who are involved in the Palestinian 
community. 
   
The sources I have used for the synopsis are the following: Firstly, I have used a list I 
received from NPA presenting the members of the Coordination Forum of NGOs 
working among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. I have compiled this with the 
 II 
information about the Coordination Forum which is found in Jaber Suleiman’s article 
mentioned in chapter 1. As mentioned in footnote 354, these two sources name 18 and 17 
NGOs respectively, and not exactly the same organisations. 
 
Secondly, NPA together with another INGO, the Welfare Association (WA) made a 
“Guide to Non-Governmental Organizations active in Palestinian Camps in Lebanon” in 
2000.505 It was meant to serve as a guide for interested parties who wished to extend 
support to local NGOs, and as information to the target population. The guide includes 
NGOs that are supported by NPA and WA, which consists of 29 local organisations. The 
guide also includes 5 INGOs, or what they call, donor NGOs.  
 
Thirdly, I have compiled information from a report which was made by the ENGO group 
in 2007. The ENGO group was a coordination group of European NGOs working with 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, mentioned in chapter 7.506 They do not present a list of 
all their partners, but I have compiled the information from their planning framework, 
which presents the actors they are involved with.  
 
Fourthly, the Lebanon-Support portal is an online resource, launched as a response to the 
July 2006 war.507 It was designed to enhance coordination between local NGOs, INGOs 
and international agencies involved with assistance in Lebanon. The portal continues to 
be updated and when I asked the Lebanese Ministry of Interior for a list of the NGOs in 
Lebanon, they directed me to this site.508 It includes a list of national NGOs, INGOs, 
UN/International Agencies and Social Development Centres. It also provides information 
about the projects which are run by each organisation, but this information is not 
available for all organisations. Even though the site recently improved their search 
system, it is not necessarily straightforward to gather exact information and receive the 
“full picture”. For example a search for national NGOs which work in “all [refugee] 
camps” will only show five NGOs, which is certainly not the accurate number. I have 
                                                 
505 Welfare Association and Norwegian People’s Aid 2000. 
506 Cf. pp. 93-94. 
507 Lebanon-Support Online. I compiled my list in November 2008. There might therefore be more recently 
updates which I have not included. 
508 E-mail correspondence with Ministry of Interior & Municipalities 06.03.09. 
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compiled my list on the basis of the project descriptions. This can not be all-inclusive 
since there might be organisations which work in the Palestinian community without 
providing information about it in this online resource, and there are a number of 
organisations without project description which may work in the Palestinian community. 
The Norwegian NGO NORWAC for example, is such an organisation. I have chosen to 
include in the list also the organisations that do not provide project information, but 
which I know for certain from the other sources are involved in the Palestinian 
community.   
 
Fifthly, I received a list of NGOs which were compiled of the Issam Fares Institute for 
Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. This 
institute launched a program called “Public Policy and Governance Challenges of 
Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab World” in February 2008. One of the aims of this 
program is to compile and maintain a database of NGOs and other active groups in the 
camps.509 
 
Sixthly, I present the information from the Ajial study which was mentioned in chapter 1.  
 
Lastly, Forced Migration Online (FMO) is an online resource which provides access to a 
variety of online resources dealing with the situation of forced migrants. FMO is 
coordinated by a team based at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. In 
2007 Sherifa Shafie made a research guide about Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which 
amongst other things included a list of NGOs. The guide is also offering links to a vast 
number of online resources concerning Palestinian refugees.510 
 
The organisations which are set in bold letters are INGOs. The year of establishment is 
compiled from the Ajial study, Jaber Suleiman’s article from 1997 and the WA and NPA 
guide from 2000. The word “yes” in the synopsis implies that the NGO is found in that 
source. 
                                                 
509 Issam Fares Institute Online. 
510 Shafie 2007. 
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Name of the 
NGO 
The 
Coord-
ination 
Forum  
   
 
1997 and 
2008 
WA and 
NPA 
Guide  
 
 2000 
ENGO 
report 
 
2007 
Lebanon 
Support 
 
2006- 
Issam 
Fares 
Institute, 
AUB 
 
2008 
Ajial 
Center 
 
2000 
Palestinian 
Refugees in 
Lebanon, 
Sherifa Shafie 
 
2006 
Year 
of est. 
 
‘l Association 
ASILES 
France 
    Yes    
Abna Al-
Qassam, Burj 
Al-Barajneh 
     Yes  1988 
Action Contre 
Le Faim, 
Spain, ACF-E 
  Yes      
Agency for 
Technical 
Cooperation 
and 
Development 
   Yes     
Aid Lebanon    Yes     
Al Irshad & Al 
Islah 
   Yes     
Al Karamah 
Association for 
Palestinian 
Disabled in 
Lebanon, Ain 
Al-Helweh 
   Yes     
Al Quds     Yes    
Al Rowwad 
Center, West 
Bank 
    Yes    
Al Sadaqa 
(friendship) 
Among People 
Association 
   Yes     
Al Shifaa 
Medical Center 
- North 
   Yes  Yes  1994 
 V 
Al-Aman 
Charitable 
Association; 
The Islamic 
Welfare 
Committee, Al- 
Buss Camp 
     Yes  1994 
Al-Ershad 
Association, 
Tyre 
     Yes  1986 
Al-Eslah 
Welfare 
Association 
(Al-Jalil), Al-
Jalil RC 
     Yes   
Al-Ghad Social 
Association 
   Yes     
Al-Khalsa 
Foundation, 
Tripoli, 
Lebanon 
    Yes Yes  1984 
American 
Near East 
Refugee Aid  
(ANERA) 
   Yes Yes    
Amnesty 
International 
      Yes  
Arab Resource 
Center for 
Popular Art, 
(ARCPA), 
Beirut 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1990 
Architects de l 
Urgence -  
Emergency 
Architects 
   Yes     
ARCI Cultura 
e Sviluppo 
   Yes     
Asamblea de 
Cooperacion 
por la Paz 
ACPP 
   Yes     
ASMAE    Yes     
 VI 
Association for 
Development of 
Palestinian 
Camps in 
Lebanon 
(AADPCL) – 
Lebanon (Same 
as Inash?) 
    Yes    
Association 
Libanaise pour l 
Education et la 
Formation 
   Yes     
Association 
Najdeh- 
Lebanon 
Yes Yes 
Yes, as 
Najdeh 
Yes, as 
Al-
Najdeh 
Associa-
tion 
Yes Yes 
Yes, as Najdeh 
Association 
1978, 
licensed 
1997 
AUB Public 
Health 
Department 
  Yes      
Aust Care 
Australia 
     Yes Yes  
Beir Al-Maqdes 
Center, Tyre, 
Lebanon 
    Yes Yes  1990 
Beneficence 
Association for 
the Detainees 
and Captives, 
Al-Jalil RC 
     Yes  1973 
Buds of the 
Future 
Institution, 
Tyre, Lebanon 
    Yes Yes  1994 
Canadian-
Palestinian 
Educational 
Exchange, 
Canada 
    Yes    
Caritas   Yes 
Yes, 
Caritas 
M.O.N.A 
coordin-
ation 
    
 VII 
Caritas 
Austria 
   Yes     
Catholic 
Agency for 
Overseas 
Development, 
CAFOD 
      Yes  
Centro de 
Solidaridad 
Social (CSS) or 
as written in 
English Social 
Solidarity 
Center, Ain Al-
Hilweh 
   Yes     
Centro 
Regionale 
d’Intervento 
per la 
Cooperazione 
(CRIC) Italy 
   Yes     
Charity Work 
Committee, 
Nahr Al-Bared 
     Yes   
Children and 
Youth Center – 
Shatila (same as 
Youth and 
Children center, 
Shatila?) 
 Yes  Yes   Yes 1997 
Christian Aid 
UK 
   Yes   Yes  
CIPS (maybe 
same as CISP?) 
  Yes      
Circuna 
Sweden 
   Yes     
CISS 
international 
   Yes     
 VIII 
Comitato 
Internazionale 
per lo 
Sviluppo dei 
Popoli, CISP 
  Yes   Yes   
Committee for 
the Assistance 
of Open Heart 
Patients, Nahr 
Al-Bared 
     Yes  1999 
Community 
Based 
Rehabilitation 
Association, 
CBRA 
  Yes      
Danish 
Church Aid 
   Yes     
Danish 
Refugee 
Council 
  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Department of 
Refugee 
Affairs, Mar 
Elias 
     Yes  1973 
Diakonia – 
Sweden – 
Jerusalem 
    Yes Yes   
Disable Revival 
Association 
 Yes  Yes   
YES, as 
Disabled 
Revival 
Association 
1989 
Disabled 
Union, Ain Al 
Hilweh 
     Yes  1992 
Enfants 
Refugies du 
Monde, France 
     Yes   
 IX 
ENGO- 
Coordination 
Group of 
European 
NGOs working 
with 
Palestinian 
refugees in 
Lebanon 
  Yes Yes     
Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung- 
Germany, 
Beirut 
    Yes Yes   
General Union 
of Palestinian 
Women 
(GUPW) 
 Yes  Yes 
YES, but 
oPt 
branch, 
Palest-
inian 
Women 
General 
Union – 
Gaza OPT 
Yes Yes 1972 
Handicap 
International, 
France 
  Yes Yes     
Handicapped 
Social 
Association 
Yes 
Yes, as 
Social 
Handi-
capped 
Assoc-
ation 
    
Yes, as Social 
Handicapped 
Association 
Licensed, 
1990 
Health Care 
Society 
 Yes  Yes   Yes 1997 
HOPING, UK     Yes    
Houleh Club 
Association 
 Yes      1973 
Human 
Appeal 
International 
     Yes   
License 
1988 Human Call 
Foundation 
 Yes  
Yes, as 
Human 
Call 
Assoc-
iation, 
Ain Al-
Hilweh 
 Yes  
(est. 
1986) 
Human 
Donation 
Society 
     Yes  1994 
Human Rights 
Watch 
   Yes   Yes  
 X 
Informatics 
Development 
Association 
 Yes      1986 
Information and 
Training 
Center, Mar 
Elias, Lebanon 
    Yes Yes  1988 
Institution of 
Humanitarian 
Information & 
Research / 
Lebanon 
Support  
   Yes     
International 
Center for 
Organizational 
Development  
(ICOD) 
   Yes     
International 
Committee of  
the Red Cross 
(ICRC) 
      Yes  
International 
Federation of 
Red Cross & 
Red Crescent 
Societies 
(IFRC/Fed) 
   Yes   Yes  
Irish Aid   Yes      
Islamic Relief 
Worldwide, 
UK 
   Yes     
Islamic Welfare 
Association 
   Yes    1985 
Islamic Youth 
Union 
Association, 
Tyre 
     Yes  1992 
 XI 
Joint Christian 
Committee 
JCC, Beirut 
Yes 
Yes, as 
Joint 
Chris-
tian 
Com-
mittee 
for 
Social 
Services 
 Yes  
Yes, as 
Joint 
Christian 
Comm-
ittee for 
Social 
Services 
Yes 1950 
Karama, West 
Bank oPt 
    Yes    
KG Resource 
and Training 
Center, Beirut, 
or as K.G. 
Training and 
Resource 
Centre 
(KGTRC) 
Yes Yes      
Licensed, 
1993 
Lebanese 
association for 
development Al 
Majmoua – 
Lebanon 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Local 
Rehabilitation 
Center (Nahr Al 
Bared) 
     Yes  1998 
Martyr Abu 
Jihad al-Wazir 
Institution 
 Yes   
Abou 
Jehad 
Alwazeer 
Handi-
capped 
Found-
ation 
Yes, as 
Abu 
Jihad Al-
Wazir 
Institu-
tion, 
Tyre 
Yes twice, as 
Abu jihad Al 
Wazir 
Institution 
(education) and 
Martyr Abu 
Jihad Al Wazir 
Institution 
(disabled) 
1992 
(1989) 
Medecins du 
Monde-France 
(MDM-F) 
   Yes     
Medical Aid 
For 
Palestinians 
(MAP) UK 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1984 
Medical fund 
for emergency 
cases, Beirut 
    Yes Yes  1998 
 XII 
Medicines sans 
frontiers – 
Switzerland 
    Yes Yes Yes  
Millenium 
Relief And 
Development 
Services 
(MRDS) 
Canada 
   Yes     
Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG) 
   Yes     
Monimondo 
(are not found, 
probably 
Movimondo, 
Italy? 
According to 
Lebanon 
support, not 
working with 
Palestinians the 
last period) 
     Yes   
Movimento 
por la Paz, el 
Desarme y la 
Libertad, 
(MPDL) 
  Yes 
Yes, but 
with no 
project 
infor-
mation 
  Yes  
Naba’a 
Association, 
Beirut -also 
know under the 
name 
Developmental 
Action Without 
Borders 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Yes, with the 
name DAWB 
2001 
Nabil Badran 
Centre for 
Disabled 
Children 
 Yes 
Yes, as 
Nabil 
Badran 
Center 
Yes   Yes 1995 
 XIII 
Nabila Breir 
Social 
Foundation 
 Yes  
Yes, as 
Nabila 
Breir 
Assoc-
iation 
(same e-
mail 
address as 
General 
Union of 
Palest-
inian 
Women) 
 Yes  1987 
National 
Association for 
Health, 
Educational and 
Social Services  
Yes 
Yes, as 
National 
Foun-
dation 
for 
Health, 
Social 
and 
Educa-
tional 
services 
    
YES, written as 
National 
Institute for 
Health, Social 
and Educational 
Services 
Licensed, 
1989 
National 
Association for 
Health-Social 
services and 
Vocational 
Training 
Yes     
Yes, (?) 
National 
Associ-
ation for 
Medical 
Services 
and 
Vocat-
ional 
Training, 
Al Beqaa 
 
Licensed, 
1989 
National 
Association For 
Medical 
Services Care 
And Vocational 
Training, 
Beddawi 
   Yes     
Netherlands 
Red Cross 
(NLRC) 
   Yes     
NGOs Platform 
of Saida 
(TAJAMOH) 
   Yes    1993 
                                                 
 
 
 XIV 
Norwegian Aid 
Committee, 
(NORWAC) 
   Yes  Yes   
Norwegian 
Institute for 
Social Sciences 
(Fafo) 
      Yes  
Norwegian 
People’s Aid 
(NPA) 
Yes, as 
observer 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Norwegian 
Refugee 
Council 
  Yes Yes   Yes  
Oxfam GB       Yes  
Palestine Red 
Crescent 
Society - 
Lebanon 
   Yes Yes Yes Yes 1968 
Palestinian 
Arab Center 
 Yes      1990 
Palestinian 
Arab Women 
League 
(PAWL), Beirut 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Yes, but 
written 
as 
Palestini
an Arab 
Women 
Union, 
Beirut 
Yes 
Licensed 
1956 
Palestinian 
Children and 
Youth 
Institution 
   Yes     
Palestinian 
Diaspora and 
Refugee Centre 
(SHAML) 
      Yes  
Palestinian 
Human Rights 
Organization, 
Beirut 
  Yes Yes Yes    
Palestinian 
Martyrs 
Association 
    Yes    
Palestinian 
Martyrs Works 
Society 
(Samed), Beirut 
Yes     
Palestin-
ian 
Martyrs 
Works 
Society 
(Samed), 
Beirut 
 
License 
1973 
 XV 
Palestinian 
Popular 
Committee, 
Beddawi 
   Yes     
Palestinian 
Scouts and 
Guides 
Association 
   Yes     
Palestinian 
Social and 
Cultural 
Society, Burj 
Al-Barajneh 
RC 
     Yes  1999 
Palestinian 
Social Cultural 
Association 
(same as 
Palestinian 
Social and 
Cultural 
Society, Burj 
Al- Barjaneh?) 
 Yes     Yes 1998 
Palestinian 
Student Fund, 
Beirut 
  Yes  Yes Yes  1973 
People In Need 
(PIN) Czech 
Republic 
   Yes     
Pharmaciens 
sans frontiers 
–France 
    Yes Yes   
Philantropic 
Martyr’s 
Association 
     Yes  1996 
Popular 
Committee, 
Mar Elias 
   Yes     
Popular 
Communication 
Committee, 
Burj Al 
Shamali 
     Yes  1998 
Premier 
Urgence (PU) 
France 
  Yes Yes     
Qatar Red 
Crescent 
   Yes     
 XVI 
Refugee Affairs 
Department 
   Yes  
YES, as 
Depart-
ment of 
Refugee 
Affairs, 
Mar 
Elias 
 1973 
Refugees 
International 
   Yes   Yes  
Resource 
Center for 
Palestinian 
residency and 
Refugee rights 
(Badil), West 
Bank 
      Yes  
Response 
International 
UK 
   Yes Yes  Yes  
Ricerca e 
Copperazione 
(RC) Italy 
  Yes Yes     
Sabra-Shatilla 
Memorial 
Scholarship 
Program 
(SSMSP) 
   Yes     
Sanabil 
Association for 
Relief and 
Development, 
Sidon, Lebanon 
    Yes Yes Yes 1994 
Save the 
Children 
Federation 
(UK) 
Yes, as 
observer 
(1997) 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Yes, 
international 
1984 (In 
Lebanon) 
Save the 
Children 
Sweden 
  Yes Yes   
Yes, 
international 
 
Sawa group    Yes    1990 
Social 
Association for 
the Disabled, 
Badawi 
     Yes  1996 
Social 
Association for 
the 
Rehabilitation 
of the 
Handicapped 
 Yes     Yes 1991 
 XVII 
Social Care 
Association 
 Yes    Yes  1982 
Social 
Communication 
Center (Ajial) 
 Yes  
YES, as 
Ajial 
Social 
Commni-
cation 
Center 
YES, as 
Statistics 
and 
Documen-
tation 
Office 
(Aijal 
Center), 
Beirut 
Yes Yes 
1968 
(or 1998 
as in NPA 
and WA 
guide) 
Social Help 
Association 
   Yes     
Solidarity 
Association for 
Social and 
Cultural 
Development 
   Yes    2005 
Swedish Team 
for 
Rehabilitation 
     Yes   
Swiss 
Palestinian 
Organisation 
for Research 
and 
Development – 
DROPS 
Switerland 
   Yes 
Yes, 
Tripoli, 
Lebanon 
   
Tamanna    Yes    2005 
Terre des 
Hommes Italy 
(Tdh It) 
   Yes  Yes Yes  
The 
Association for 
the 
Development of 
Palestinian 
Camps 
(Inaach), Beirut 
Yes Yes 
Yes, as 
Inaash 
Yes, as 
Inaash 
Yes, but 
written 
Al-Inash 
Yes Yes 1969 
The Ghassan 
Kanafani 
Cultural 
Foundation, 
(GKCF) Beirut 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1974 
 XVIII 
The Martyr 
Association, 
Sidon 
     Yes   
The National 
Association for 
Social Medical 
Care & 
Vocational 
Training 
(NAMSCVT), 
Beirut 
Yes Yes  
Yes, and 
also 
registered 
as 
National 
Associati
on of 
Medical 
Social 
Care and 
Vocat-
ional 
Training, 
NAMSC,
Beqaa, 
but with 
same e-
mail 
adress 
  Yes 
Founding 
date 1983 
as 
NAMSC 
The National 
Association for 
Vocational 
Training and 
Social services 
(NAVTSS), 
Mar Elias, 
Beirut  
(Formerly 
known as 
Vocational and 
Technical 
Training 
Committee and 
Vocational 
Development 
Social 
Association) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Founded, 
1983 (as 
VTTC) 
Regis-
tered 
1986 (as 
VDSA) 
lost 
Regis-
tration in 
1996 and 
re-
registered 
in 1999 
(as 
NAVTSS) 
 XIX 
The National 
Institution for 
Social Care & 
Vocational 
Training 
(NISCVT) – 
also known as 
Beit Atfal Al- 
Sumod, Beirut 
Yes Yes 
Yes, 
both as 
Beit 
Atfal 
Assou-
moud 
and 
NISCVT 
Yes, as 
National 
Institution 
of Social 
Care and 
Vocat-
ional 
Training 
(Beit 
Atfal 
Assu-
moud) 
NISCVT 
Yes, 
written  as 
National 
Assoc-
iation for 
Medical 
and Social 
Services 
(Al –
Soumoud) 
however, 
same 
manager 
as 
NISCVT 
and 
counted 
also as 
Beit Atfal 
Assomoud  
Yes, 
written 
as 
National 
Assoc-
iation for 
Medical 
and 
Social 
Services 
(Al-
Somoud) 
Yes, written 
twice? (as 
National 
Institute for 
Social Care and 
Vocational 
Training AND 
The National 
Institute of 
Social Care & 
Vocational 
Training) 
1976, 
licensed 
1980 
The Popular 
Aid for Relief 
and 
Development 
(PARD), Beirut 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1990 
(1985) 
The Zakat 
Charities, Ain 
Al-Hilweh 
     Yes  1988 
Un Ponte Per 
(UPP) Italy 
   Yes     
Universal 
Physicians 
     Yes   
Vocational and 
Developmental 
Association, 
Beirut 
Yes    
Yes, as 
Vocational 
and 
Develop-
mental 
Society, 
Beirut 
Yes  
1983, 
license 
1988 
Welfare 
Association, 
Beirut 
Yes, as 
observer 
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  1983 
Women Charity 
League – North 
Lebanon 
(WCL) 
   Yes    1945 
 XX 
Women’s 
Humanitarian 
Organization 
 Yes Yes 
Yes, 
twice as 
Women 
Humani-
tarian 
Organi-
zation  
and 
Palesti-
nian 
Women’s 
Human-
itarian 
Organi-
zation 
Yes Yes  1993 
World Vision 
Lebanon 
 Yes 
Yes, as 
World 
Vision 
Interna-
tional 
(WV) 
Yes  Yes Yes 
1985  (in   
Lebanon) 
Young Men 
Christian 
Association 
(YMCA) 
   Yes     
Youth and 
Children 
Center, Shatila 
RC 
     Yes  1987 
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Abu Jihad Al-Wazir Institute for the Disabled 
 
Al Karameh Association for Disabled 
 
Aidoun Group 
 
Arab NGOs Network for Development (ANND) 
 
Arab Organization for Disabled People (AODP) 
 
Assalam Social and Charity School (Salam) 
 
Association Najdeh 
 
Coordination Forum of NGOs Working Among Palestinian Community in Lebanon 
 
Development Action without Borders (NABAA) 
 
General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) 
 
Ghassan Kanafani Cultural Foundation (GKCF) 
 
Health Care Society (HCS) 
 
Human Development Center 
 
Inclusion International (II) 
 
Lana al-Mostakbal Association 
 
Lebanese Occupational Therapy Association (LOTA) 
 
Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union (LPHU) 
 
Lebanese Universitees [sic] League for the Blind (LULB) 
 
                                                 
511 NPA Lebanon Online (d). 
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Nabil Badran Special School for Disabled Children 
 
National Association for Medical Social Care and Vocational Training (NAMSCVT) 
 
National Association for the Rights of Disabled People (NARD) 
 
National Association for Vocational Training and Social Services (NAVTSS) 
 
National Institution of Social Care and Vocational Training (NISCVT) 
 
National Rehabilitation and Development Center (NRDC) 
 
Popular Aid for Relief and Development (PARD) 
 
Palestine Solidarity Association in Sweden 
 
Palestinian Student Fund (PSF) 
 
Society for the Care of the Disabled 
 
The Disabled Revival Society 
 
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) 
 
Women Humanitarian Organization 
 
Welfare Association for the Disabled 
 
Rehabilitation International (RI) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
